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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE
(NON)TREATY POWER
MICHAEL D. RAMSEY*

Executive agreements have played an increasingly important role
in the foreign affairs of the United States in the twentieth century.
These internationalagreements, sometimes involving obligations
of greatmagnitude, are concluded solely by the President,without
the assent of two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of Congress,
and have been given the force of law domestically. Although the
presidentialpower to enter into executive agreements has been
upheld by the Supreme Court, the authority for executive
agreements under the originalunderstandingof the Constitution is
commonly thought to be at best uncertain and perhaps entirely
absent. In this article, Professor Ramsey concludes that the
original constitutional design did include an independent
presidentialpower to undertake internationalobligations through
"nontreaty" agreements, but that this presidential authority was
limited in two significant ways. First, in the original view, the
power to conclude executive agreements extended only to minor
and temporary matters. Second, executive agreements, unlike
treaties, were not originally understood to be the supreme law of
the land of their own force; rather, they required legislative
implementation. Thus, as an original matter, ProfessorRamsey
concludes that although the President has the independent
authority to enter minor agreements, the Presidentdoes not have
the sole authority to bind the United States to significant
internationalobligationsor alter domestic law without some form
of legislativeparticipation.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Has the U.S. President the constitutional authority, without the
benefit of any action by the Senate or House, to conclude
international agreements on behalf of the United States? This power
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has been widely assumed in theory' and widely exercised in practice,2
but lacks a thorough explanation of its foundations. The U.S.
Constitution, of course, grants the President the "Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur ' 3 and provides that "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."4
Undertakings such as the North American Free Trade Agreement,
which have not commanded the assent of two-thirds of the Senate,
have produced a vigorous debate as to whether the legislative power
granted to the House and Senate together5 provides an alternate
route for the approval of international agreements by a majority vote
of the two chambers.' The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized a
third avenue: by virtue of the President's independent power in
foreign affairs, the President acting alone may enter into
international obligations having the force of law. The constitutional
viability of this third avenue has largely escaped detailed
consideration.
The matter is one of constitutional and diplomatic significance.
Important international commitments have been established on the
the de facto U.S.
independent authority of the President:
protectorate over the Dominican Republic in 1905,8 the agreements
leading to the diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, 9
1. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 303(4) (1987) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT (THIRD)"]; LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 219-24 (2d ed. 1996); Henry

P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 51-53
(1993).
2. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 219 ("Without the consent of the Senate (or
authorization or approval by both houses of Congress), Presidents from Washington to
Clinton have made many thousands of [international] agreements, differing in formality
and importance, on matters running the gamut of U.S. foreign relations.").
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
4. Id. art. VI.
5. See id. art. I, §§ 1, 8.
6. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARV. L.
REV. 801, 804 (1995); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1225-28
(1995).
7. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1981); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203,229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,330 (1937).
8. See Exchange of Notes at Santo Domingo Regarding Collection and
Disbursement of Customs Revenues, Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1905, U.S.-Dom. Rep., 7
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1949, at 193 (Charles I.
Bevans ed., 1971).
9. See Exchange of Notes at Washington Regarding General Relations, Nov. 16,
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the "destroyers-for-bases" arrangement with Great Britain in 1940,10
the Yalta Agreement in 1945," and the U.S. undertakings relating to
the peace settlement between Egypt and Israel 2 are a few of the
more prominent examples. In more recent years, President Clinton's
1997 understanding with Russia regarding NATO expansion into
Eastern Europe was reached (amid some criticism) without
submission to the House or Senate. 3 Thus the independent
executive agreement presents a constitutional issue of some practical
magnitude. 4
This Article considers whether it is possible to identify an
"executive agreement"' 5 power based upon the original
understanding of the Constitution. As set forth below, I conclude
that the original understanding did include an independent
presidential power to undertake international obligations.
I
conclude, however, that this presidential power was limited in two
respects. First, it extended only to minor, short term agreements.
Second, unlike treaties, international obligations undertaken by the
President alone lacked the status of law in the domestic legal system,
and thus required
legislative enactment
for domestic

1933, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 11 Bevans 1249 [hereinafter Litvinov Agreement].
10. See Exchange of Notes at Washington Regarding Leasing of Naval Air Bases,
Sept. 2, 1940, U.S.-U.K., 54 Stat. 2405; see also Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in
Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940) (advising that the
President had the authority to make an executive agreement to exchange destroyers for
bases).
11. See Report Signed at Crimea (Yalta) Conference, Feb. 11, 1945, U.S.-U.K.U.S.S.R., 59 Stat. 1823, 3 Bevans 1005 [hereinafter Yalta Agreement].
12. See Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Assurances, Consultations, and U.S.
Policy on Middle East Peace, Feb. 27, 1976, U.S.-Isr., 32 U.S.T. 2150; Memorandum of
Agreement Regarding Middle East Peace, Feb. 27,1976, U.S.-Isr., 32 U.S.T. 2160.
13. See Henry Kissinger, Editorial, The Dilution of NATO, WASHINGTON POST, June
8, 1997, at C9.
14. See Covey Oliver, Speculations About the Future of Sole Executive Agreements in
the Twenty-First Century, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191, 192 (1997) (suggesting
that presidential authority to make executive agreements may become a substantial point
of interbranch controversy in the future).
15. Terminology is important but unfortunately not standardized in this area. I use
the term "executive agreement" to refer to an international agreement concluded by the
President without explicit approval or authorization by either two-thirds of the Senate or
a majority of the two Houses. I use the term "congressional-executive agreement" to
mean an international agreement approved by a majority of both Houses (but not twothirds of the Senate) and "Article II treaty" to indicate an international agreement
approved by two-thirds of the Senate as set forth in Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution. By "international agreement," I mean any understanding between the
United States and a foreign nation, regardless of the domestic procedure by which it is
approved.
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implementation. 6
This view is contrary to the conclusions of both sides of the
conventional debate regarding executive agreements. On the one
hand, originalist writings, most prominently associated with Raoul
Berger, deny that executive agreements were part of the original
constitutional design and assign an exclusive role in the formation of
international accords to the treaty clause of Article II, Section 2.17 In
contrast, the prevailing modem view, identified with such leading
figures as Louis Henkin, bases an independent presidential power to
enter into international agreements upon post-constitutional practice
and the exigencies of modem diplomacy rather than upon a direct
refutation of Berger and his allies. 8 This modem view further
assumes that, as executive agreements and Article II treaties have
equal constitutional validity, their effect within the domestic legal
system should similarly be equivalent. 9 Thus, giving the President
16. I make no claim as to the conclusiveness of this result for the contemporary
constitutionality of executive agreements-a matter I leave to general theorists of
constitutional interpretation. However, I proceed from the widespread observation that
the original understanding of the document is at least relevant as a starting point for our
modem interpretation.
17. See RAouL BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 14056 (1974); Raoul Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 55 (1972); see also David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution and ForeignAffairs, in
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19, 27-32
(David Gray Adler & Larry George eds., 1996) (arguing that in the original
understanding all international agreements required approval under the treaty clause).
18. See, e.g., HENKIN, supranote 1, at 219-24; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654,678-81 (1981).
19. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-81; HENKIN, supra note 1, at 219-24.
In saying that an international agreement has "domestic legal effect," I mean that it alters
rights and obligations as a matter of U.S. law. This status is distinct from its creation as
international law. Consider, as an example, a hypothetical rapprochement between the
United States and Cuba that includes a settlement of U.S. claims arising from the postrevolutionary nationalizations of the Castro government. The U.S. President may be
willing to accept a deeply compromised settlement of these claims in pursuit of diplomatic
and geostrategic advantage. Suppose, however, that Congress is unwilling to support such
a compromise. Can the President effect a settlement agreement without the participation
of the House or Senate? Evidently the initial question is whether the President has
independent authority to make an agreement with Cuba (and thus bind the United States
in international law). But even if the President has that power, if unsatisfied private
parties continue to hold claims against the Castro government under U.S. law, the claims
would remain unsettled as a practical matter regardless of the formal content of the
international agreement. To have truly independent power to achieve the settlement, the
President also needs to terminate these private legal rights under U.S. law. Of course, the
President could seek implementing legislation-but that requires the assent of Congress
which, by hypothesis, may be unavailable. Thus, the President needs the settlement
agreement-either by its own force or through an implementing executive order-to have
"domestic legal effect": i.e., to terminate existing private rights without the aid of
implementing legislation. As described below, this effect is given "treaties" by the
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the power to create international agreements is thought, more or less
automatically, to carry with it corresponding domestic lawmaking
power.
My thesis is that each of these views is flawed in important
respects. The conventional originalist argument is far too quick to
assign exclusivity to the procedure of Article II, Section 2, and the
modern pro-executive view is far too quick to concede that point as
an original matter and fall back upon arguments derived from
practice and evolution. Rather, the text and structure of the
Constitution, combined with the historical usage of the relevant
phrases in international law, suggest that the founding generation
recognized a class of nontreaty "agreements" falling within the
President's independent power. This understanding is confirmed by
diplomatic practice in the early years of the Constitution's operation,
which accepted without debate such an independent presidential
power. Moreover, the modern view is flawed (as an original matter)
in assuming that the independent presidential power to conclude
international agreements implies the independent presidential power
to implement them domestically. The original understanding appears
to have been otherwise. Indeed, the very evidence and arguments
that indicate a presidential power to conclude international
agreements within the original design also show that incorporation of
those agreements into domestic law would have been understood to
require the participation of the legislative branch. The executive
power in this area, as originally conceived, is therefore greater than
conventionally assumed in originalist writing yet less extensive than
its modern assertion.
I begin in Part II with an overview of the present law. This
discussion illustrates that the President's power to conclude and
implement international agreements is generally assumed in the
conventional modern analysis, but that this view is not based upon
investigation of the original understanding of the Constitution. I next
consider, as an original matter, the scope of the relevant presidential
authority. In Part III, I argue that the treaty power as defined in
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution was not understood to
encompass the entire range of agreements between the United States
and foreign nations. Rather, I conclude that a class of agreements,
which I will call "nontreaty" agreements, can be identified as well. In
Part IV, I address the distinction between treaties and nontreaty
Supremacy Clause of Article VI; the question is whether a nontreaty agreement (such as
the hypothetical agreement with Cuba) also has this effect.

1998]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

agreements and conclude that, while the distinction may not be clear
in all respects, general parameters may be identified which indicate
that many of the nontreaty powers claimed by the modern President
fall within the original understanding of the "nontreaty" power.
Specifically, in the original design, short-term agreements, or ones
with limited executory components, were not considered "treaties"
subject to the procedures of Article II, Section 2. In Part V, I argue
that the nontreaty power was understood to lie within the
independent authority of the President. Finally, in Part VI, I show
that each of the arguments supporting the President's nontreaty
authority fail to support-and indeed directly refute-a claim that
executive agreements were originally understood to affect the
domestic legal system. I conclude, therefore, that the President's
"nontreaty" power, as originally understood, did not include the
power to preempt or supersede inconsistent state or federal law, or
otherwise alter private legal rights.
II. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE MODERN CONSENSUS

Overview
Modem consensus lodges with the President the independent
power, at least in some circumstances, to enter into international
agreements and to incorporate those agreements into domestic law.
Louis Henkin, the pre-eminent voice in the field, observes:

A.

The

President

can

... make

many

[international]

agreements on his own authority, including, surely, those
related to establishing and maintaining diplomatic relations,
agreements settling international claims, and military
agreements within the Presidential authority as Commander
in Chief. There are doubtless many other 'sole' agreements
within the President's foreign affairs powers, but which they
are is hardly agreed.2"
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law confirms that "the
President, on his own authority, may make an international
agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent
powers under the Constitution."'" Moreover, in this view, executive
20. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 229.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 1, § 303(4) nn.7 & 11. The executive branch
has asserted:
The President may conclude an international agreement on any subject
within his constitutional authority so long as the agreement is not inconsistent
with legislation enacted by the Congress in the exercise of its constitutional
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agreements, like treaties, are the supreme law of the land. "If one
sees the Treaty Power as basically a Presidential power (albeit
subject to check by the Senate) there is no compelling reason for
giving less effect to agreements that [the President] has authority to
make without the Senate."'
The modern consensus rests largely upon three Supreme Court
cases: United States v. Belmont23 in 1937; United States v. Pink24 in
1942; and Dames & Moore v. Regan'5 in 1981. Each held that, at least
under the particular circumstances presented, an international
agreement concluded solely upon the authority of the President was a
constitutional exercise of power that altered domestic legal rights.2 6
Other judicial discussions of the subject are limited. Lower courts
have treated the matter summarily on the authority of Pink and
Belmont, and thus have assumed a presidential power to enter into
executive agreements27 and to give those agreements domestic legal
authority. The constitutional sources of authority for the President to conclude
international agreements include ... the President's authority as Chief
Executive to represent the nation in foreign affairs.
The Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong. 178 (1985) [hereinafter Committee on Foreign
RelationsHearing].
22. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 228; see also Monaghan, supra note 1, at 53 ("[T]he
President's 'specific' constitutional powers, such as the Commander-in-Chief power and
the powers 'implied' from presidential duties, now (whatever the original understanding)
imply some independent presidential law-making power [by executive agreements].").
23. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
24. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
25. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See United States v. Walczak, 783 F.2d 852, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Supreme
Court has recognized that of necessity the President may enter into certain binding
agreements with foreign nations not strictly congruent with the formalities required by
the Constitution's Treaty Clause.... [C]onstitutionally valid executive agreements are to
be applied by the courts as the law of the land ....
" (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S.
25, 30 (1982); Pink, 315 U.S. at 230)); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 812 (1st Cir. 1981) (relying on Pink and Belmont to uphold
executive agreement between the United States and Iran); Ozanic v. United States, 188
F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951) ("The constitutional power of the President extends to the
settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government and the United States, at least
when it is an incident to the recognition of that government; and it would be unreasonable
to circumscribe it to such controversies." (citing Pink and Belmont)); Security Pac. Nat'l
Bank v. Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864,873 (C.D. Cal. 1981) ("This particular use of the executive
agreement power has been affirmed both by the courts and by history." (citing Pink and
Belmont)); Unidyne Corp. v. Government of Iran, 512 F. Supp. 705, 708 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(citing Pink to uphold executive agreement between the United States and Iran); Guerra
v. Guajardo, 466 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (S.D. Tex. 1978) ("It has long been recognized that
the President has the power to enter into international agreements without the need of
acquiring the Senate's permission." (citing Belmont)), affd mem., 597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir.
1979); Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (D. Kan.) (relying on Pink and Belmont to

1998]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

effect at least to the extent of overriding inconsistent state law.28

Similarly, academic commentary has for the most part not addressed
the constitutional matter in detail.

As indicated, influential

commentators have assumed without elaborate inquiry the
constitutionality of executive agreements, again in large part on the
authority of Pink and Belmont.29 To the extent that commentary
endorsing such agreements has moved beyond a summary or
description of existing practice, it has been largely confined to
political rather than constitutional analysis.3 0
Debate concerning the exclusiveness vel non of Article II,
uphold executive agreement between the United States and Hungary), affd on other
grounds, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977).
28. See supra note 27. At least two cases have suggested some limits on the executive
agreement power to override inconsistent federal law. In United States v. Guy W. Capps
Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds,348 U.S. 296 (1955), the Fourth
Circuit declined to give an executive agreement preemptive force over a pre-existing
federal statute on the grounds that the subject matter in question-foreign commercewas within the exclusive domain of Congress. See id. at 659-61. In Swearingen v. United
States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Col. 1983), the court declined to give effect to an executive
agreement that conflicted with the Internal Revenue Code, without any reference to
Belmont and related cases. In material part, the court said only: "Treaty provisions are
the supreme law of the land and, depending on the subject matter, may supersede prior
inconsistent acts of Congress.... The same cannot be said of executive agreements
which, unlike treaties, require no Senate ratification and are not directly authorized by or
described in the Constitution." Id. at 1021 (citing Guy W. Capps, 204 F.2d at 659-61).
29. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 228-29; Monaghan, supra note 1, at 51-53; see also
Evan Todd Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power: Constitutional
Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 168-75 (1985)
(setting forth circumstances in which the President may use the settlement power).
30. See, e.g., LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE 158-64 (1984) (recounting efforts by Congress
to limit exercise of the executive agreement power); LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN POLICY (1986) (discussing the
political ramifications of the use of executive agreements); STEPHEN M. MILLET, THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:

ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V.

BELMONT (1990) (discussing the historical development of the executive agreement
power in connection with the Belmont decision without rendering a comprehensive
opinion upon its constitutionality); Honor6 Marcel Catudal, Executive Agreements: A
Supplement to the Treaty-Making Procedure, 10 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 669 (1942)
(arguing for the executive agreement as an effective instrument of foreign policy); Arthur
W. Rovine, Separation of Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J.
397, 406-07 (1977) (same). An exception is MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIPLOMACY 177-91 (1990), which considers the constitutional issues in some detail
(although in a relatively brief passage). The most extensive constitutional treatment of
executive agreements is Bloom, supra note 29; however, Bloom largely assumes the
constitutionality of (some) executive agreements and is primarily concerned with whether
the President has exclusive authority with respect to such agreements. See id. at 166-75.
For a powerful functional critique of the modern use of executive agreements, see Joel R.
Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86
CAL. L. REV. 671, 678-81, 722-26 (1998).
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Section 2 as a procedure for forming international accords has
instead focused upon the constitutionality of so-called
"congressional-executive
agreements"-that
is, international
agreements concluded on the authority of the President plus a
majority of both Houses of Congress, but lacking the two-thirds of
the Senate putatively required by Article II, Section 2.31 These
agreements became a substantial issue during and after World War
II, driven by the perception that the agreements then envisioned to
establish the postwar international order (principally the U.N.
Charter, the IMF Agreement, and GATr) could command a
majority of both Houses but not a supermajority of the Senate. 2
While Pink and Belmont, and the executive agreement power
generally, were discussed in the context of this debate, they were
rightly seen as not directly relevant. 33
Defenders of the
congressional-executive agreement did not need to establish an
independent presidential power, because such advocates additionally
relied upon the legislative powers of Congress, while opponents of
the congressional-executive agreement for the same reason could not
carry the day simply by discrediting sole executive agreements.
Nonetheless, the postwar debate is critical to the modern view of
executive agreements.
The proponents of the congressionalexecutive agreement-and thus of the nonexclusive view of Article
31. For arguments in favor of the congressional-executive agreement, see EDWARD
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 234-47 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1984) (1940);
WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC
PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 254-64 (1941); Myres
S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 186-88
(pt. 1), 534, 535-36 (pt. 2) (1945); Quincey Wright, The United States and International
Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 355 (1944). The counterattack is principally
identified with Professor Edwin Borchard. See Edwin Borchard, Shall the Executive
Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664, 666-67 (1944) [hereinafter Borchard,
Shall the Executive Agreement]; Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-a
Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 624-28 (1945) [hereinafter Borchard, Reply]. Despite some
loose terminology (especially in the titles), the focus of this debate was a presidential
agreement concluded with the approval of Congress, not (as occurred in Belmont) one
concluded solely upon presidential authority. The debate over congressional-executive
agreements has been renewed in the context of the North American Free Trade
Agreement.
Compare Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 804-05 (favoring
congressional-executive agreements), with Tribe, supra note 6, at 1225-28 (opposing
congressional-executive agreements).
32. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 861-96.
33. See Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement, supra note 31, at 680-82; McDougal
& Lans, supra note 31, at 311-13; see also MCCLURE, supra note 31, at 354-64 (relying on
the power of President-plus-Congress as an alternative to the Article II, Section 2
procedure for international agreement-making).
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II, Section 2-generally prevailed: the U.N. Charter, the IMF
Agreement, and GATT were approved as congressional-executive
agreements without lingering constitutional objection.34 Under cover
of that victory, the assumed legitimacy of the sole executive
agreement-and of Pink and Belmont-arose." Yet there are
considerable differences between the two types of agreements, as
defenders of the congressional-executive agreements ultimately
acknowledge.3 6 Acceptance of one plainly does not compel
acceptance of the other. The thorough scholarly defenses of the
congressional-executive agreement (a matter beyond the scope of
this Article) do not amount to authority for the constitutionality of
sole executive agreements. Hence, the modem consensus concerning
on executive agreements rests, largely unadorned, upon the triad of
Belmont, Pink, and Dames & Moore.
The pre-eminence of Belmont and related cases is critical in two
respects. First, as discussed below, these cases do not investigate the
original understanding of the executive agreement power. Second,
they do not make clear that the President asserted two distinct
powers: (1) the authority to enter into international agreements, and
(2) the authority to give those agreements legislative effect to alter
rights and obligations established under domestic law.
These errors have infected much of the subsequent consensus
with respect to executive agreements. First, most defenses of
executive agreements essentially concede that, as Raoul Berger and
his allies have argued, no original basis for the power exists. Instead,
the conventional acceptance of executive agreements rests largely
upon an argument from constitutional evolution and modern
exigency. 7 The result, however, is that no consensus exists as to the

34. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 873-96 (discussing evolution of the
conventional view).
35. Indeed, the terms of the debate often obscured the distinction between the two
types of agreements.
Wallace McClure's International Executive Agreements:
DemocraticProcedure Under the Constitution of the United States, a major brief for the
postwar accords, recounts the history of agreement-making outside the parameters of
Article II, Section 2, yet does not acknowledge a serious constitutional distinction
between agreements that had the approval of Congress and those that did not. See
MCCLURE, supra note 31, at 35-100. See generally Paul, supra note 30, at 742-58
(recounting the growing acceptance of executive agreements and congressional-executive
agreements during and after World War II).
36. See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 919-24 (relying on power granted
to Congress under Article I to support conclusion of agreements outside Article II,
Section 2); McDougal & Lans, supra note 31, at 238-44 (appealing to power granted to
Congress by the Constitution in support of congressional-executive agreements).
37. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 219-24.
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appropriate scope of the executive agreement power. Most observers
would conclude, as does Henkin, that the executive agreement power
cannot be fully interchangeable with the Article II, Section 2 power:
"As a matter of constitutional construction ... that view is

unacceptable, for it would wholly remove the 'check' of Senate
consent which the Framers struggled and compromised to write into
the Constitution. ' 38
However, cut off from any original
understanding of the scope of the executive agreement power by the
premature concession of its original illegitimacy, the modem view has
been unable to articulate any satisfactory limits upon it. "One is
compelled to conclude," Henkin continues, "that there are
agreements which the President can make on his sole authority and
others which he can make only with the consent of the Senate (or of
both houses), but neither Justice Sutherland [in Belmont] nor anyone
else has told us which are which."39
Second, most defenses of executive agreements follow Belmont
in describing a single presidential power: the authority to enter into
4
international obligations having (where necessary) the force of law.
It has not been systematically contemplated that-as I argue belowthe President might have the power to enter into executive
agreements but not have the power to implement them domestically.
The unification of these powers is, however, by no means a logical
necessity. In the case of treaties and congressional-executive
agreements, these powers are in the U.S. system necessarily
indiscrete, by operation of the Supremacy Clause in the case of
treaties and, in the case of congressional-executive agreements,
because the obligation is undertaken by the organs of government
which also possess the ordinary legislative power. In other legal
systems in which the power to undertake international obligations is
separated from ordinary legislative powers, such obligations may not
carry the force of law; they may be, in the language of international
lawyers, not "self-executing."'" The error in Belmont of conflating
the two powers obscures the importance of considering whether, with
respect to independent executive agreements, this might not also
have been our intended system.

38. Id. at 222; see also GLENNON, supra note 30, at 166-75 (arguing for limited scope
of executive agreement power); Monaghan, supra note 1, at 51-53 (same).
39. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 222.
40. See id. at 226-30; McDougal & Lans, supra note 31, at 311-13.
41. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCriON TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-99 (2d ed.
1993); see also infra Part VI (discussing non-self-executing treaties under English law).
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B.

The Supreme Court and Executive Agreements
Because the Belmont-Pink-Dames & Moore triad is central to
the modem acceptance of executive agreements, some attention to
the reasoning of that line of cases is warranted. As described below,
none of these cases proceeds from an examination of the text, history,
and structure of the Constitution. Therefore, one seeking to establish
a defense of the executive agreement power in the original
understanding of the Constitution cannot draw comfort from these
decisions. Since these decisions constitute essentially the entire basis
of the modem consensus concerning the legitimacy of executive
agreements, that consensus is not derived from an original
understanding of the Constitution.
Furthermore, consideration of these decisions illustrates the
difficulty of conflating two distinct powers: (1) the power to create
international obligations binding upon the United States as a matter
of international law, and (2) the power to implement such
international obligations as a matter of U.S. law, such that they
supersede existing inconsistent U.S. law and provide the basis for
altering private legal rights within the U.S. legal system. As
developed in subsequent sections, that error flows from the failure to
consider the original understanding of the executive agreement
power, for that understanding illustrates that these are independent
powers which may be (and were initially understood to be)
structurally separated.
1. United States v. Belmont
In 1933, President Roosevelt recognized the government of the
Soviet Union, which had been unacknowledged by the United States
since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.42
In connection with
recognition, the two governments entered into an agreement to
resolve a number of issues between them. Among these issues were
the claims of the United States and U.S. citizens against the Soviet
government and the claims of the Soviet government against the
United States and U.S. residents. The former principally consisted of
claims for U.S. property nationalized in the Soviet Union following
the revolution; the latter principally consisted of claims against the
U.S. government for its participation in the multilateral intervention
in Siberia in 1918.41 Critical to Belmont, the latter category also
42. For a detailed analysis of the events leading to Pink and Belmont, see
supranote 30, at 1-115.
43. See id. at 28.
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included Soviet claims on property in the United States owned by
Russian nationals that the Soviet Union had purportedly nationalized
by post-revolutionary decree but over which it had been unable to
secure physical control. Pursuant to the agreement accompanying
recognition (known as the Litvinov Agreement after the principal
Soviet negotiator),44 the United States waived its claims against the
Soviet Union in return for a Soviet waiver of the Siberian claims and
an assignment to the U.S. government of the Soviet claims to
purportedly nationalized property located in the United States. 5
Roosevelt never asked for or received authority from either house of
Congress to conclude the Litvinov Agreement.
Some time after the signing of the Agreement, the U.S.
government identified certain nationalized property in the
custodianship of August Belmont4 6 a New York banker, and sought
its recovery. However, the government faced a problem: under New
York law, nationalization decrees operated only territorially.
Property situated in New York (as was that held by Belmont) could
not be affected by the Soviet nationalization decree, and title
remained with its original owner. 47 Since the Litvinov Agreement
assigned to the United States only the Soviet interest, and since the
Soviets, under New York law, had no interest in the subject property,
it appeared that the United States could not have succeeded to any
interest. The United States responded that the conclusion of the
Litvinov Agreement recognized the validity of the Soviet
nationalization, giving the Soviets (and derivatively the United
States) title to the property.4 Belmont's motion to dismiss was
granted by the lower court, and the case reached the U.S. Supreme
49
Court as United States v. Belmont.
Without the Litvinov Agreement, Belmont's argument would
have seemed unassailable: a private party purchasing all of the
Soviet Union's interest in the subject property would have received
44. Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
45. See Litvinov Agreement, supra note 9, 11 Bevans at 1257-58. The Agreement
also covered a variety of other topics, including an agreement on trade credits and a
Soviet commitment to curtail the circulation of revolutionary propaganda. See id. at
1248-53; MILLET, supra note 30, at 45-50.
46. Or, more precisely, in the custodianship of Belmont's executors, Belmont having
died prior to the commencement of the case. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
325-26 (1937). For convenience I call the defendant/respondent in the ensuing case
"Belmont."
47. See Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co. v. New York Trust Co., 189 N.E. 456, 465 (N.Y.
1934).
48. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
49. See i&L at 324-26.

1998]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

the interest recognized by applicable (i.e., New York) law-namely,
nothing. Had the Litvinov Agreement been concluded as a treaty
under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, its terms would have
preempted New York law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI.50 The Belmont case thus turned upon (1) whether the
Litvinov Agreement represented a constitutional exercise of the
President's power, and (2) if so, whether the Agreement had the
force of a treaty in domestic law such that it preempted the New
York rule on which Belmont sought to rely. The Court ruled in the
affirmative on both points: "while this rule [supremacy over preexisting law] in respect of treaties is established by the express
language of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would
result in the case of all international compacts and agreements." 51
Much of Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court is not
relevant to present purposes: 52 the opinion devoted only three
50. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 209-10 (1796) (concluding that the 1783
treaty with Great Britain preempted inconsistent state laws relating to debts owed British
citizens).
51. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
52. The case raised two distinct issues which the Court separately addressed:
whether the Litvinov Agreement superseded New York law and whether the Agreement
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 327, 332 (identifying the two
issues); id. at 332-33 (discussing the latter issue). The latter issue would, of course, have
been present regardless of the method of approving the Agreement, see Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (concluding that individual rights protections of the Constitution
apply to international agreements), and thus is not germane to the present inquiry. The
later portions of Sutherland's opinion take up this issue. In addition, the initial portion of
the opinion discusses the so-called "act of state" doctrine, which does not appear relevant
to any issue raised in the case. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Decipheringthe Act of State
Doctrine,35 VILL. L. REV.1, 18-22 (1990) (discussing Belmont's relationship to the act of
state doctrine). Under the act of state doctrine, "the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326
(paraphrasing Underhill,168 U.S. at 252); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,
303 (1918) (quoting Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252). This doctrine meant that U.S. courts
would accept wholly foreign nationalizations as valid transfers of title. New York courts
applied a similar rule. See, e.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 186 N.E. 679
(N.Y. 1933). Thus a nationalization occurring wholly within the Soviet Union would have
been recognized in New York. That issue was not relevant in Belmont. the property in
question had been located in New York at all times, and that made the Soviet
nationalization an extraterritorial act not subject to Underhill's protection. As Justice
Stone said in concurrence: "If the subject of the transfer were ...located in Russia, we
may assume that the validity of the seizure would be recognized here." Belmont, 301 U.S.
at 333 (Stone, J., concurring) (citing Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302-03). Justice Stone continued:
"But this Court has often recognized that a state may refuse to give effect to a transfer,
made elsewhere, of property which is within its own territorial limits if the transfer is in
conflict with its public policy." Belmont, 301 U.S. at 334 (Stone, J.,concurring). In any
event, the discussion is of no moment to the present inquiry: if the Soviet nationalizations
had been protected by Underhill, then they would have been protected with or without
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paragraphs5 3 to the presidential power to enter into the Litvinov
Agreement. That discussion is almost wholly ipse dixit. In the first
paragraph, Sutherland stated without citation that the President's
power to enter into the Agreement "may not be doubted."54 In a
similarly conclusory vein, Sutherland continued:
[I]n respect of what was done here, the Executive had
authority to speak as the sole organ of that government.
The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith
did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the
treaty making clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2),
require the advice and consent of the Senate.'
The paragraph contains no further discussion or explanation as to
why advice and consent was not required.
In the second paragraph, Justice Sutherland cited two authorities
in support of the conclusions of the preceding paragraph: the Court's
prior decision in B. Altman & Co. v. United States56 and a section of
John Bassett Moore's A Digest of InternationalLaw.57 Altman, a

1912 decision involving the construction of the word "treaty" in the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act, at best implied approval of
congressional-executive agreements." Moore's 1906 Digest reported
(without constitutional commentary) the then-existing presidential

the Litvinov Agreement; if not, nothing in the Oetjen-Underhillline of cases has any
relevance to the constitutional procedures for making international agreements (since
none of these cases even remotely implicated an international agreement). See generally
Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and ForeignSovereign Obligations,39 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1, 13-16, 22-23 (1998) (discussing application of the Underhillrule).
53. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32 (specifically, the three paragraphs following the
discussion of A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (Eng. C.A.), an act of
state case, and preceding the discussion of the takings issue).
54. Id. at 330.
55. Id
56. 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912).
57. 5 JOHN BASsETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 210-21 (1906).
58. The Circuit Court of Appeals Act gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over
appeals involving, among other matters, the interpretation of "treaties." See Circuit
Court of Appeals Act, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891). Altman involved the interpretation of an
agreement entered into by the President under the authority of the Trade Act of 1897, but
not approved pursuant to Article II, Section 2. See Altman, 224 U.S. at 583-602. The
United States argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, as the subject
agreement was not a "treaty" under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act; however, no party
argued that the agreement was constitutionally invalid. See id. at 584-93. The Court
determined that the word "treaty" in the Court of Appeals Act was intended by Congress
to include the subject agreement. See id. at 600-01. This result says nothing about the
meaning of "treaty" in the Constitution, and to the extent it implies approval of a process
outside Article II, Section 2, it relates only to congressional-executive agreements, which
are distinct from the matter under consideration. See supra note 15.
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practice of entering into various minor agreements without Senate
approval.59 In short, neither authority indicates, as a matter of
constitutional text, structure, or history, that the President had an
independent power to conclude executive agreements.
In his third and final paragraph on the subject, Justice
Sutherland addressed the domestic effect of the executive agreement.
He began with the (uncontroversial) proposition that
the external powers of the United States are to be exercised
without regard to state laws or policies.... Within the field
of its powers, whatever the United States rightfully
undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And
when judicial authority is invoked in aid of such
consummation, state constitutions, state laws, and state
policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision. It is
inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as an
obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional
power. 0
In support, Sutherland adduced authority relating to the Article
II, Section 2 treaty power: the Supremacy Clause, a comment by
Madison on the importance of the supremacy of treaties, and three
cases to the same effect.61 These authorities are, of course, beside the

point: no one suggested that the Litvinov Agreement, had it been
approved by the Senate, could not have preempted New York law.
Despite Sutherland's efforts to characterize it otherwise, Belmont
was not a case about federalism and state versus federal power. No
one asserted that the New York law could be "an obstacle to the
effective operation of a federal constitutional power;" and no one
denied that the entry into a settlement agreement with the Soviet
Union upon the procedure specified in Article II, Section 2 would
have been a "federal constitutional power." The issue was whether
the Litvinov Agreement, despite bypassing the Article II, Section 2
procedure, was an exercise of "federal constitutional power." That is
an issue of intrafederal separation of powers: which federal
institutions are allocated the ability to exercise a concededly federal
59. See 5 MOORE, supra note 57, at 210-21. Moore did not offer a constitutional
defense of executive agreements, but merely described existing practice. See id. Few of
Moore's examples of executive agreements reached even before the Civil War, and none
extended to a period anywhere near the ratification of the Constitution. See id. Thus,
Moore was authority for the proposition that Belmont did not claim a novel power of
concluding international agreements, but his work did not provide any insight into an
original understanding of the "nontreaty" power.
60. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32.
61. See id. at 330-31.
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power? The treaty power expressed in Article II, Section 2 thus
actually tends to undermine Sutherland's conclusion (as it suggests
that a Senate role might be required), and none of the references
discussed by Sutherland lend his conclusion any material support.
The foregoing exhausts Sutherland's authorities, save one. That
authority merits additional attention: the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Co.62 Curtiss-Wright,one of
the Court's most widely cited (and widely criticized)6" foreign affairs
decisions, was not a case about international agreements. Rather,
Sutherland cited it for the proposition-"that complete power over
international affairs is in the national government"4---which was not
an issue in Belmont (the question there being not whether the federal
government had the power to do what was done, but which part of
that government-President or President-plus-Senate-had that
power). But Curtiss-Wright is illustrative of the thinking that
underlies Belmont. Decided less than a year earlier by essentially the
same Court and also written by Sutherland, the decision concerned a
congressional act giving the President discretion to impose arms
embargoes on countries involved in hostilities. 65 The defendant,
prosecuted for violation of an embargo, argued that this was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch. The Court, per Sutherland, thought otherwise. The
President, Sutherland said, inherently had "plenary" power in foreign
affairs, in which the President was (in a phrase reused in Belmont)
the "sole organ" of the nation; because the President already had
broad powers in foreign affairs, the nondelegation doctrine had
limited application in the field.67
This conclusion proceeded from two propositions.
First,
according to Sutherland, all powers related to foreign affairs are
committed to the national government, not by the Constitution but
by the inherent attributes of national sovereignty. 68 Second, within
62. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
63. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 30, at 18-27; David M. Levitan, The Foreign
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 47897 (1946); Paul, supra note 30, at 689-92.
64. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331.
65. See Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 311-12.
66. See id. at 314-15 (discussing the defendant's nondelegation claim).
67. Id. at 320.
68. See id. This was the proposition for which Sutherland cited Curtiss-Wrightin
Belmont. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32. Whether true or not as a general matter, no
one doubted that the power to preempt the New York law at issue in Belmont by
international agreement was committed to the national government, at least by Article II,
Section 2, combined with Article VI. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245-46
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the national government, all of the foreign affairs power is vested in
the President. For the first point, Sutherland adduced a historical
account, much of which has been challenged 69-but which again is
largely beside the point with respect to Belmont (and Curtiss-Wright
as well). Neither Belmont nor Curtiss-Wright was a case about
federal/state power, for in both cases the federal government had the
requisite power-the question was solely what part of the federal
government had that power.7" In both cases the second proposition
was the critical one-and in Curtiss-Wright, as in Belmont, it was
largely assumed.7 '
Sutherland's principal authority in Curtiss-Wright is the nowfamiliar statement by John Marshall (in the U.S. Congress) that the'
executive is the "sole organ" of the United States in foreign affairs. 72
A number of charges have been laid against Marshall's statement:
that it was made in the context of partisan debate, that its premise
was not widely accepted at the time, and that its import was
considerably less sweeping than has been claimed. 73 For present
purposes it should be sufficient to observe that Marshall did not
speak in any context related to international agreements, and thus
whatever force might be had for the general proposition of executive
power, it cannot count as an endorsement of presidential power over
international accords.74
(1796) (concluding that the 1783 treaty with Great Britain preempted inconsistent state
laws relating to debts owed British citizens).
69. See GLENNON, supra note 30, at 21-22; Levitan, supra note 63, at 478.
70. As discussed above, in Belmont the power to enter into an agreement preemptive
of New York law was plainly held by the President-plus-Senate; the issue was whether the
President alone had such power. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-32. Similarly, in CurtissWright the power to impose the arms embargo was plainly held by the President-plusCongress, pursuant to Congress's power to regulate international trade under Article I,
Section 8; the issue was whether the President alone could be given this power. See
Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 314-16.
71. Foreshadowing Belmont, Sutherland claimed (without citation) in Curtiss-Wright
that the President had an independent power to enter into international agreementsalthough curiously he did not cite that part of Curtiss-Wright in Belmont. See CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 317.
72. Id. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
73. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100
YALE L.J. 229, 338-61 (1990) (discussing the context of Marshall's "sole organ"
statement).
74. The context of Marshall's remark was the case of Jonathan Robbins, a British
sailor wanted for murder on a British ship and seized in the United States. Robbins
claimed to be a U.S. citizen wrongfully "impressed" into British service. The British
government demanded his extradition pursuant to the terms of the 1794 U.S.-U.K. treaty.
While extradition was pending, President Adams wrote to the presiding judge indicating
(or, in a less-favorable interpretation, directing) that extradition was appropriate. This
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Marshall's statement aside, Sutherland's only other historical

authority is a quotation from an 1816 Senate report similarly
irrelevant to executive agreements (and to foreign affairs power
generally).'
As a result, Curtiss-Wright provides no historical

support for the Belmont result (or, indeed, for its own assertion of
executive supremacy). It does, however, show the largely unstated
premise of Belmont: once one accepts, with Sutherland in CurtissWright, that the President has essentially unlimited powers in foreign
affairs, the result in Belmont is self-evident.
Belmont is
fundamentally not an analysis of the President's power to make
international agreements; rather, it is merely an application of a
generalized theory of foreign affairs in which the President holds
plenary power. That explains why Sutherland's opinion in Belmont,

distilled to its essential parts, is conclusory and lacking in argument
or authority: Sutherland thought it an obvious application of his
broader theory about foreign affairs which did not call for
individualized analysis. 76
action provoked a crisis in the House, where Adams's opponents accused him of
exceeding his authority. Marshall's statement came in the course of defending Adams,
arguing that the President's role in foreign affairs made such advice to the court
appropriate. The events, and the ensuing debate, are recounted in detail in Wedgwood,
supra note 73. Whatever one thinks of Marshall's defense of Adams (and it was not
accepted by everyone at the time, see id. at 354), it seems apparent that Marshall was not
thinking of anything like the executive agreement power. See CORWIN, supra note 31, at
216 ("Clearly, what Marshall had foremost in mind was simply the President's role as
instrument of communicationwith other governments .... "); GLENNON, supra note 30, at
24 (arguing that Sutherland's reliance on Marshall "mistakes policy communication with
policy formulation"); Louis Fisher, Evolution of Presidentialand CongressionalPowers in
ForeignAffairs, in CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE TABVAN RELATIONS AcT 20
(Louis W. Koenig et al. eds., 1985) (arguing that Marshall intended only that Adams was
acting pursuant to his duty to faithfully execute the treaty); Paul, supra note 30, at 690
("Far from asserting the executive's discretion in foreign relations, Marshall
characterized the executive as the agent or 'organ' of Congress. Sutherland twisted
Marshall's statement to support the contrary proposition .... "). Moreover, a decision of
the Marshall Court, Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), suggests that
Marshall did not think executive power over foreign affairs unlimited. In Little, the Court
deemed unconstitutional executive orders, taken without congressional authorization, to
seize certain ships during the "undeclared war" with France. See id. at 177-79; see also
GLENNON, supra note 30, at 26 (noting tension between Little and Curtiss-Wright).
75. In the language excerpted in Curtiss-Wright, the report states that "'[t]he
President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign
nations.'" Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting REPORTS OF COMMITrEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1789-1901, S. Doc. No., pt. 8, at 24 (1816)). Plainly, however, the
Senate was discussing the President's communicative role, not responsibility for the
content of what the President might communicate and certainly not what the President
might undertake as an international obligation. See GLENNON, supranote 30, at 19,24.
76. Sutherland had expressed similar views prior to his appointment to the Court.
See GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS 117-18,
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Consequently, two conclusions may be advanced with respect to

Belmont. First, it does not establish an original power of the
President to enter international agreements. The closest Sutherland

comes to an originalist argument is the suggestion, derived from
Curtiss-Wright, that the President is invested with all of the nation's

foreign affairs power. But this suggestion rests as a historical matter
almost entirely on Marshall's "sole organ" statement, taken wholly
out of context. Nothing is adduced to show any evidence of a specific

original understanding with respect to international agreements.
Second,

conflation

of the power

to conclude

executive

agreements and the power to incorporate them into domestic law
allowed Sutherland to assume a power which was unprecedented

even in Belmont's time. No court prior to Belmont had construed an
executive agreement to preempt state law.77 Sutherland's authorities
included only Altman, a (backhanded) approval of a congressionalexecutive agreement that is not relevant to the President's
independent power, and Moore's catalogue of minor executive

agreements, none of which purported to preempt preexisting state
law. 78

By casting the issue as one of state versus federal law,

Sutherland was able to argue-once the presidential power over
executive agreements was declared-that of course no state could
interfere with national policy reflected in the executive agreement.

That argument succeeds only if one does not acknowledge the
of the "agreement power" and the
potential separateness
"preemptive power. ' 79 Once the two are separated, it becomes clear
172 (1919).
77. Only one pre-Belmont case addressed the matter, although its dicta generally
support Sutherland's view. See Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870).
Speaking of an executive agreement respecting joint military occupation of San Juan
Island, in Washington Territory, by the United States and Great Britain, the territorial
court stated:
The power to make and enforce such a temporary convention respecting its own
territory is a necessary incident to every national government, and inheres
where the executive power is vested. Such conventions are not treaties within
the meaning of the constitution, and, as supreme law of the land, conclusive on
the courts, but they are provisional arrangements ...[which are] for the
occasion an expression of the will of the people through their political organ,
touching the matters affected; and to avoid unhappy collision between the
political and judicial branches... such an expression to a reasonable limit should
be followed by the courts and not opposed, though extending to the temporary
restraint or modification of the operation of an existing statute.
Id. However, the court went on to hold (over a dissent) that the executive agreement did
not in fact modify the existing statutes in the manner claimed by the appellant. See id. at
298.
78. See supranotes 52-62 and accompanying text.
79. By the "agreement power" I mean the power to enter into a binding international
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that the debate with respect to the preemptive power is not between
the state and federal governments, but between the President and
Congress (or the Senate). Assuredly, the power of preemption in
support of international agreements is a federal power, but its
location within the federal government remains contested. Once the
issue is stated in this manner, Sutherland's arguments regarding the
primacy of federal over state power become wholly irrelevant, and
one sees that Belmont simply adduces no authority for an
independent presidential preemptive power.
2. United States v. Pink
Belmont did not quite settle the matter, for two reasons. First,
Belmont was only a custodian and could assert no property interest in
the subject assets; it was unclear whether this affected the Court's
analysis." Second, New York courts essentially ignored the Belmont
decision, ruling against the United States on similar facts in Moscow
Fire Insurance Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co.81 in 1939 and
United States v. Pink' in 1940. Like Belmont, these cases involved
property purportedly nationalized by the Soviet government and
conveyed to the United States by the Litvinov Agreement. The only
substantive differences between Belmont on one hand and Pink and
Moscow Fireon the other were that in the latter cases the property in
question was tangible rather than money and the claimants were the
agreement on behalf of the United States; by the "preemptive power" I mean the power
to give an international agreement preemptive effect over pre-existing law. The
preemptive power is a subset of the larger "implementation power"-i.e., the power to
give an international agreement the force of domestic law. This power is granted, in the
case of treaties, in Article VI, and in the case of congressional-executive agreements, in
the legislative power of Article I. The central question, which Sutherland evaded, is
whether Article II conveys such independent power on the President.
80. The custodianship matter was principally relevant to the second, entirely distinct
issue raised in the Belmont case: whether the Litvinov Agreement, even if concluded
through constitutional procedures, substantively violated the "takings" clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332 (discussing the
"takings" issue and concluding that Belmont, as custodian, lacked standing to raise it).
But Justice Stone, concurring in the Belmont judgment, indicated that this might affect
the first issue as well, since (in his view) Belmont also lacked standing to object to the
procedure of the assignment. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 337 (Stone, J., concurring in the
result) (stating that "[a]s respondent debtor may not challenge the effect of the
assignment to the United States, the judgment is rightly reversed" and noting that
because "the reversal is without prejudice to the rights of any other parties to intervene,
they should be left free to assert... such claims with respect to the amount due as are in
accordance with the laws and policy of New York").
81. 20 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 1939), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided court sub
nom., United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624 (1940).
82. 32 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1940), rev'd, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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original owners (or their successors) rather than a custodian.
Nonetheless, the New York courts declined to find Belmont
Each case held that the Soviet decrees lacked
controlling.
extraterritorial force-despite the existence of the Litvinov
Agreement-and hence the United States had succeeded to no right
under that Agreement because the Soviet Union itself had no right to
the property.83
An equally divided U.S. Supreme Court, for reasons that remain
somewhat mysterious, affirmed the judgment against the United
States in Moscow Fire without opinion.' Ultimately the Court
reversed the judgment in Pink in 1942, confirming that the United
States held title to the nationalized property by the preemptive effect
of the Litvinov Agreement.'
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Pink treats the issue
as essentially settled by Belmont. Effectiveness of the New York law,
he wrote, "was denied New York in United States v. Belmont....
With one qualification, to be noted, the Belmont case is
determinative of the present controversy."86 (The qualification
related to a Fifth Amendment claim, and thus is not relevant to the
present inquiry), s7 Although Douglas added a number of citations,
his argument is not materially distinct from Sutherland's, and each
time he confronted the critical issue-the President's power to enter
into and implement international agreements-he returned to a
direct appeal to Belmont.
Justice Douglas first recited Belmont's conclusion that " 'all
international compacts and agreements' are to be treated with similar
dignity [to treaties under the Supremacy Clause] for the reason that
'complete power over international affairs is in the national
government,'" citing only Belmont itself. 8 He thus followed
Belmont in wrongly describing the issue as a matter of state/federal
power, rather than of intrafederal allocation of powers. Later, again
83. See Pink, 32 N.E.2d at 552 (summarily affirming judgment against the United
States on the basis of Moscow Fire); Moscow Fire, 20 N.E.2d at 764 (distinguishing
Belmont).
84. See United States v. Moscow Fire Ins. Co., 309 U.S. 624 (1940). In light of
Belmont and the subsequent decision in Pink, it is unclear what lay behind the Court's
division in Moscow Fire.
85. See Pink,315 U.S. at 222; id. at 241 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 222.
87. See id. at 226. The Belmont Court had declined to reach the takings claim
because August Belmont was a custodian and the nonparty owners were not U.S. citizens.
Because the party in Pink was both a claimant to title and a U.S. citizen, the issue
unresolved in Belmont was squarely presented in Pink. See supra note 80.
88. Pink, 315 U.S. at 223 (quoting Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331).
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citing only Belmont, he continued: "If the priority had been accorded
American claims by treaty with Russia, there would be no doubt as to
its validity.... As we have noted, the Belmont Court recognized that
the Litvinov Assignment was an international compact which did not
require the participation of the Senate. '8 9 In conclusion, Douglas
wrote, "the power of a State to refuse enforcement of rights based on
foreign law ...

must give way before the superior Federal policy

evidenced by a treaty or international compact or agreement," citing
only Santovincenzo v. Egan90 (a case concerning only treaty power)
and Belmont.91 Therefore, on the issue under consideration, Pink
reaffirmed Belmont, but essentially added nothing to it. As Chief
Justice Stone wrote in dissent, "my brethren are content to rest their
decision on the authority of the dictum in United States v. Belmont,
'
without the aid of any pertinent decision of this Court."9
3. Dames & Moore v. Regan
Forty years after Pink, the Court revisited the issue in Dames &
Moore v. Regan,9 in the context of the 1979 revolution in Iran. In the
course of that revolution, Iranian militants seized U.S. embassy
personnel in Tehran and held them as hostages; in response,
President Carter froze Iranian assets in the United States.94 The new
Iranian regime also repudiated its predecessor's contracts with U.S.
companies, including contracts with Dames & Moore. Dames &
Moore filed suit against Iran under state law for breach of contract,
89. Id. at 228-29 (citation omitted). Justice Douglas further added: "A treaty is a
'Law of the Land' under the Supremacy Clause.... Such international compacts and
agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity," citing only Belmont and
Corwin's 1940 treatise on executive power, which in turn relied on Belmont. Id. at 230;
see CORWIN, supra note 31, at 228-40.
90. 284 U.S. 30, 34 (1931). Santovincenzo concerned the preemptive effect of the
Consular Convention of 1878 between the United States and Italy, which, while not
denominated a treaty, was approved by the Senate in accordance with the procedure set
forth in Article II, Section 2. See Privileges and Immunities of Consular Officers;
Consular Convention, May 8, 1878, U.S.-Italy, 9 Bevans 91 (Senate resolution of advice
and consent to ratification May 28, 1878).
91. Pink, 315 U.S. at 231 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 242 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). Stone dissented on the ground suggested in his
concurrence in Belmont: that the Litvinov Agreement was not intended to preempt state

law, and thus should not be so read, regardless of the issue of the President's
constitutional power to do so. See id. at 249 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("I assume for
present purposes that these sweeping alterations of the rights of states and of persons
could be achieved by... executive agreement, although we are referred to no authority
which would sustain such an exercise of power ... by mere assignment unratified by the
Senate.").
93. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
94. See id. at 662-63.
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and ultimately obtained a default judgment and an attachment on
Iranian assets in the jurisdiction.95 However, this apparently
successful litigation strategy was then overtaken by global events:
the United States and Iran, after protracted maneuvering, defused
the hostage crisis through a series of understandings known as the
Algiers Declarations. In relevant part, this was the agreement: the
United States would release the frozen assets, some $1 billion of
which would then be deposited with an international arbitration
tribunal to be established to hear claims between the two countries;
outstanding claims against Iran would be referred to the tribunal, and
no further recourse to U.S. courts would be permitted; and Iran
would secure release of the hostages. 6 As with the Litvinov
Agreement, no congressional or Senate approval was sought or
obtained.
President Carter then issued a series of executive orders
implementing the Declarations which, among other things, dissolved
Dames & Moore's attachment and terminated its rights under state
law (with, of course, the opportunity to refile before the claims
tribunal).97 Dames & Moore objected, and the dispute became
Dames & Moore v. Regan.98
The similarities with Pink and Belmont are plain: the Algiers
Declarations, like the Litvinov Agreement, had no constitutional
authority beyond that of the President, and the private party claimed
a right under state law that was opposed by the (asserted) preemptive
effect of the international agreement. The Court reached the same
95. The full procedural history is set forth in Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 663-64.
96. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran-Alg., 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981); Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-Iran-Alg., 20 I.L.M. 230
(1981); Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, U.S.-IranAlg., 20 I.L.M. 229 (1981).
97. See id. at 665 (citing Executive Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-7932
(1981)). President Reagan, succeeding Carter in January of 1981, confirmed the relevant
executive orders, such that the order actually at issue in Dames & Moore was that of the
Reagan administration. See id. at 666 (citing Executive Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg.

14,111 (1981)).

98. The case that reached the Supreme Court was one of a number of similar claims
arising in various federal districts. See, e.g., Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 651
F.2d 800, 811 (1st Cir. 1981); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Government and State of Iran,
513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Unidyne Corp. v. Government of Iran, 512 F. Supp.
705,708 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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conclusions:
the agreement was (1) constitutional and (2)
preemptive. 9 Thus Pink, Belmont, and Dames & Moore implicate
both aspects of the issue under consideration in this Article, and
conclude that the President acting independently possesses
constitutional authority to enter into (at least some) international
agreements which (at least under some circumstances) supersede preexisting domestic law. Put another way, these cases concluded that
the President may exercise domestic law-making authority through
executive agreements.
In his opinion for the Court in Dames & Moore, Justice
Rehnquist declined to place much weight upon Pink and Belmont,
although one might have thought them essentially dispositive. But
Curtiss-Wright (and derivatively Pink and Belmont) had been
undermined by the subsequent decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer,100 which expressed a less-comprehensive view of
presidential power in foreign affairs.' 0 ' Following Youngstown, the
Dames & Moore Court articulated a theory of overlapping powers of
the President and Congress that gave prominent consideration to
implicit congressional approvals or disapprovals of presidential
action. 102 This theory may or may not be convincing (again, a point
upon which this Article takes no position), but it is not a theory based
upon the original understanding of the executive agreement power.
"Crucial to our decision today," Rehnquist wrote in Dames &
Moore, "is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the
This
practice of claim settlement by executive agreement. ' ,
conclusion followed from two observations: first, the existence of "a
longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive agreement
without the advice and consent of the Senate" (citing, among other
99. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677-79. On Dames & Moore, see Lee R. Marks &
John C. Grabow, The President's Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v.
Regan: Legislationby Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 68 (1982); John E. Nowak &
Ronald D. Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and Resolution of a "Nonproblem":
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the ForeignAffairs Power and the Role of the Court, 29 UCLA
L. REV. 1129 (1982).
100. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
101. In Youngstown, the Court held unconstitutional President Truman's seizure of
steel mills during an impending strike. See id. at 585-88. The government defended the
action, in part, as necessary to sustain the war effort in Korea. See id. at 582. The Court,
avoiding reliance on Curtiss-Wright,concluded that the asserted foreign affairs nexus did
not give the President any expanded unilateral power. See id. at 587-88; id. at 640-50
(Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment).
102. See id. at 640-50 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment); infra note 107 (noting
that this theory of overlapping powers is based on Justice Jackson's concurrence in
Youngstown).
103. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680.
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things, Wallace McClure's study of executive agreements concluded
between 1817 and 1917);104 and second, "the enactment of legislation
closely related to the question of the President's authority in a
particular case" (referring to the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1949).105 The former, occurring without objection, showed
congressional "acquiescence" in the practice; the latter (which
established a procedure to distribute the proceeds of international
settlement) "placed [Congress's] stamp of approval on such
agreements." 05
The foregoing argument depends, however, upon actions
occurring after (in most cases long after) the ratification of the
Constitution. It assumes that Congress may, by processes other than
legislation, approve a procedure (or at least waive objections to a
procedure) not envisioned by the Constitution itself. Like CurtissWright, it is an application of a generalized theory about foreign
relations power, albeit a different one: the theory that the allocation
of foreign relations powers depends upon the silence or implied7
acquiescence of one branch in the expansive assertions of another.1
As such, it tells little about the original understanding of the
President's power; it is an inquiry solely into that power's practical
evolution.
Further, Dames & Moore continued the assumption that with
respect to international accords, the power of entry and the power of
implementation are indivisible. Once the Court established the
President's power to agree to the Algiers Declarations, it treated the
case as decided: the Declarations, if constitutionally valid, must
preempt the inconsistent state law.08 Moreover, in adducing
diplomatic practice to sustain the constitutionality of the agreement,
the Court relied indiscriminately upon prior agreements that had not
raised any preemption issues. 09 In short, Dames & Moore is not
authority for an original presidential power of entry and is not really
authority at all (except in a declaratory sense) for a presidential
power of preemption.

104. Id. at 679 & n.8.
105. Id. at 678 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1645 (1949)).
106. Id. at 679, 680.
107. As the Dames & Moore Court acknowledged, see id. at 679, the theory is based
on Justice Robert Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, which was self-consciously
divorced from inquiry into the original understanding. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 &
n.1 (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment).
108. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669-74.

109. See id. at 679-80 & n.8.
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IH. TREATIES AND NONTREATY AGREEMENTS AS DISTINCT
CATEGORIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

I now turn to the possibility of constructing an argument based
upon the original understanding of the Constitution for the
President's independent powers to conclude and implement
international agreements. The immediate difficulty confronted by an
advocate of such powers is the language of Article II, Section 2,
which states that the President "shall have the Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.""'
This
provision is, naturally, the centerpiece of Raoul Berger's stronglyworded 1972 article"' opposing presidential power over international
agreements. As Berger forcefully argues," its negative implication is
almost unmistakable: given the constitutional language, it is difficult
to see how the President, acting alone, could have the general power
to make treaties without the advice and consent of the Senate. This
greater power, if given by some other part of the Constitution, would
include the lesser power described in Article II, Section 2: a
President capable of acting on independent authority surely would be
capable of acting with the approval of another body. If another part
of the Constitution conveys to the President the general power to
make treaties, the enumerated power of Article II, Section 2 is
wholly superfluous.
Moreover, public comment at the time of the framing and
ratification of the Constitution confirms the natural reading of the
text. Berger collects a range of statements to this effect," 3 of which
the following are illustrative. In The Federalist,Hamilton wrote:
[T]he vast importance of the trust and the operation of
treaties as laws plead strongly for the participation of the
whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of
making them.
[I]t would be utterly unsafe and improper to intrust [the
power of making treaties] to an elective magistrate ....
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a
nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a
kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and
110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
111. See Berger, supra note 17.
112. See id. at 35.
113. See id. at 37-40; see also GLENNON, supra note 30, at 181-83 (collecting
authorities).
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circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.
It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint
possession of the power in question, by the President and
Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security than the
separate possession of it by either ....
"I
Similarly, James Wilson observed that "[n]either the President
nor the Senate, solely can complete a treaty; they are checks upon
each other, and are so balanced, as to produce security to the
people."'1 5 And Roger Sherman stated: "The establishment of every
treaty requires the voice of the Senate....
The Constitution
contemplates the united wisdom of the President and Senate, in order
to make treaties
"6
1....Therefore, it seems an uncontroversial
assertion that, in terms of the original understanding, the President as
a general matter lacked an independent treaty power.
From the foregoing, Berger concludes that "the specific
objective of the treaty clause was to preclude the President, acting
alone, from entering into international agreements. 1 17
That
conclusion, however, contains a substantial and unsubstantiated
definitional step equating the word "treaty" with the phrase
"international agreement." The specific object of the treaty clause,
we may concede, was to prevent the President, acting alone, from
entering into treaties; to reach Berger's conclusion, one must further
demonstrate that the term "treaty" encompasses all undertakings
between nations. The first component of an originalist defense of the
Belmont powers is to demonstrate, contra Berger, that the term
"treaty" was understood as a special case of the term "international
agreement" rather than as its synonym." 8
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 425-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaak Kramnick ed.,
Penguin Books 1987).
115. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE

ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTiTUTION 507 (2d ed. 1836) (statement of James
Wilson to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1085 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of Roger Sherman
in the First Congress) (emphasis added).
117. Berger, supra note 17, at 37.
118. It is worth noting the divergence of this argument from the question of the
constitutionality of congressional-executive agreements (a matter not always fully
distinguished by commentators). The negative implication of Article II, Section 2,
supported by the contemporaneous interpretations of that language, overwhelmingly
suggests that the President lacked independent power to enter into treaties. But an
argument by negative implication that Congress lacks that power has less force.
Concluding that some other provision of the Constitution gave Congress that power, see
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 914, does not render Article II, Section 2
superfluous: the two methods of approving treaties would be complementary. See id. at
919-20. Similarly, the contemporary observations quoted above are for the most part
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A.

ConstitutionalText
In addition to Article II, Section 2, the word "treaty" appears
three times in the Constitution: in Article IMl, Section 2 (giving
federal courts jurisdiction over cases arising under treaties);' 9 in the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI (in a context not germane to the
definitional inquiry); 20 and in Article I, Section 10.121 Article I,
Section 10 states: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation.... No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with
a foreign Power ... ."I' As several commentators have noted, this

language suggests an understanding of "treaty" as a subclass of all
possible international agreements."2
By these provisions,
treatymaking at the state level was absolutely banned, yet states
might (with the consent of Congress) enter into some understandings
with foreign nations. That formulation is simply impossible if one
believes, with Raoul Berger, that the word "treaty" encompasses
every conceivable international agreement. 24
Nor is it sustainable that this text arose through error. It derives
from (but materially modifies) similar language in the Articles of
Confederation. Under that document,
No State, without the consent of the United States in
Congress assembled, shall ...enter into any conference,

agreement, alliance or treaty with any king, prince or state
addressed to the danger of investing one person-the President-with treaty power.
While these authorities appear to assume that the Senate will perform a checking power
through Article II, Section 2, most of their concerns would also be allayed by a checking
power performed by the Congress as a whole. Thus the argument over congressionalexecutive agreements (or, put another way, the argument as to whether Congress may
approve treaties) is distinct from the present inquiry. Even if one were to conclude that
Article II, Section 2 wholly precludes the President acting alone from entering into
understandings with foreign nations, that conclusion would not disprove a power of the
President-plus-Congress to do so.
119. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ...
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority.").
120. See id. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."). This
language could support either a comprehensive or a specialized meaning of the word
"treaty" and thus is not material to the immediate inquiry. I consider the effect of the
Supremacy Clause upon executive agreements in Part VI, infra.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
122. Id.(emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 30, at 178; Paul, supra note 30, at 735; Tribe,
supra note 6, at 1265-66.
124. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
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No two or more States shall enter into any treaty,
confederation or alliance whatever between them, without
the consent of the United States in Congress assembled
125

In other words, treaties and agreements between a state of the
United States and a foreign nation required the consent of Congress,
but as among the separate states treaties but not agreements required
such consent. 1 6 Thus, the textual distinction between treaties and

other types of agreements among sovereigns began with the Articles
of Confederation.
In keeping with the purpose of the Constitution to strengthen

the national government, Article I, Section 10 went beyond the
Articles in limiting the diplomatic powers of the states: it precluded

state treaties altogether and required congressional consent for all
state/foreign and interstate agreements.

In so doing, however, it

retained the Articles' differential treatment of state "treaties" and
state "agreements," while increasing the limitations upon both
categories. Given this adoption-with-modification of the Articles'

terminology, it seems plain that Article I, Section 10 reflects a
conscious understanding that treaties did not encompass the entire

field of international agreements. 27
125. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION BETWEEN THE STATES

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, MASSACHUSETrS BAY, RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS, CONNECTICUT, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, PENNSYLVANIA, DELAWARE,

art. VI
(1777) [hereinafter ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION] (emphasis added); see also Abraham
C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framersof the Federal Constitution Mean by 'Agreements or
Compacts'?, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 454-56 (1936) (tracing the development of the
relevant language).
126. It is the differential substantive treatment of "treaties" and "agreements," in both
the Articles of Confederation and in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, that is
critical. Drafters of legal instruments frequently employ lists of synonyms to convey fully
their intent. Thus the fact that the Constitution refers, for example, to "Treat[ies],
Alliance[s] or Confederation[s]," see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, does not necessarily suggest
that its drafters understood any pertinent distinction among the three; each is treated the
same, and the repetition may have arisen only through an excess of caution. However,
when two terms are treated differently-as are "treaties" and "agreements" in both
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution and Article VI of the Articles of Confederationit is literally nonsensical, in the effect it produces on the document, to view them as
synonyms.
127. The earliest interpretations of Article I, Section 10 confirm this view. See JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 715 (1833); 1
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE,
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 309-10 (1803); see also
MARYLAND, VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND GEORGIA,
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Moreover, with respect to state practice, the ordinary meaning of
these phrases has been employed without controversy. Under the
Articles of Confederation, states entered into agreements with each
other without congressional assent (despite the ban on unapproved
"treaties");12 under the Constitution, states have entered into
agreements with foreign governments (with congressional approval)
despite the complete preclusion of "treaties.' ' 29 None of these
practices would make sense, of course, if "treaty" meant every form
of understanding between sovereigns.
Berger recognizes the force of these arguments and responds
only by arguing that the word "treaty" in Article I does not mean the
same thing as the word "treaty" in Article II But this seems
insufficient. Even if there were two ordinary understandings of the
word "treaty"--one
technical
and
limited, the other
comprehensive-and even if it is reasonable to suppose that the
framers and ratifiers might have understood the term differently in
successive articles of the same Constitution, at best this only
establishes ambiguity. The text at least suggests-if it does not
actually compel-an understanding of "treaty" as a subclass of
"international agreement."
B. Pre-ConstitutionalUsage
Pre-constitutional usage of the term "treaty" further suggests
that it was understood as a subclass of, rather than a synonym for,
"international agreement." In ordinary speech, it is true, the
understanding of the relevant terms was-as it is today-imprecise.
However, in the more technical writing of eighteenth-century
international law not all "international agreements" were considered
"treaties." Since use of "treaty" as a restricted term of art in
international law would have been familiar to the drafters of the
Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 454-56 (discussing these commentators).
128. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694 (1925); Weinfeld,

supra note 125, at 464.
129. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 153 & nn.15-17 (discussing, among others,
agreements between New York and Canada and agreements among various Canadian
provinces and neighboring U.S. states).
130. See Berger, supranote 17, at 42. In Berger's view:
[T]here is no place in the treaty clause for the more restricted reading of 'treaty'
as it is used in the 'compact' clause ....It is familiar learning that the same
words may have different meanings in the different contexts of the same statute
when they are directed to different purposes.
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Articles and of the Constitution,1 31 it is reasonable to suppose that
they would have adopted that usage.
English dictionaries of the time are not helpful in clarifying the
understanding of the relevant terms. Nicholas Bailey's 1729
dictionary, for example, defines "treaty" to mean " 'an agreement
between two or more distinct Nations concerning Peace, Commerce,
Navigation, etc.' ,132 Berger concludes from this definition that the
term "treaty" is comprehensive. 133
That is not the only
interpretation. Bailey might have meant (as Berger supposes) to
define treaties as "[al] agreements between nations [including for
example those] concerning Peace, Commerce Navigation, etc." But
he also might have meant "[certain kinds of] agreements between
nations [such as those] concerning Peace, Commerce, Navigation,
etc." Bailey's "etc." is fatally ambiguous; it could include all other
agreements, or only those similar (in respects not yet identified) to
agreements of peace, commerce, and navigation. Samuel Johnson's
1756 dictionary is even less helpful, defining "treaty" as a type of
"compact" without indicating whether it includes all agreements (or
even all "compacts") between nations. 134 Little can be concluded as
to ordinary English usage, and it is not unlikely that the usage was
itself ambiguous.
Presumably the ordinary eighteenth-century English usage did
not pursue a refined distinction among various types of international
understandings because, in English law, nothing turned upon such a
distinction. All international agreements worked the same way:
their formation was part of the prerogative of the English monarch,
and they were negotiated directly by the crown or, more usually, by a
designated
representative
subject
to
crown
approval
("ratification"). 135 There was, therefore, no need for precisely
delineated multiple terms.
The language of eighteenth-century international law was,
131. See supranote 136 and infra notes 156-57.
132. Berger, supra note 17, at 35 (quoting BAILEY'S DICTIONARY 1729).
133. See id. (arguing that Bailey's dictionary shows that "[a]t the adoption of the
Constitution, the word 'treaties' had a broad connotation").
134. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1756).
Johnson unhelpfully defines "treaty" to mean: "A compact of accommodation relating to
publick affairs"; "compact" to mean: "A contract; an accord; an agreement"; and
"Agreement" to mean: "Compact; bargain." See id. It is impossible to tell from these
definitions whether Johnson thought the word "treaty" included all "agreements"
between nations. See Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 454 (concluding that "[Johnson's]
dictionary obviously throws no light on the question").
135. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *252.
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however, another matter. From a U.S. perspective, the writings of
Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel were leading sources of
international law in the constitutional period. 36 As elaborated
below, both Grotius, the seventeenth century so-called "father" of
modem international law,' 37 and Vattel, the most widely read
eighteenth-century writer in the field, 38 used the equivalent of
"treaty" to indicate a subset of, not as a general term for, agreements
among nations. Given the extent to which U.S. lawyers and political
writers at the time cited and relied on Grotius and Vattel in matters
of international law,'3 it seems inconceivable that this usage would
not have been recognized. 40
Differentiation among classes of international agreements dates
to Roman times. Roman practice recognized three types of
agreements. The foedus was a formal undertaking of the Roman
state whose conclusion required specified ceremonies and whose
violation was said to risk divine retribution. The sponsio was a
contract undertaken by a Roman officer in the field on that officer's
own authority and initiative and subject to ratification or rejection by
the sovereign power (at various times lodged in the Senate or the
Emperor). A third designation, alias pactiones, was apparently a
catch-all phrase for agreements not included in either of the
foregoing categories.'4
This differentiation among international agreements was likely
known to educated persons of the eighteenth century who were

136. On the influence of Vattel and Grotius, see PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF,
FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF
REVOLUTIONS 1776-1814, at 11 (1993); Adler, supra note 17, at 133, 137-38 & nn.27-30;
Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 457-59; and John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 242-43
(1996).
137. See Christopher A. Ford, PreachingPropriety to Princes: Grotius, Lipsius, and
Neo-Stoic InternationalLaw, 28 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 313, 315 (1996).
138. On the influence of Vattel, see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing influence of Vattel and
Grotius during constitutional period).
140. I speak here only of the usage of eighteenth century international law. Modern
international law usage generally recognizes the word "treaty" as encompassing
international obligations generally. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 129/15
(defining a treaty as any written agreement governed by international law).
141. See Peter Haggenmacher, Some Hints on the European Origins of Legislative
Participationin the Treaty-Making Function, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313, 321 & n.35
(1991) (discussing Roman practice). The principal Roman sources are Titus Livius
(Livy), author of the principal history of Rome, and Domitius Ulpianius (Ulpian), quoted
extensively in Justinian's Digest of Roman law.
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acquainted with the Roman sources themselves, but in any event,
the differentiation had been reproduced by the widely-read Grotius
in the prior century. Grotius, writing in Latin, adopted the Roman
terms to describe international agreements: foedus (or fedus),
sponsio, and aliaspactiones 43 The conventional English translation
of foedus was "treaty";' 44 sponsio (which had largely passed out of
practice by that point) had no obvious translation into ordinary
English, and alias pactiones would have been rendered as "other
agreements." A reader of Grotius would have in mind a hierarchy of
international agreements in which "treaty" designated but one (albeit
the most important) category: the entire class consisted of "treaties,
sponsios, and other agreements."
Vattel is to similar effect. Writing in French, he distinguished
between the "traitg" on the one hand, and "Accords, Conventions,
Pactions" on the other. 45 Vattel specifically equated the Latin foedus
with the French trait6,'4 and it is of course associated with its English
142. See Yoo, supra note 136, at 243 & n.368 (remarking on the influence of Roman
sources).
143. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAciS, bk. II, ch. XV, § 2 (1625)
(Carnegie Endowment ed. 1925) ("Publius has conventiones ... dividere possumus in
federa, sponsiones, pactiones alias" (translation: Public conventions may be divided into
treaties (federa, from fedus), sponsiones and other agreements (pactiones alias)).
Moreover, Grotius maintains a distinction among the terms in his subsequent analysis. In
speaking of the interpretation of international agreements, he uses pactiolpactiones
(agreement) in speaking of interpretation generally and uses fedus/federa in reference to
particular agreements or particular types of agreements. See id. bk. II ch. XVI, §§ 3-4
(speaking generically, using pactio); see id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 13 (speaking specifically of
alliances, using fedus); see id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 14 (speaking of a specific agreement
between Rome and Carthage, using fedus); see id. bk. II, ch. XVI, § 16 (speaking
generically, using pactio). As indicated, Grotius's Roman sources were Ulpian and Livy.
See id. bk. II, ch. XV, §§ 1-3; supra note 141. On Grotius's use of classical sources, see
David J. Bederman, Reception of the Classical Tradition in InternationalLaw: Grotius'
De Jure Belli ac Pacis,10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1 (1996).
144. See, e.g., James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. 1 (1793), in 1 JAMES
MADISON, LETrERS AND OTHER WRrrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 607, 614 (J.B.
Lippinscott & Co. ed. 1867) (using foedus/foedera to mean "treaty"); see also HUGO
GROTIUS, LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE ET DE LA PAIX (Jean Barbeyrac trans., 1724)
(renderingfoedus as trait-whichis conventionally equated with "treaty").
145. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI
NATURELLE, APPLIQu s A LA CONDUrrE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES
SOUVERAINS bk. II, § 153 (James Brown Scott ed., 1983) (1758) [hereinafter VATTEL, LE

DROrr DES GENS]; see also EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDucr AND AFFAIRS OF
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, bk. II, § 152 (Joseph Chitty ed. & trans., 1863) (1758)

(describing the trait6); id. § 153 (describing pactions, accords, conventions) [hereinafter
VAITEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS].
146. See id. VATTEL, LE DROIT DE GENS, supranote 145, bk. II, § 152 ("Un Traitd,en

Latin Foedus").
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quasi-cognate "treaty."
Accords, conventions, pactions would
conventionally be translated as "arrangements [or compacts],
agreements, conventions."' 47 Again "treaty" or its equivalent is not
used as a comprehensive term, but as a subset of the larger class of
international understandings, which is composed of treaties and other
agreements.
In the development of European writing upon international law,
the leading intermediary between Grotius and Vattel was Christian
de Wolff. Wolff, a German writer in the intellectual tradition of
Grotius, published his principal work (like Grotius, in Latin) in
1749;148 Vattel's 1758 treatise was, to a large extent, a popularized
version of Wolff in French. 14 9 Wolff himself was less widely cited by

U.S. writers, and it is unclear whether his work was known in the
United States prior to 1793.11 However, his writings are critical in
tracing the evolution of the international law terminology from
Grotius to Vattel and are indicative of eighteenth-century European
international law usage which, as a general matter, was likely familiar
to those of the framers of the Constitution who had experience in

international circles.' 5 '
Like Grotius, Wolff outlined three categories of agreements: the
foedus, the sponsio (which he described in accordance with Grotius
and the Roman sources), and a third category he designated
5 2 Further, Wolff stated, "Gentes enim earumque Rectores
pactiones.'

pactiones inire possunt, quae foederibus contradistinguuntur"
("Nations and their rulers can enter into agreements [pactiones]
147. See Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 460 & n.30.
148. CHRISTIAN DE WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCENTIFICA PERTACrATUM
(J.B. Scott ed., 1983) (1749).
149. On the influence of Wolff on Vattel, see Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 463. See
also VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 145, at x-xv (discussing Wolff as a
source).
150. The earliest U.S. citation to Wolff of which I am aware is in Madison's work. See
Madison, supra note 144, at 614 (citing as international law authorities "Wolfius,
Burlamaqui and Vattel").
Jefferson had earlier written to Madison, evaluating
international law sources: "Vattel has been most generally the guide. Bynkershoek often
quoted, Wolf [sic] sometimes." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (August
5, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 50-51 (Robert Rutland ed., 1985). See
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (citing and
quoting the "Baron De Wolfuis [sic]").
151. See, e.g., Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 459 (discussing international law
background of James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth, and John Rutledge).
152. See WOLFF, supra note 148, § 369 (entitled "Foedera quid sunt; quid pactiones"
(translation:
"What foedera are; what are pactiones")); id. § 464 (entitled "De
Pactionibus Gentium" (translation: "Of the pactiones of nations")); id. § 465 (entitled
"Sponsio quid est" (translation: "What is a sponsio")).
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which are distinguishable from treaties [foedera].").153 In sum, Wolff,
like Vattel and Grotius, saw the foedus/treaty as a subset of
international agreements. Vattel's French rendition of Wolff's
thought retained the distinction between foedus (which he translated
as traitg) and pactiones (which he naturally associated with the
French paction ("arrangement" or "compact") and its French
synonyms accords and conventions). Thus, Vattel was likewise
repeating the Roman terminology, passed through Grotius and
Wolff.
For the Romans, the categories of agreements mattered because
different types of agreements required the authority of different
actors within the Roman polity.154 By the eighteenth century these
practical effects had largely disappeared. Generally, as in England,
the eighteenth-century monarchs possessed absolute diplomatic
fully-empowered
through
exercised
they
which
power
eighteenth-century
some
Consequently,
representatives.
international writers, including the widely-cited Bynkershoek,
However, the historical
ignored the technical distinctions. 55
terminology remained available through Grotius and Vattel, and
would have held interest for those, such as the drafters of the Articles
and of the Constitution, who were engaged in distributing the
theretofore absolute diplomatic power of the conventional
eighteenth-century monarch between state and federal governments
and among the branches of the federal government.
This in turn is critical because Grotius and Vattel were wellknown and widely consulted by the constitutional generation in the
United States. As one might expect in the context of the creation of
a new nation from revolution and the guidance of that nation in its
153. Id. § 464.
154. See GROTIUS, supra note 143, bk. II, ch. XV; Haggenmacher, supra note 141, at
321.
155. See 1 CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LRi
Duo 251-59 (Carnegie Endowment ed., 1930) (1737). Bynkershoek nonetheless confirms
the foregoing analysis. In keeping with the actual practice of the eighteenth century, he
considered only a single classification of international agreement to which all of his
observations applied. However, his word for this generic category was pactiolpactiones
("agreement,", from pacisor/pactussum, "to agree") rather than foedus ("treaty"), which
he did not use at all. See id. Wolff, it will be recalled, also used the word pactiones to
signify "agreements" and further stated that some "agreements" (pactiones) could be
distinguished from the more specialized "treaty" (foedus). See WOLFF, supra note 148,
§ 464; supra note 153 and accompanying text. Similarly, Grotius used pactiolpactionesas

a generic term and fedus as a specific term. See GROTIUS, supra note 143, bk. II, ch. XVXVI. Bynkershoek apparently recognized that foedusltreaty was a specialized word, and

since he intended to discuss all international agreements and not just treaties, he used the
generic pactionesinstead.
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difficult diplomacy with the established powers, questions of
international law were often in the forefront of debate; the
authorities cited on these occasions were the European treatise
writers, in particular Vattel:
During the Founding period and well beyond, Vattel
was, in the United States, the unsurpassed publicist on
international law.
From the day Vattel's treatise arrived in America in
1775, it was invariably invoked as authoritative on matters
of international law by the likes of Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, James Wilson, Edmund Randolph, Thomas
Jefferson, John Marshall, Joseph Story and James Kent,
among others. Moreover, it was relied upon by the Second
Continental Congress, the Constitutional Convention and
the U.S. Congress.156
A leading commentary on international law practice in the
United States confirms:
In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers and
judges of that era [the eighteenth century] relied heavily on
continental treatise writers, Vattel being the most often
consulted by Americans. An essential part of a sound legal
education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf,
and Burlamaqui, among others. Quotations from these
sources appeared not only in briefs and opinions, but also in
discussions of critical foreign policy matters by the
1 57
President's Cabinet and in the popular press.

156. Adler, supra note 17, at 137-38; see also ONUF & ONUF, supra note 136, at 11
(stating that Vattel's work "was unrivaled... in its influence on the American founders");
Paul, supra note 30, at 736 & nn. 328-29 (discussing Vattel's influence and concluding that
Vattel "was the most authoritative contemporary source of international law among the
thirteen States"). There was at the time, moreover, little independent literature upon
what we would today call "international relations"; writers upon the "law of nations" such
as Grotius and Vattel were concerned alike with how nations did behave, should behave,
and were obligated to behave. Their scope, in short, was broader-and their appeal more
general-than might be suggested by the modern connotation of "international law." Cf.
Ford, supra note 137, at 359-63 (noting that Grotius did not focus exclusively on what
today would be referred to as legal matters); Yoo, supra note 136, at 242-43 (suggesting
that international law had broader appeal during the late 1700s than it does today).
157. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 819, 823 (1989). The other treatise writers mentioned by Professor JayPufendorf and Burlamaqui-did not discuss the nature of treaties in any relevant manner.
See JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW
(Thomas Nugent trans., Arno Press 1972) (1807); see also Weinfeld, supra note 125, at
457.
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In short, one would expect that the founding generation,
concerned with such an important matter as the power of
international agreements, would have consulted the European
publicists of international law, and that Vattel and Grotius would
have been most in mind. Vattel and Grotius thought a treaty was
only one kind of international agreement.15 Thus, it is reasonable to
suppose that the drafters of Article VI of the Articles of
Confederation and Article I of the Constitution employed the
international law terminology to differentiate the states' power over
the various kinds of international accords, and that the word "treaty"
in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution would have been
understood, following Vattel, Wolff, and Grotius, to describe only a
particular category of international accords. Since the word was used
as a term of art derived from international law in Article I, Section
10, it would seem incongruous to embrace an imprecise colloquial
meaning in Article II, Section 2.
C. Post-ConstitutionalUsage
Raoul Berger rests much of his case against executive
agreements upon post-drafting statements by principal framers and
commentators. 159 Most of these statements (some of which I have

quoted above) 60 specifically address the repository of the treaty
power with the President and the Senate as opposed to the President
alone. Berger quotes James Wilson's statement, for example, that
"'[n]either the president nor the Senate, solely, can complete a
treaty;' "161 similarly he relies on Story's comment that "'[it is too
much to expect that a free people would confide to a single
magistrate ... the sole authority to act conclusively, as well as

exclusively, upon the subject of treaties.' "162 As argued above, these
observations should conclusively refute (if the constitutional text
alone were not enough) the suggestion that the President has an
But the
independent comprehensive treaty-making authority.
argument for executive agreements turns not upon the location but
upon the scope of the treaty power. If the treaty power is
comprehensive as to all international agreements, assuredly the
adduced statements are powerful evidence against any independent
158. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
159. See Berger, supra note 17, at 37-40.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
161. Berger, supra note 17, at 38 n.206 (quoting James Wilson, reprintedin 2 ELLIOT,
supra note 115, at 507).
162. Id. at 38 n.210 (quoting 2 STORY, supra note 127, § 1512, at 343-44).
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presidential agreement-making ability; if it is not-as the
Constitution itself and the terminology of Vattel, Wolff, and Grotius
suggest-these statements simply do not speak to the power to
conclude nontreaty agreements.
Most of the surviving discussion of the constitutional generation
concerning the power over international agreements is confined to a
discussion of the location of the treaty power without consideration
of its scope-and thus is largely irrelevant to the matter at hand. The
principal exception among Berger's authorities is Hamilton's
statement that the treaty power is"'competent to all the stipulations
which the exigencies of national affairs might require; competent to
the making of treaties of alliance, ... treaties of peace, and every

other species of convention usual among nations.' "163 Unlike the
foregoing authorities, this observation appears directed to the scope
of the treaty power and suggests that it is comprehensive.
The context of Hamilton's statement, however, shows that great
reliance should not be placed upon it. It comes in the last of the
thirty-eight "Camillus" essays written by Hamilton in defense of the
1794 treaty with Great Britain (known as the Jay Treaty after its
negotiator, John Jay). The treaty was widely condemned by leaders
of the Francophile Republican party for too closely aligning the
United States with Britain in the Anglo-French disputes of the 1790s.
Once it was ratified by the Senate, debate turned to the House
(where implementing legislation was still necessary to provide
requisite funding). As a "Law of the Land" under the Supremacy
Clause, its supporters argued, the treaty commanded the allegiance of
the House, which could therefore not thwart it by declining to fund it.
Not so, rejoined opponents, for the treaty itself was unconstitutional:
it purported to regulate commerce, commit the United States to
expenditures, and limit war-all of which transgressed the powers of
Congress under the Constitution. The proper scope of a treaty, the
opponents further argued, was confined by the scope of the powers
committed to Congress. 164
163. Id at 35 (emphasis added) (quoting Letters of Camillus, No. 38, in 6 ALEXANDER
183 (H. Lodge ed., 1904)); see also
GLENNON, supra note 30, at 182 (citing Camillus 38 and concluding that "Hamilton
apparently regarded the advice-and-consent power of the Senate as encompassing every
international agreement"). To the same effect, see Letters of Camillus, No. 36, in 6
HAMILTON, supra, at 168 ("The power of treaty... is the power by agreement, convention
or compact, to establish rules binding upon two or more nations ....).
164. See Letters of Camillus, Nos. 36 & 37, in 6 HAMILTON, supra note 163, at 166-67,
171-72 (restating the Republican argument); 5 MOORE, supra note 57, at 224 (recounting
HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON

the Jay Treaty controversy).
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Camillus 38 (and its immediate predecessors) were a response to
this argument. In Camillus 36 and 37, Hamilton pointed out the
structural difficulty of the Republican contention: by virtue of
Congress's power over war, commerce, and expenditure, the
proposed limitation would leave effectively nothing to the treaty
power. 165 The first part of Camillus 38, to which the critical quote
belongs, is a summary of that argument: the treaty power was not
intended to be circumscribed, Hamilton repeated-meaning that the
treaty power was not intended to be circumscribed by the
enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, Section 8.
So understood, it is difficult to see the Camillus essay as relevant
to the issue of presidential power. The question was whether matters
ordinarily thought encompassed within a treaty (such as peace,
navigation, and commerce)'66 were removed therefrom by the design
of the Constitution. It was, in other words, about the division of
power between the Senate and the House, not between the Senate
and the President, and it was about whether power over matters
ordinarily understood to be within the province of treaties was
limited by other provisions of the Constitution. Added to the usual
tendency for rhetorical overstatement in the course of partisan
debate, the entirely distinct context makes Hamilton's observation an
unreliable indicator of the view of the executive agreement power.
Hamilton's statement aside, there is little commentary of a postconstitutional nature that is relevant to the present inquiry. Indeed,
the subject of nontreaty agreements seems not to have been widely
discussed in that era. Thus, post-constitutional views may be
discovered more readily from what was done rather than what was
said. Accordingly, I next turn to the early history of the nontreaty
agreement.
D. Nontreaty Agreements in Practice
The historical pedigree of the nontreaty agreement has become
an article of faith in modern comprehension. As discussed above, the
Court in Dames & Moore relied upon the "longstanding practice of
claim settlement by executive agreement."' 67 McDougal and Lans,
writing in 1945, repeatedly referred to "150 years" of history
supporting nontreaty agreements. 16 Ackerman and Golove, while
165. See Letters of Camillus, Nos. 36 & 37, in 6 HAMILTON, supra note 163, at 167-82.
166. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (giving dictionary definition).
167. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,682 n.10 (1981).
168. McDougal & Lans, supranote 31, at 212,214,216,229,232. To the same effect is
McCLURE, supra note 31, at 3-4,35-99.
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disputing some of McDougal and Lans's conclusions, confirm that
"there were hundreds of unilateral executive agreements between the
American Revolution and the First World War."'16 9 Even Professor
Tribe, although generally skeptical of the power to conclude
nontreaty agreements, agrees that "[f]rom the nation's earliest days,
the President has been understood to have inherent power to make
limited types of agreements with foreign nations ....
Though such statements are not inaccurate, their tenor vastly
overstates the historical record relevant to the present inquiry. To an
inquiry concerning original understanding, the post-constitutional
record is only indirect evidence; the further removed from the
constitutional period, the less suggestive it will be of that period's
understanding.' 7 ' What interpreters in, say, 1910 thought of
nontreaty agreements may (depending upon one's theory of
constitutional interpretation) be relevant to the present
understanding, but given its remoteness from the constitutional
period it is not particularly good evidence of the original
understanding. Because the Dames & Moore Court, McDougal and
Lans, and others were expressly not conducting an inquiry into the
original understanding (but rather into the evolution of the
understanding), they gave equal weight and consideration to all past
practice, and from an undifferentiated evaluation of all such practice
pronounced that history supported their view. But their conclusion is
distinct from a claim that history indicates an original (i.e., 1787-89)
understanding embracing nontreaty agreements. Such a claim must
focus upon immediately post-constitutional practice and strongly
devalue historical evidence remote from the period under inquiry.
Once the inquiry is recast in this fashion, the historical evidence
becomes less overwhelming than is commonly suggested. For the
first fifty years of post-ratification history (i.e., through 1839),
compilations of U.S. international agreements'72 contain a total of at
169. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 820.
170. Tribe, supra note 6, at 1265.
171. The use of post-ratification events to demonstrate the original meaning of a text
is, of course, subject to substantial objections. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550-51 (1994)
("[T]he Constitution's postenactment 'legislative' history ... is, after all, the history that
is least likely to reflect the original understanding. It is better to examine exhaustively
the pre-ratification material first and only look at the post-ratification material if it is
absolutely necessary to do so."); id. at 554 (explaining that post-ratification history is
unreliable because "there can be no guarantee that a later lawmaker's understanding in
fact bears on the intent animating an earlier enactment"). Remoteness of the events from
the ratification sharply compounds these difficulties.
172. The most complete compilation for the relevant period is TREATIES AND OTHER
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most twelve agreements that rest upon the independent authority of

the executive branch. They are: (1) the 1799 claims settlement
agreement with the Netherlands involving the ship Wilmington
Packet;'7 3 (2) an agreement with Britain relating to exchange of
prisoners during the War of 1812;174 (3) the 1817 Rush-Bagot
Agreement demilitarizing the Great Lakes; 175 (4) and (5) agreements
settling claims with Russia and Colombia in 1825;176 (6) and (7)
commercial agreements with Hawaii and Tahiti in 1826;177 (8) and (9)
claims settlement agreements with Brazil and Colombia in 1829;178
(10) a claims settlement agreement with Portugal in 1832;171 (11) a
claims settlement agreement with the Netherlands in 1839;18 and (12)
a commercial agreement with Samoa in 1839.181
Moreover, a number of these are subject to substantial
difficulties as precedent for the recognition of nontreaty agreements.
To support the executive's argument in this regard, authoritative

INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Hunter Miller ed., 19311948) [hereinafter Miller]. Also useful is INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1776-1949 (Charles I. Bevans ed., 1968-1974).
173. Note of Maarten van der Goes, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Batavian
Republic [The Netherlands], to William Vans Murray, Minister Resident of the United
States, and answering Note of the Minister Resident, Dec. 7-12,1799, U.S.-Neth., 5 Miller
1075 [hereinafter Wilmington Packet Agreement].
174. Cartel for the Exchange of Prisoners of War, May 12, 1813, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 2
Miller 557 [hereinafter Prisoner of War Agreement].
175. Exchange of Notes Relative to Naval Forces on the American Lakes, Apr. 28-29,
1817, 18(2) Stat. 296,2 Miller 645 [hereinafter Rush-Bagot Agreement].
176. Exchange of Notes for the Settlement of the Claims in the Case of the Brig Pearl,
Apr. 19-22, 1825, U.S.-Russ., 3 Miller 201 [hereinafter Russian Claims Settlement];
Convention for Adjusting Certain Claims, Mar. 16, 1825, U.S.-Colom., 3 Miller 195
[hereinafter 1825 Colombian Claims Settlement].
177. Articles Agreed on with the King, Council, and Head Men of Tahiti (0 Taheite),
Sept. 6, 1826, U.S.-Tahiti, 3 Miller 249 [hereinafter Tahiti Articles]; Articles of
Arrangement with the King of the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), Dec. 23, 1826, U.S.Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), 3 Miller 269 [hereinafter Hawaii Articles]. McClure's
historical summary of the executive agreement power includes an additional agreement
signed with the king of Raiatea, nominally a dependency of Tahiti. See MCCLURE, supra
note 31, at 56. Miller's compilation, however, does not list this as a separate agreement.
See 3 Miller at 256-60, Notes.
178. Convention for Adjusting Certain Claims, Nov. 25, 1829, U.S.-Colom., 3 Miller
523 [hereinafter 1829 Colombian Claims Settlement]; Confirmation of Thirteen Claims
Agreements and of an Agreement Regarding the Rate of Exchange, June 15, 1829, U.S.Braz., 3 Miller 485 [hereinafter Brazilian Claims Settlement].
179. Settlement of Claims, Agreement, Jan. 19, 1832, U.S.-Port., 3 Miller 653
[hereinafter Portugal Claims Settlement].
180. Settlement of the Claim for the Ship Mary and Her Cargo, Mar. 25, 1839, U.S.Neth., 4 Miller 179 [hereinafter 1839 Netherlands Claims Settlement].
181. Commercial Regulations, signed by the Chiefs of the Samoan Islands, Nov. 5,
1839, U.S.-Samoan Islands, 4 Miller 241 [hereinafter Samoa Regulations].
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precedent should encompass only those incidents in which the U.S.
executive asserted a unilateral power to make promises to foreign
nations on behalf of the United States. A number of the foregoing
"agreements" do not meet this standard in all respects.
For convenience of discussion we may divide the twelve
candidates between claims settlement agreements (of which there are
seven) and other agreements. Of the agreements other than
settlement agreements, four of the five require significant
qualification. For example, the Rush-Bagot Agreement, although
often cited as a critical early nontreaty agreementy z received a
belated Senate approval under the Article H, Section 2 procedure. 8 3
President Monroe initially proposed to make the agreement on his
own authority (perhaps fearing that, in light of the just-concluded war
with Great Britain, it might encounter opposition). However, he was
persuaded otherwise, in part by his own advisers and in part by the
British, who wanted to avoid controversy as to the agreement's
binding effect.Y4 Monroe accordingly submitted the agreement to
the Senate with a note asking whether this was the type of agreement
requiring Senate approval; the Senate (implicitly answering in the
affirmative) gave its advice and consent to the agreement, in
accordance with Article II, Section 2, approximately a year after it
was first signed. 5 Thus, although Monroe apparently believed he
might have some independent power with respect to some types of
international agreements, the incident is not evidence for a common
understanding of such a power.
Another three of the agreements are problematic for a different
reason: they do not appear, upon close examination, actually to be
undertakings of the United States. The commercial agreements with
Hawaii and Tahiti were negotiated by a single naval captain, Thomas
Jones, operating without specific instructions, and do not appear to
have been approved or ratified by any U.S. President. 6 The
182. See, e.g., MCCLURE, supra note 31, at 49-50; 5 MOORE, supra note 57, at 214-15;
McDougal & Lans, supra note 31, at 247 n.138.
183. Rush-Bagot Agreement, supra note 175, 18(2) Stat. 296, 2 Miller 645 (Senate
resolution of approval and consent on Apr. 16, 1818).
184. See 2 Miller at 647-48, Notes.
185. See 18(2) Stat. 296 (1818) (reflecting Senate resolution of advice and consent
dated April 16, 1818); 2 Miller 645 (same); see also Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at
816-17 & n.57 (questioning relevance of Rush-Bagot Agreement to history of the exercise
of executive agreement power).
186. See Tahiti Articles, supra note 177, 3 Miller 249; Hawaii Articles, supra note 177,
3 Miller 269. Miller adds that
it seems that Captain Jones regarded the articles, to the extent that they
constituted an agreement, as provisional and operative only "until the
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arrangement with Samoa suffers similar difficulties. It was likewise
the work of a single naval captain, John Wilkes, again operating
without specific instructions as to the making of agreements.'17 It is
styled more as an enactment of local law than as an international
agreement: the document is entitled "Commercial Regulations" and
carries the signature of Wilkes as a "witness" rather than as an agent
signing on behalf of the United States.'

Although it imposes

obligations upon U.S. commercial ships in Samoa (as would be
expected as a matter of local law), it does not appear to impose
international obligations upon the United States as a nation." 9 As
with the Hawaii and Tahiti agreements, there is no record of any U.S.
President embracing the Samoa arrangement as an international act
of the United States. 190
With respect to the settlement agreements, at least two of the

seven are subject to serious objections. Each of the seven involved
individualized private claims by U.S. citizens against a foreign
government arising from the detention or seizure of a U.S. merchant
ship in alleged violation of treaty obligations or customary
international law. 191 Nineteenth-century rules of jurisdiction and
immunity made suit by a private party against a foreign sovereign
essentially impossible; 192 realistically the only way a U.S. citizen's
private claim against a foreign government might be vindicated was
by negotiation through the U.S. embassy. The private party typically
requested State Department assistance, and the U.S. minister in the
relevant nation raised the claim with that government and secured
President's pleasure could be known." So far as the record shows, the pleasure
of the President never was made known in the matter; no record appears of any
official notice of the articles ....
Tahiti Articles, supra note 177, 3 Miller at 256, Notes. These objections would also apply
to Jones's agreement with the king of Raiatea, see McClure, supra note 31, at 56, were
one inclined to count that as a separate executive agreement.
187. See Samoa Regulations, supra note 181,4 Miller at 252, Notes.
188. Wilkes himself apparently saw the incident as an enactment of local law at the
behest of the United States, rather than an international agreement; he stated that his
object was "to procure the formal enactment of laws and regulations which might secure
to our whaleships a certainty of protection and security." Id- at 252, Notes (citing
Wilkes's report of his voyage).
189. See Samoa Regulations, supra note 181,4 Miller 241.
190. See id. at 244, Notes.
191. See 1839 Netherlands Claims Settlement, supra note 180, 4 Miller 180; Portugal
Claims Settlement, supra note 179, 3 Miller 659; 1829 Colombian Claims Settlement,
supra note 178, 3 Miller 528; Brazilian Claims Settlement, supra note 178, 3 Miller 487;
Russian Claims Settlement, supra note 176, 3 Miller 205; 1825 Colombian Claims
Settlement, supra note 176, 3 Miller 197; Wilmington Packet Agreement, supra note 173, 5
Miller 1075.
192. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
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what payment could be negotiated. The agreements entered into in
connection with such events involved an undertaking by the foreign
government to pay a sum of money and an undertaking by the United
States to accept that sum as a final settlement of the claim. 93 Where
the claim was paid in full, the "settlement" involved only a one-sided
obligation to pay; the United States and the private claimant
effectively surrendered no asserted right. As a result, such
"agreements" may not be said to involve an undertaking on the part
of the United States and might not serve as meaningful precedents.
Two of the seven agreements under study, the 1829 settlement with
Colombia9 4and the 1832 settlement with Portugal, involved full
payment.
Subtracting these doubtful entrants, one is left with one military
agreement 95 and five settlements of claims' 96-- not an impressive
record for 50 years of practice. Further, the bulk of these agreements
occurred near the end of the period. Aside from the Wilmington
Packet settlement in 1799, the first twenty-four years of postconstitutional practice saw no such agreements, and in the first thirtysix years there was only one, and that during the exigencies of
wartime.
Nonetheless, U.S. presidents did sometimes make international
promises on their own authority. Consider President Madison's 1813
agreement with Great Britain regarding prisoners of war. The
operative sections outlined, among other things, where prisoners of
war were to be housed, how they were to be treated, upon what terms
they would be exchanged, details of their conditions of parole, and
even how costs of exchanges were to be allocated.1 7 Plainly,
193. See supra note 191 (citing agreements).
194. As to the Colombian agreement, Miller's editorial notes reflect that "the amounts
of the claims were not questioned; the calculations were according to the figures of the
claimants." 1829 Colombian Claims Settlement, supra note 178, 3 Miller at 196, Notes.
With respect to the Portuguese settlement, President Jackson's message to Congress
describing the settlement states that the claims were to be paid in full. See Portugal
Claims Settlement, supra note 179, 3 Miller at 657, Notes.
195. See Prisoner of War Agreement, supra note 174,2 Miller 557.
196. See 1839 Netherlands Claims Settlement, supra note 180, 4 Miller 179; Brazilian
Claims Settlement, supra note 178, 3 Miller 485; Russian Claims Settlement, supra note
176, 3 Miller 201; 1825 Colombian Claims Settlement, supra note 176, 3 Miller 195;
Wilmington PacketAgreement, supra note 173, 5 Miller 1075.

197. See Prisoner of War Agreement, supra note 174, 2 Miller 557, arts. II-IX. For
example: "All noncombatants that is to say surgeons and surgeons mates, Pursers,
secretaries, chaplains and Schoolmasters ...if taken shall be immediately released
without exchange ....

."

(art. II); "British prisoners taken and brought into the United

States shall be stationed at [list of ports] and at no other ports or places in the United
States." (art. III); "Whenever a Prisoner is admitted to parole the form of such parole
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therefore, by this instrument the United States promised
performance of certain acts to Great Britain. If one believes (as the
constitutional generation appeared to) that the President lacked
unilateral power to enter into a "treaty" by the negative implication
of Article II, Section 2, and if one believes (as Raoul Berger asserts)
that the term "treaty" encompasses every species of international
agreement, Madison's agreement would appear to be constitutionally
infirm. But there is no record that anyone at the time raised such an
objection.
Further, in five of the post-constitutional settlement agreements
the President did make promises to foreign nations on behalf of the
United States. For example, in the 1825 settlement with Russia, the
Russian government was willing to recognize only a portion of the
damages asserted. The U.S. government (on the authority of
President John Quincy Adams) agreed that if Russia would pay that
reduced amount, the U.S. government would make no further
assertion of claims in respect of the subject injury. 19 Similarly, in the
1839 agreement with The Netherlands, the U.S. government not only
agreed to accept a compromised payment as full settlement of the
claim, but also assumed responsibility for any further claims against
the Dutch government (including claims by non-U.S. parties) arising
out of the relevant incident. 199 Again, if "treaty" encompasses all
agreements with foreign nations, it is hard not to see these
agreements as "treaties"-and yet apparently no suggestion was
made that they be approved through the Article II, Section 2
procedure. While these incidents may not amount to the
shall be as follows-[a specific form is attached]." (art. IV); "No prisoner shall be struck
with the hand, whip, stick or any other weapon whatever ....
" (art. VII); "To carry on a
regular exchange of prisoners between the two countries, four vessels shall be employed,
two of which shall be provided by the British government and two by the government of
the United States." (art. IX). Id at 557-63.
198. See Russian Claims Settlement, supra note 176, 3 Miller at 201, Notes (giving
historical background).
199. See 1839 Netherlands Claims Settlement, supra note 180, 4 Miller 179. By the
terms of that settlement:
I do hereby assume, [wrote the U.S. representative] in the name of the
Government of the United-States the obligation ...to Answer all demands or
applications which may in [the] future be addressed to the Government of his
Said Majesty [King of the Netherlands] ...whenever such demands or
applications may be referred for that purpose by the Netherlands' Government
to that of the United States; the latter engaging to Stand in the place and Stead
of the Netherlands' government, in all respects and for all purposes and
liabilities connected with, or arising from the Seizure and detention of the
property referred to.
4 Miller 179, 179.
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commanding historical record modem authorities often suggest,
there is some historical evidence that, in the post-ratification period,
some species of international agreement in addition to a "treaty" was

recognized.
This evidence may be strengthened somewhat by two further
observations. First, the experience of the next twenty years-

extending the historical period under examination essentially up to
the beginning of the Civil War-affords considerably more
precedent. Continuing the trend of the 1820s and 1830s, the volume

of unilateral executive agreements increased, for a total of around
thirty-five agreements between 1840 and 1860.200 It is noteworthy,
moreover, that the Presidents during this period, with the exception
of James Polk, were advocates of neither strong executive powers nor

an expansive reading of the Constitution.20 1 For example, James
Buchanan-who

in four years

concluded as many executive

agreements (twelve) as were concluded in the first fifty years after
ratification2 ° -manifested an extraordinarily cautious interpretation
200. See Miller, supra note 172, vols. 5-8. My own count is 38 executive agreements,
but as with the 1789-1839 period, there may be some dispute as to which international
accords concluded during this period are appropriately counted as executive agreements.
201. See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIc HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
309-39 (4th ed. 1955) (discussing diplomacy of the relevant period).
202. See (1) Convention for the Settlement of the Case of George W. Johnston, Oct.
18, 1860, U.S.-Venez., 8 Miller 577 [hereinafter Johnston Settlement Agreement]; (2)
Settlement of the Case of Walter Dickson, Dispatch of James Williams, American
Minister Resident in Turkey, to Secretary of State, reflecting terms of oral agreement,
July 19, 1860, U.S.-Turk., 8 Miller 519 [hereinafter Dickson Settlement Agreement]; (3)
Settlement of the Claims of Hemenway & Co. and Alsop & Co., Notes of Geronimo
Urmeneta, Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, to John Bigler, American Minister, and
answering note of American Minister, Jan. 16-28, 1860, U.S.-Chile, 8 Miller 449
[hereinafter Hemenway & Co. Settlement Agreement]; (4) Agreement Concerning the
Joint Occupation of San Juan Island, Correspondence between Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott,
General in Chief of the U.S. Army, and James Douglas, C.B., Governor of the Colony of
Vancouver, Oct. 25-Nov. 9, 1859, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Miller 281 [hereinafter San Juan Island
Agreement]; (5) Settlement of the Case of Edward Newton Perkins, Notes of John P.
Stockton, American Minister Resident, to Giacomo Cardinal Antonelli, Papal Secretary
of State, and answering note of the Papal Secretary of State to the American Minister
Resident, June 24-July 26, 1859, U.S.-Papal States, 8 Miller 267 [hereinafter Perkins
Settlement Agreement]; (6) Settlement of the Case of the American Bark Mermaid; Note
of William L. G. Smith, American consul at Shanghai, to Sieh, taotai at Shanghai, and
answering note of the taotai, Oct. 26, 1858, 8 Miller 13 [hereinafter 1858 China Claims
Settlement]; (7) Convention for the Settlement of the Case of the American Whaling Ship
Franklin, Sept. 10, 1858, U.S.-Chile, 8 Miller 3 [hereinafter 1858 Chile Claims
Settlement]; (8) Convention for the Settlement of the Case of the Brig Horatio, Feb. 27,
1858, U.S.-Venez., 7 Miller 727; (9) Settlement of the Case of the Brig Esmerelda, Note of
John Appleton, Acting Secretary of State, to Comte de Sartiges, Minister of France, and
answering note to the Minister of France, June 10-Dec. 26, 1857, U.S.-France, 7 Miller
591 [hereinafter 1857 French Claims Settlement]; (10) Agreement for a Mixed
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of executive power both in international affairs and with respect to
the impending secession crisis. 2°3 Moreover, Congress during this
time had a number of powerful leaders-Webster, Clay, Calhoun and
others-who gave attention to its prerogatives (as shown, for
example, in the sharp criticism of Polk for his supposedly
unconstitutional provocation of the Mexican War).2 °4
Thus,
limitation of executive power was a topic of attention, the
congressional leadership was powerful and presidential claimants
weak; yet there is no record of concern over the expanding use of
unilateral executive agreements. 2 5 To be sure, these agreements
were for the most part of no great significance, but the fact that they
occurred essentially unremarked suggests that no one saw the
practice as ahistorical or inconsistent with earlier assumptions.
Second, a number of international accords were concluded in the
early years of constitutional history on the authority of the President
Commission for the Case of the Whaling Ship George Howland, Nov. 13, 1857, U.S.Ecuador, 7 Miller 707 [hereinafter 1857 Ecuadorian Claims Settlement]; (11) Settlement
of the Case of John Adams, June 4, 1857, U.S.-Peru, 7 Miller 587 [hereinafter Adams
Settlement Agreement]; (12) Settlement of the Case of American Shipmasters at the
Chincha Islands, Note of Manuel Ortiz de Zavallos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru,
to John Randolph Clay, Minister of the United States, and answering note of the Minister
of the United States, Apr.8-9, 1857, U.S.-Peru, 7 Miller 503 [hereinafter Chincha Islands
Settlement Agreement].
203. On Buchanan, see generally PHILIP S. KLEIN, PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN, A
BIOGRAPHY (1962); ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES BUCHANAN (1975).
See also BEMIS, supra note 201, at 327 (discussing Buchanan's deference to Congress in
U.S.-Mexico relations); James Buchanan, Second Annual Message to Congress,
December 6, 1858, reprintedin 8 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN: COMPRISING HIS
SPEECHES, STATE PAPERS, AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 246 (John Bassett Moore
ed., 1910) (showing highly limited interpretation of executive war power). Buchanan had,
moreover, served as Secretary of State under President James Polk and Minister to Great
Britain under President Franklin Pierce, so the exercise of executive authority in
international affairs no doubt received his considered attention.
204. Polk, on his own initiative, ordered U.S. military forces into territory disputed
with Mexico; after the Mexican army attacked these forces, Polk asked Congress to
declare war. Although Congress acceded to the request, numerous voices during the
debate protested Polk's action as inconsistent with Congress's constitutional war power.
See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 784-86 (1846) (statements of Senators Calhoun,
Morehead, Archer and Clayton). Two years later, the House approved (by an 85-81 vote)
a resolution describing the conflict as "a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun
by the President of the United States." Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1848). See
LouIs FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 31-34 (1995) (discussing constitutional
criticism of Polk's unilateral action).
205. See BEMIS, supra note 201, at 309-39. The Senate was, moreover, well aware of
the practice. See, e.g., James Buchanan, Message to the Senate, Feb. 9, 1860, 8 Miller at
143, Notes (submitting a claims settlement agreement for advice and consent but noting
that "[u]sually it is not deemed necessary to consult the Senate in regard to similar
instruments relating to private claims of small amount when the aggrieved parties are
satisfied with their terms").
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plus a majority of both houses of Congress. The leading examples
26
are a number of postal agreements authorized by acts of Congress
and concluded between the U.S. Postmaster General and various
European powers to regularize international mail delivery.2 °7 A few
additional examples beyond the postal agreements may also be
identified, but the practice was otherwise not widespread.0 '
Of course it may be argued that Congress has an independent
implicit treaty-making power conveyed by Article I of the
Constitution and that these agreements were constitutionally
concluded as "congressional treaties."209 If so, their existence adds
nothing to the present inquiry.
But at least some of the
Constitution's framers apparently did not share this view. Hamilton,
in the Camillus essays, attacked the idea that Congress (as opposed
to the Senate) had any Article I treaty power 10 Nonetheless,
206. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1792, 1 Stat. 236 (1792) (authorizing Postmaster General
to enter into agreements respecting foreign mail delivery); Act of June 15, 1844, 5 Stat.
718 (1844) (directing that "the Postmaster General be ... authorized to make such
arrangements as may be deemed expedient with the Post Office Department of the
British government for the transmission of the British mail ... between Boston and
Canada); id. (authorizing postal agreements with Germany and France).
207. See MCCLURE, supra note 31, at 38-40 & n.16 (describing early postal
agreements); see also 19 Op. Att'y Gen. 513, 520 (1890) (noting that the Constitution "has
been interpreted to mean that the power vested in the President to make treaties, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, does not exclude the right of Congress to vest in
the Postmaster-General power to conclude conventions with foreign government for the
... carriage of foreign mails") (opinion of William H. Taft).
208. The only agreements plainly falling into this category during the relevant periods
are (1) Protocol of the Cession of Horseshoe Reef, Dec. 9, 1850, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 18(2) Stat.
325, 5 Miller 905, approved by Act of Mar. 3, 1849, 9 Stat. 38 (1849) and Act of Mar. 3,
1851, 9 Stat. 627 (1851) [hereinafter Horseshoe Reef Agreement]; and (2) Settlement of
Claims, Note of the Rt. Hon. Richard Pakenham, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty, to James Buchanan, Secretary of State, and
answering note of the Secretary of State, Nov. 10-26, 1845, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 4 Miller 779
[hereinafter 1845 British Claims Settlement], approved by Congress pursuant to the
Appropriations Act of May 8, 1846, 9 Stat. 6 (1846). McClure identifies several
additional informal trade reciprocity arrangements authorized by Congress and
implemented by the President, including an arrangement with Austria in 1829 and one
with Great Britain in 1830; Miller's compilation, however, declines to recognize these as
formal agreements. See MCCLURE, supra note 31, at 57-59; cf. 3 Miller at 521, Notes
(describing the arrangement with Austria).
209. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 919 (arguing for independent Article I
power to conclude international agreements).
210. See Letters of Camillus, No. 36, in 6 HAMiLTON, supra note 163, at 168-69.
Washington appeared to agree. See George Washington, Message to Congress, Mar. 30,
1796, reprintedin 5 MOORE, supra note 57, at 225 ("[T]he power of making treaties is
exclusively vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."
(emphasis added)). Yet Washington's Postmaster General, Timothy Pickering, concluded
the first postal convention (with Canada) outside of the Article II, Section 2 process. See
MCCLURE, supra note 31, at 38-39.
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Hamilton and those who shared his view apparently did not think
that congressionally-approved agreements such as the postal
conventions required supermajority approval by the Senate.
Presumably that was because Hamilton thought they were not
treaties: as Congress lacked treaty power, congressional approval
would not have been constitutionally relevant otherwise. Thus,
Hamilton and his allies must have recognized a category of nontreaty
international, agreements.
Accordingly, post-constitutional practice seems to provide some
support for the idea that "treaty" was not understood to encompass
every international agreement. Taken with the textual evidence that,
at least with regard to state practice, some kinds of international
agreements were accorded treatment different from "treaties," and
the pre-1789 international law terminology (with which the
constitutional generation was conversant) distinguishing between
"treaties" and other international agreements, the first step of the
executive's argument is fairly obtained: the treaty clause of Article
II, Section 2 does not, as an original matter, seem to ericompass every
form of international agreement.

IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The foregoing shows an understanding of the constitutional text
that recognized a class of nontreaty agreements distinct from the
"treaties" encompassed by Article II, Section 2. The next step,
therefore, is to identify the difference between treaties and nontreaty
agreements.21 '
In the ensuing section, I argue first that the difference must lie in
the substance of the undertaking. Other differences have been
suggested. International understandings could be classified according
to their form or the manner in which they are concluded, such that
(for example) one category might encompass understandings
211. Much modem commentary treats identifying this difference as an impossible task.
McDougal & Lans state:
[T]here are no significant criteria, under the Constitution of the United States or
in the diplomatic practice of this government, by which the genus 'treaty' can be
distinguished from the genus 'executive agreement,' other than the single
criterion of the procedure or authority by which the United States' consent to
ratification is obtained.
McDougal & Lans, supra note 31, at 199. In Professor Tribe's view, "[w]hat the Founders
saw as the precise definitions of treaties, alliances, confederations, agreements and
compacts is largely lost to us now. Consequently, line-drawing in this area is especially
complex." Tribe, supra note 6, at 1266.
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undertaken with elaborate formalities while another category might
include informal arrangements achieved by an exchange of
diplomatic notes.212 Alternatively, international understandings
could be classified according to their effect-that is, their status (or
lack of status) as binding obligations under international or domestic
law.
Commentators have suggested, for example, that only
"treaties," and not other forms of agreements, have the attributes of
international law.213 I argue, however, that substantial structural and
historical considerations exclude the non-substantive categories as
realistic candidates for the constitutional distinction, and therefore
that the distinction recognized by the constitutional generation must
turn upon the subject matter of the agreements.
In considering the substantive distinction between treaties and
nontreaty agreements, I conclude that structure, history, and usage
suggest a distinction based upon the length and importance of the
agreement.
The uniqueness of international agreements, as
compared to mere policy or even to legislation, is that typically they
cannot easily be undone without cost, even if the policymaking
authorities of the United States are convinced that they should be.
Violating an international commitment may carry substantial
diplomatic and reputational consequences as well as the potential for
military confrontation.214
Thus, international agreements are
limitations of sovereignty in that they prospectively limit the nation's
freedom of action. This feature underlies the "check" of Senate
advice and consent, for it is this attribute that commends
international agreement-making-and not other forms of
policymaking-to supermajority limitations. However, with respect
to agreements that are of limited duration in all but minor respects
(and thus in which the prospective limitation of sovereignty is
minimal), one might expect the supermajority check to be of less
importance. This structural supposition is supported by international
212. See, for example, the statement of Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v. Jennison, 39
U.S. 540, 571 (1840): "For when we speak of 'a treaty' we mean an instrument written
and executed with the formalities customary among nations." Similarly, a State
Department Report observed "[a]n exchange of diplomatic notes has often sufficed,
without any further formality ... to effect purposes more usually accomplished by the
more complex machinery of treaties." Report of Secretary of State Foster to President
Cleveland, December 7, 1892, reprinted in 5 MOORE, supra note 57, at 215. As noted,
McDougal's view appears to distinguish solely on the method of entry-i.e., whether or
not Senate advice or consent was obtained. See McDougal & Lans, supranote 31, at 199.
213. See infra notes 225-26.

214. See TIM

FEDERALIST

No. 3, at 95 (John Jay) (Isaak Kramnick ed., Penguin

Books 1987) (discussing the dangers of war arising from treaty violations).
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law usage and by post-constitutional diplomatic practice, both of
which saw the "treaty" as an important, long-term, sovereigntylimiting undertaking.
A.

Why the Differences Between "Treaties" and "Nontreaty
Agreements" CannotBe Matters of Mere Form and Effect

1. Failure of the Distinction Based on Form
As indicated above, some modem views have dismissed the
distinction between treaties and nontreaty agreements as merely a
matter of form. In its less sophisticated version, this view would
simply assign the term "treaty" to agreements approved through the
Article II, Section 2 procedure, and the term "agreement" to those
which are not.2 15 A more refined version would assert that
understandings accompanied by elaborate formalities (formal
instruments, signing ceremonies, etc.) should be denominated
"treaties" while less formal arrangements (oral agreements,
understandings accomplished by the exchange of diplomatic notes,
etc.) are properly labeled simply "agreements. 216 Neither view,
however, is supported by the constitutional text read as a whole, by
historical usage, or by diplomatic practice.
If the characterization of an agreement as treaty or nontreaty
depended solely upon form or upon the manner in which it was
concluded, presumably the President (as chief negotiator) could
substantially control the form and hence the designation of an
agreement for constitutional purposes. If the President had that
power, however, it would render the treaty clause essentially
meaningless, for the President could evade the clause simply by a
215. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH, THE AMERICAN CHIEF ExEcUTIVE: THE
PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNORSHIP 503 (1966).
216. Suggestive of this view, there was undoubtedly an element of formality in the old
Roman law distinction, repeated by Grotius, between the foedus and alias pactus. As
described, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text, the foedus involved ritual
ceremonies while other Roman agreements did not. Moreover, the third Roman/Grotian
category, sponsio, was primarily distinguished by its form, or more precisely the manner
in which the agreement was concluded: that term referred to an agreement concluded by
an agent but beyond the agent's authority and thus involved a wholly discretionary
decision by the principal whether to accept it. Wolff stated:
[S]ponsions do not differ in their subject-matter from treaties, but only in the
respect that the latter are made by right of sovereign power, and of the one
having its mandate, but the former are made without this right and without a
mandate. Therefore the subject-matter of sponsions can be as varied as that of
treaties [foedera].
WOLFF, supra note 148, § 467.
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change in form-a matter over which the Senate would appear to
have no control and in which the foreign party would ordinarily have
little interest. 17 Had that been the understanding, the statements in
the ratifying conventions and elsewhere218 that the power to make
treaties had been purposefully denied the President because of the
dangers of placing such power in a single person become nonsensical:
if the President could accomplish the same result by a different
instrument, the protection applauded by the founding generation
would be entirely ineffective.
Moreover, the antifederalist attack on Article II, Section 2
contended that approval of treaties was too easy: somewhat
fancifully, the opponents of the Constitution argued that because
Article II, Section 2 required only two-thirds of the Senators present
to approve, and because a majority constituted a quorum, then a
treaty could be approved by only two-thirds of half the Senators,
which in practice meant only ten Senators representing five states. 219
On the other hand, not one antifederalist discussion of the treaty
power mentioned the danger that the President alone might
accomplish what they feared ten Senators could do. Yet if
presidential "agreements" differ from treaties only in formality, that
would be the result. Had this been an available interpretation,
assuredly the antifederalists-who strained to produce the contorted
and paranoid argument concerning betrayal by ten Senators-would
have mentioned it."2
The "formality" argument also entirely ignores Article I, Section
10. If "treaties" are distinguished only by form, then states may (with
217. A later example of this sort of manipulation was the 1905 Dominican
protectorate. President Roosevelt initially negotiated the U.S. role in the Dominican
Republic as a treaty that he submitted to the Senate. When the Senate refused to consent
to ratification, Roosevelt concluded essentially the same substantive agreement with the
Dominicans on his own authority; two years later, he resubmitted the formal agreement
to a more cooperative Senate and received its consent. See MCCLURE, supra note 31, at
30-31.
218. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
219. See 3 ELLIOIT, supra note 115, at 500-15 (recording statements of Patrick Henry
to Virginia ratifying convention); FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
197 (1994) (discussing the antifederalist position); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS:

POLITCS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

150 (1996)

(discussing the speculative nature of antifederalist objections).
220. Again, it is worth noting the divergence of the argument with respect to executive
agreements and the argument with respect to congressional-executive agreements.
Because McDougal and related writers were actually advocating congressional-executive
agreements, their distinction based on the form of ratification did not materially
encounter the objection noted in the text. The congressional-executive agreement
procedure gives the President some flexibility, but not unchecked power.
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congressional approval) enter into any understanding with foreign
governments so long as those understandings remain informal."' But
there is no reason to think that the drafters would have employed the

elaborate scheme of Article I, Section 10 (no state treaties; state
agreements only with congressional approval) merely to force states

to adopt informal, rather than formal, diplomacy.
Post-constitutional practice also does not support a distinction
based on form. While some of the early nontreaty agreements, such
as the Wilmington Packet settlement, are reflected in an informal
exchange of diplomatic notes,'

others have the physical appearance

of a treaty, with ceremonial recitations, contractual forms, and dual
signatures.?

Moreover, some agreements submitted to the Senate

for ratification, such as the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement, have an
informal appearance. 2 4 As a result, it seems implausible to argue
that the constitutional distinction turned on the form of the
agreement, as that argument is not supported by constitutional text,
constitutional structure, international law usage, or postconstitutional practice.
2. Failure of the Distinction Based on Effect
With respect to effect, one could argue that nontreaty
agreements are understood to lack the force of treaties under either
international law or domestic law. However, neither of the proposed
distinctions withstands scrutiny. First, consider international law.
Professor Borchard, in the course of his debates in the 1940s with
Myres McDougal and others concerning the treaty power, asserted
that nontreaty agreements (unlike treaties) are not binding under
international law.' Similarly Justice Sutherland, author of Belmont,
221. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (noting
that under Article I, Section 10, states cannot enter into treaties but may enter into
agreements with congressional consent).
222. See, e.g., Wilmington Packet Agreement, supra note 173,5 Miller 1075.
223. See, e.g., Convention for the Settlement of the Cases of the Schooner Economy,
the Schooner Ben Alam and the Vessels San Jose, Carolta and Gertrudis,May 1, 1852,
U.S.-Venez., 5 Miller 1063 [hereinafter 1852 Venezuelan Claims Settlement]; Convention
for the Settlement of the Case of the Brig Native, Nov. 16, 1846, U.S.-Venez., 5 Miller 103
[hereinafter 1846 Venezuelan Claims Settlement]; 1829 Colombian Claims Settlement,
supra note 178, 3 Miller 523; Prisoner of War Agreement, supranote 174, 2 Miller 557.
224. See, e.g., Rush-Bagot Agreement, supra note 175, 18(2) Stat. 296, 2 Miller 645
(agreement effected by exchange of diplomatic notes).
225. See Borchard, Reply, supra note 31, at 628-29, 639-41; id. at 641 ("[W]hile it is
perhaps a moral obligation of the signing President to observe the executive agreement
during his administration, no such obligation, moral or legal, rests upon his successor.");
Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement, supra note 31, at 678-80 & nn.48-60.
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spoke of "protocols," unlike treaties, as "constituting only a moral
obligation" in international practice.2 6 This distinction has structural
appeal:
it leaves the President free to negotiate informal
arrangements without committing the nation and allows for the check
of Senate ratification when binding obligations are to be undertaken.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that the framers might have
designed such a system.
Undoubtedly, the Borchard/Sutherland view is correct up to a
point. An essential attribute of a treaty under international law is
that it is binding '7 This binding nature was recognized at the time
the Constitution was written, as it is today.2 s Similarly, international
practice recognizes (however reluctantly) the idea of a nonbinding
arrangement between nations, and such arrangements have at times
been an important part of U.S. diplomatic practice. 9 Surely, as
Borchard maintained, such nonbinding arrangements are not treaties
in the Article II, Section 2 sense, and, if one accepts the model of the
President as the primary actor in shaping U.S. foreign policy,20 such
arrangements would be within the President's constitutional power.
However, these observations do not fully identify the
constitutional distinction between treaties and nontreaty agreements.
Rather, the original presidential nontreaty power, properly
understood, is broader than Borchard would allow. Recall the
arguments upon which that constitutional distinction is founded: the
constitutional text (principally Article I, Section 10), international
law usage, and post-constitutional practice.231 All of these sources
indicate the existence of a category of nontreaty agreements binding
226.

SUTHERLAND, supra note 76, at 120.
227. See JANIS, supra note 41, at 9-15. Recall that the word "treaty" equates to the
Latin foedus, which was an obligation carrying the penalty of divine retribution if
violated. See supra text accompanying note 144.
228. See GROTIUS, supra note 143, bk. II, ch. XV; VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS,
supra note 145, bk. II, § 163.
229. See Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement, supra note 31, at 679 & n.54
(discussing the exercise of U.S. diplomacy through nonbinding agreements, especially the
Open Door Policy in China in 1900 and the Root-Takahira and Lansing-Ishii
"agreements" between the United States and Japan in 1908 and 1917). A leading modem
example is the set of human rights understandings between the United States and the
Soviet Union known as the Helsinki Accords. See Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1, 1975, at 323,
14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Accords]; Statement of President Gerald Ford on
signature of the Helsinki Accords, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 11, 1975, at 204, 205 ("I would
emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any
participatingstate." (emphasis added)).
230. See infra Part V.
231. See supraPart III.
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in international law.

First, with respect to text, the primary evidence is that Article I,
Section 10 permits states to enter into "agreements"

but not

"treaties" with foreign nations. 321 Borchard's view would require an
interpretation permitting states to enter only nonbinding agreements

with foreign nations (and to require congressional approval even for
those). This view seems implausible on several grounds. It
disregards the ordinary meaning of the word "agreement," which

the ordinary meaning, some
connotes a binding obligation. Despite
"agreements" may be nonbinding. 1 3 However, it is a remarkable
interpretation to assert-as a proponent of Borchard's view must
do-that the sine qua non of an "agreement" under Article I, Section

10 is that the parties do not, in fact, agree to anything. Moreover, it
seems odd that, if the only understandings states may achieve with
foreign countries are nonbinding, the drafters of the Constitution

would have thought congressional approval should be required. The
danger of an international agreement is, of course, that it cannot be
broken without international consequences; that being so, a stateinitiated international agreement is a partial qualification of
However, these concerns are not
congressional sovereignty.?
present with respect to a nonbinding agreement; thus it is not clear
why, if state activity is so restricted, Congress need be involved.

Finally, in practice no one has ever interpreted Article I, Section 10
(or its predecessor, Article VI of the Articles of Confederation) to

limit states to nonbinding international agreements. 35 Thus any
interpretation of Article II, Section 2 suggesting that agreements

concluded without the consent of the Senate are nonbinding in
232. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see supra Part III. Relatedly, Article VI of the
Articles of Confederation, on which this provision was based, required congressional
approval of "treaties" and "agreements" with foreign nations but only of "treaties"-and
not "agreements"-among states. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
233. See supranote 225.
234. Absent the agreement, Congress generally could preempt state foreign relations
activity, but with the agreement, Congress might not be able to preempt that activity
without forcing the state to violate the agreement and thus incur the international
consequences.
235. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 153 & nn. 15-17. Such an interpretation would also
pose difficulties for interstate compacts under Article I, Section 10. These compacts are,
after all, described not only in the same clause but by the same words: "No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State or with a foreign Power." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. If "treaties" are binding and
"agreements" are not, this language suggests that states may enter only nonbinding
agreements with each other. See id. Yet interstate compacts, before and after the
Constitution, have always been thought to be binding. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 128, at 691-704.
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international law -seems inconsistent with the ordinary reading of
Article I, Section 10.
Second, the international law parlance of Vattel, Wolff, and
Grotius that distinguished between "treaties" and "other
agreements" did not do so on the basis of their binding effect.
Rather, each of these authors thought that all of the international
agreements they discussed were of a binding nature. In Vattel's view,
for example:
The public compacts, called conventions, articles of
agreement, &c., when they are made between sovereigns,
differ from treaties only in their object. What we have said
of the validity of treaties, of their execution, of their
dissolution, and of the obligations and rights that flow from
them, is all applicable to the various conventions which
6
sovereigns may conclude with each other.3
Thus, if the framers had the Vattel/Wolff/Grotius terminology in
mind in drafting the Constitution (as seems likely), they would not
have been thinking of nontreaty agreements as nonbinding.
Third, post-constitutional practice does not support the
proposition that nontreaty agreements were seen as nonbinding.
Many of the nontreaty agreements undertaken at that time contain
the language of binding commitment. The 1813 executive agreement
between the United States and Great Britain concerning prisoners of
war states, for example:
This cartel is to be submitted for ratification to the
secretary of State for and in behalf of the government of the
United States and to the Right Honourable the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty for and in behalf of the
Government of Great Britain ... and it is further agreed
that after the mutual ratification of the cartel, either of the
parties on six months notice to the other may declare and
render the same null and no longer binding2 37
236. VATEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 145, bk. II, § 206 (emphasis added);
see also GROTIUS, supra note 143, bk. II, ch. XVI (discussing the binding nature of
international "promises" without distinguishing among types of agreements); VATrrL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 145, bk. II, § 163 ("Nations, therefore, and their
conductors, ought inviolably to observe their promises and their treaties."); WOLFF, supra
note 148, § 376 ("Nations and their rulers are bound to observe treaties and promises
[foedera etpromisae], and are bound by nature not to violate a promise given." (emphasis
added)).
237. Prisoner of War Agreement, supra note 174,2 Miller at 565 (emphasis added); see
also 1852 Venezuelan Claims Settlement, art. 3, supra note 223, 5 Miller at 1065 ("By the
fulfillment of the stipulations in the preceeding articles, all damages ... shall remain
completely and absolutely indemnified."); 1846 Venezuelan Claims Settlement, art. 1,

1998]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

None of the nontreaty agreements in this period contain any
language disclaiming binding effect. Moreover, as noted above, a
number of the early nontreaty agreements were of formal appearance
no different (on their face) from what one would expect in a treaty 38
It seems unusual to employ contractual formalities for something
considered nonbinding (particularly without any disclaimer as to
binding effect).
Finally, the binding nature of the early agreements was not
disputed. There does not appear to be any record in the early years
of U.S. diplomacy of an assertion that the terms of an international
understanding were not obligatory.-39 Rather, the frequent use of
nonbinding arrangements as instruments of policy-as noted by
Sutherland and Borchard-seems to be a more recent
development.0 °
Consequently, while Borchard was likely correct that Article II,
Section 2 did not preclude the President alone from entering into
nonbinding arrangements, 241 that does not explain the framers'
distinction between treaties and nontreaty agreements.
Some
nontreaty agreements likely are nonbinding, but it appears that the
original understanding also encompassed some nontreaty agreements
that nonetheless amounted to international obligations.
Distinguishing treaties from nontreaty agreements solely on the
basis of their domestic effect is even less plausible. One could argue
that although any sort of international agreement can be made, in
any form, by the President alone, it cannot become "the law of the
land" (by operation of the Supremacy Clause) unless it is approved as

supra note 223, 5 Miller at 104 (providing that the United States "shall have no right
hereafter to prefer any new claim that may have origin in the circumstances of this case");
1829 Colombian Claims Settlement, supra note 178, 3 Miller at 525 (reserving the "right"
of the United States to make certain additional claims in the future).
238. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
239. The 1829 agreement with Colombia recited that it constituted a compromise and
settlement of certain claims. See 1829 Colombian Claims Settlement, supra note 178, 3
Miller 523. When some of those same claims were reasserted before a subsequent
arbitral tribunal, they were disallowed-presumably on the grounds that they had been
relinquished in a prior binding agreement-and the United States did not object to this
result.
See id.; 2 JOHN BAsSETr MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNrrED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY
1418 (1898) (recording results of subsequent arbitration); 3 Miller at 529-30, Notes
(discussing subsequent history of the claims).
240. Borchard's earliest example is from 1894, concerning the termination of an 1890
tariff arrangement with Brazil. See Borchard, Reply, supra note 31, at 639-40 & n.90.
241. Or, by similar reasoning, agreements which impose no obligations upon the
United States.
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a treaty. 242 While such an argument is consistent with the language of

the Supremacy Clause, it accords poorly with the concerns of the
constitutional generation. The diminution of sovereignty associated
with an international agreement and its effect upon U.S. interests are
not driven by the agreement's status as domestic law. Many
important agreements lack domestic effect either because they
concern largely nondomestic issues (such as the NATO Treaty)243 or
because they are not intended to have domestic effect (such as
certain articles of the U.N. Charter).244 Affording the President
unilateral control over entry into such agreements-which would be
the effect of the distinction under discussion-would award
substantial power to the President and would be inconsistent with the
emphasis on the checking power of the Senate.
As a result of the controversy in the 1780s over navigation rights
on the Mississippi River, purely external agreements were much in
the framers' contemplation in the drafting of the Constitution. A
substantial concern at the time was that the national government
would by agreement with Spain concede rights to free navigation of
the Mississippi (a matter of great moment in the South and West but
of little interest to New York and New England). 245 The Continental
Congress had in fact entered into negotiations for such a treaty in
1786 but lacked the supermajority support needed to approve it
under the Articles of Confederation.246 This incident has been
attributed a substantial role in the decision to retain the
supermajority requirement in the new Constitution drafted soon
afterward. 24 7 Yet, such an agreement relinquishing the (asserted)
242. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
243. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 4 Bevans
828.
244. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir.
1985) (concluding that Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter are not intended to have
legal effect in the United States); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980)

(same).
245. Spain at that time controlled both banks of the Mississippi at New Orleans; hence,
it could close the Mississippi to U.S. navigation if it vished. The United States asserted a
right in international law (with little support in practice) of free navigation by upstream
nations. On the controversy, see BEMIS, supra note 201, at 73-81.
246. See id. at 78-79; see also MCDONALD, supra note 219, at 196-97 (discussing
sectional rift on this issue); Charles Warren, The MississippiRiver and the Treaty Clause

of the Constitution,2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 285 (1934) (identifying a majority-but
not a supermajority-in favor of accommodating Spain, composed of Connecticut,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island).
247. See BEMIS, supra note 201, at 79-80. Bemis states:
A few months later [after the Spanish negotiations] when the delegates to the
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rights of the United States under international law would not have
needed to have domestic effect, since it did not govern the actions of
U.S. parties but of Spain (which was not constrained by U.S.
domestic law in any event). Only the international law implications
of a Spanish agreement would have mattered; an interpretation that
would distinguish "treaties" under Article II, Section 2 solely by
domestic effect would permit the President alone to relinquish the
Mississippi navigation rights (as well as to approve NATO, the U.N.
Charter, etc.). That does not seem plausible in light of the founding
generation's particular concern to protect sectional interests from
adverse international (and purely external) arrangements. Again,
given the implausible attacks on Article II, Section 2 mounted by the
antifederalists,248 it seems inconceivable that, were this a plausible
interpretation, it would have gone unmentioned.
Moreover, distinguishing "treaties" as only those agreements
having domestic effect makes no sense in the context of the Article I
limitations upon the states.249 Such a view would allow the states to
enter any arrangement with a foreign power (if Congress approved)
unless the agreement would have legal effect in the United States, in
which case it could not be entered into even with the consent of
Congress. But one would expect that a state could always (subject to
federal law) give its agreements domestic effect over its own laws by
implementing legislation (even if the treaty itself lacked such effect),
and could never give its agreements domestic effect over federal law
(by virtue of the Supremacy Clause) no matter what the treaty
purported to provide. It is therefore nonsensical to suppose that a
state agreement purporting to have domestic effect should be singled
out for constitutional prohibition.
Finally, there is no post-constitutional evidence of a "domestic
effect" distinction. Many treaties ratified by the Article II, Section 2
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 were drawing up the new Constitution the men
from the southern states remembered the dangers, so recently presented to
them, of any constitution which would allow a bare majority to ratify a treaty
....

The Jay-Gardoqui negotiations [concerning the Mississippi River] are

responsible for that clause in the Constitution of 1787 which requires a twothirds majority of senators present for the ratification of any treaty.
lId; accord Warren, supra note 246, at 293-97. During the ratification debates, Patrick
Henry and other opponents of the Constitution argued that even the two-thirds
requirement of Article II, Section 2 was insufficient to protect the Mississippi navigation
rights while proponents of the Constitution replied that it was sufficient: plainly no one
contemplated that the Senate check of Article II, Section 2 would not even apply to an
external agreement. See supranotes 219-20 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
249. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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process in the pre-Civil War period concerned purely external
matters without effect upon domestic lawY 0 Accordingly, we may
conclude that if the founding generation understood a distinction
between treaties and nontreaty agreements, it turned neither upon
the form nor the effect of the agreement in question. This suggests
that the distinction was understood to be substantive-a matter I
consider below.
B.

The Substantive DistinctionBetween Treaties and Nontreaty
Agreements

1. Purposes of the Treaty Clause
Identification of the substantive difference between treaties and
nontreaty agreements begins with the observation that the
Constitution provides substantial limitations upon the power to enter
treaties, while (textually or by hypothesis) it affords materially fewer
restrictions upon the ability to enter into nontreaty agreements.
With respect to state practice under Article I, Section 10, treaties
between states and foreign nations are expressly prohibited, while
nontreaty agreements between states and foreign nations are
permitted with the consent of Congress.251 With respect to federal
practice, treaties require a supermajority vote of the Senate 52 (or
alternatively, if one credits McDougal's view, approval of a majority
of both Houses of Congress), whereas nontreaty agreements, it is
asserted, may be concluded on the authority of the executive alone.
This structure provokes inquiry as to why the framers sought
protection from treaties: if they did not seek such protections from
nontreaty agreements, there must be a substantive component to
treaties that is more threatening (or, more precisely, militates for
greater caution) than the substance of nontreaty agreements.
A conventional conclusion would be that treaties involve
important matters, while nontreaty agreements involve unimportant
250. See, e.g., Convention for Further Regulating the Intercourse of American Citizens
within the Empire of Japan, June 17, 1857, U.S.-Japan, 18(2) Stat. 448, 7 Miller 595
(matters occurring in Japan); Convention for Discontinuance of the Sound Dues, Apr. 11,
1857, U.S.-Den., 18(2) Stat. 173, 7 Miller 519 (matters occurring in Danish coastal
waters); Treaty for the Free Navigation of the Rivers Parana and Uruguay, July 10, 1853,
U.S.-Arg., 18(2) Stat. 15, 6 Miller 211 (matters occurring in Argentina); Convention for
Facilitating and Protecting the Construction of a Ship Canal between the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans, and for other Purposes [the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty], Apr. 19, 1850, U.S.Gr. Brit., 18(2) Stat. 222,5 Miller 671 (matters occurring in Nicaragua).
251. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
252- See. id. art. II, § 2.
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matters?5 3 No doubt there is an element of truth to this suggestion:
the 1780s controversy over Mississippi River navigation rights
assumed prominence due to the almost complete dependence of
certain parts of the country upon free navigation of the Mississippi5 4
That any agreement affecting a matter of such importance should be
subjected to a full panoply of procedural safeguards is a natural
conclusion5 5 Conversely, if the drafters (and, more importantly, the
antifederalists) were willing to accept unconstrained presidential
action with respect to certain international accords, presumably that
was because they thought these accords to be of little importance.
However, the important/unimportant distinction is not fully
satisfactory. Many "important" results that can be accomplished by
international agreement can be accomplished equally well by
presidential action or inaction without an international agreement.
For example, rather than attempting to incorporate an agreement
over Mississippi navigation into a formal instrument, President
Washington could simply have announced that U.S. policy would
henceforth be not to contest Spain's navigational prerogatives.
Similarly, the United States's withdrawal of armaments from the
Great Lakes under the Rush-Bagot Agreement? 6 could have been
accomplished by President Monroe ordering, in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief, the withdrawal of U.S. forces for such time as
the British likewise limited their forces. 7 True, these presidential
initiatives may be subject to congressional override - but treaties are
likewise subject to congressional override 58 Thus, looking purely at
subject matter, it is hard to see why elaborate approval processes
were thought necessary for treaties when frequently the same effect
could be accomplished, without any procedural protections, by the
President acting alone.
The critical difference, however, between a treaty and a
presidential action, even though affecting the same substance, is the
253. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 30, at 183 (suggesting that Senate advice and
consent is necessary for international agreements of "unusual importance"); Tribe, supra
note 6, at 1268 (suggesting that the Article II, Section 2 procedure is required for treaties
that "constrain[] federal or state sovereignty").
254. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
255. See Paul, supra note 30, at 722-26 (emphasizing functional benefits of the
Constitution's treaty provisions).
256. See Rush-Bagot Agreement, supra note 175,2 Miller 645.
257. One may speculate that this apparently constitutional alternative was what led
Monroe to believe the Rush-Bagot Agreement did not require Senate approval.
258. See The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870) (concluding that a
subsequent act of Congress supersedes a prior inconsistent treaty).
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former's prospective effect. Consider the Rush-Bagot Agreement. 9
Presumably, Monroe could have accomplished demilitarization by
unilateral presidential order. But that would not have amounted to a
commitment to the future. Had a subsequent President decided to
remilitarize (or had Congress decided to alter the policy by statute),
there would have been no international obstacle to doing so.
However, by incorporating demilitarization into an international
agreement, it became a binding commitment under international law.
Of course, international law generally is not (and plainly in 1817 was
not) subject to supranational enforcement mechanisms, and as a
practical matter is (and was) subject to violation on a regular basis. If
Congress or a future President had decided to violate the Rush-Bagot
Agreement, the violation might have occurred without domestic
consequences-but it could not have occurred without international
implications, for there can be substantial diplomatic (and even
military) consequences to a violation of international law. 260 An
international agreement is not an absolute limitation on future
action-but it is a partial limitation. Therein lies both its promise
and its danger. By erecting obstacles to the remilitarization of the
Great Lakes through the formal agreement, Monroe at once made it
more likely that the British would reciprocate and made it more
difficult to alter U.S. policy. 261 Likewise, if President Washington by
proclamation had declined to contest Spain's sovereignty over the
Mississippi, he could have been persuaded to change his mind,
congressionally overridden, or replaced; had that decision been
incorporated into an international agreement, it would have become
somewhat more difficult to alter the policy (because it would have
entailed dishonoring an international commitment). Thus, a central
concern of the treaty power was the prospective constraint of future
259. See Rush-Bagot Agreement, supra note 175,2 Miller 645.
260. Hamilton, for example, viewed treaties as imposing substantial (though not
absolute) practical limitations on future action. See Letters of Camillus, No. 37, in 6
HAMILTON, supra note 163, at 181-83.
261. Similarly, consider another Monroe action that was not reflected in a treaty: the
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, by which the United States declared itself opposed to
European intervention anywhere on the American continents. See BEMIS, supra note
201, at 208-09. Although obviously a substantial event in U.S. diplomatic history, the
Doctrine would have been more momentous if reflected in a treaty (a course of action
encouraged by Great Britain and the South American republics). However, Monroe and
his successor Adams resisted formalization of the policy to maintain flexibility. See id. at
204-09. Based on the idea of prospective commitment, one can understand why the
constitutional system might permit Monroe to announce the policy on his independent
authority but require Senate participation should the (nonbinding) policy be formalized
into a (binding) treaty.
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action-in effect, the partial limitation of sovereignty-accomplished
by the agreement's binding effect in international law.
Conversely, an agreement performed by an immediate act is
difficult to distinguish from a unilateral presidential action. To use a
modem example, in 1977 President Carter agreed to return the
Hungarian crown (which the United States had acquired after World
War II) to the government of Hungary. This agreement was
challenged in federal court by Senator Robert Dole on the ground
that it should have been submitted to the Senate in accordance with
Article H, Section 2. The court held (with little analysis) that the
understanding had been properly concluded as an executive
agreement. 262 But consider the effect of a decision to the contrary:
presumably the President could simply have returned the crown (of
which the United States was only a custodian) as an exercise of
diplomatic goodwill, without incorporating that action into an
agreement. Since the relevant act would have been completed upon
delivery, there would have been no question of binding effect upon
future Presidents or future Congresses. Viewed in light of the
purposes of the treaty clause, it seems immaterial whether the
President entered into an agreement, because he did not, in any
event, enter into an agreement with prospective effect.
An analysis of the purposes of the treaty clause therefore
suggests a concern about prospective commitments upon important
matters. An international commitment-as opposed to a mere policy
decision-is a weighty matter because it limits national sovereignty.
In practice, however, serious sovereignty-limiting concerns arise only
when the subject matter is important (else the limitation is
immaterial) and only when the commitment purports to bind future
action (else the commitment is not materially distinct from a policy
decision). As a result, if substantial procedural protections were
given only to certain kinds of international accords, one might expect
the distinction to rest upon this basis.
2. Substance and International Usage
As indicated above, the usage extant in the constitutional period
distinguishing between treaties and other international agreements
lay in the works of Grotius, Wolff, and Vattel. 63 These authors

262. See Dole v. Carter, 444 F. Supp. 1065, 1068-69 (D. Kan.) (relying on Belmont
without substantial discussion), affd on other grounds,569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977) (per

curiam).
263. See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
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suggest a substantive distinction. Grotius does not specifically
undertake to describe a difference in substance, but his terminology
flows from the Roman conception of foedera (formal treaties),
sponsio (agreements concluded by subordinates subject to
ratification), and pactus alias (typically local agreements concluded
on delegated authority).2 4 On the surface this terminology appears
to distinguish the agreements by the manner of entry, a procedural
element not relevant to constitutional considerations. 26 However,
substance underlies it. The full ceremony of the foedera was reserved
for elaborately negotiated agreements of great importance; as one
moved down through the terminology procedurally, importance
lessened as well. 6 Grotius gives few examples; as his is a work on
the international law of war, not surprisingly he concentrates on
wartime agreements. He discusses, for example, the truce-which
seems characteristic of a temporary, localized agreement lacking
long-term significance. Grotius thought the truce was binding in
international law, and he thought (as did the Romans) that it could
be concluded on behalf of the sovereign by a local commander
without the formalities of the foedus.267 A localized agreement of
peace apparently required ratification (which was sometimes
refused), because the local commander was not given (and perhaps
could not be given) authority over such an important matter. Fullscale (and long-term) alliances were concluded as foedera.2 68 Thus,
although not explicit, the Grotian terminology suggests a substantive
hierarchy of international agreements in which the word foedus
("treaty") was reserved for the most important.
Vattel presents a more explicit distinction:
A treaty, in Latin foedus, is a compact made with a
view to the public welfare by the superior power, either for
perpetuity, or for a considerable time.
The Compacts which have temporary matters for their
object are called agreements, conventions, and pactions
[Accords, Conventions, Pactions]. They are accomplished
by one single act, and not by repeated acts. These compacts
are perfected in their execution once for all: treaties receive
a successive execution whose duration equals that of the

264. See GROTIUS, supranote 143, bk. II, ch. XV.
265. See Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 457-58 (suggesting that Grotius's distinctions
lack constitutional relevance).
266. See Haggenmacher, supra note 141, at 321 & nn.34-35.
267. See GROTIUS, supra note 143, bk. III, ch. XXI.
268. See id. bk. II, ch. XV-XVI.
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treaty. 26 9
Wolff is to similar effect. In his view:

A treaty [foedus] is defined as a stipulation entered
into reciprocally by supreme powers for the public good, to

last forever or at least for a considerable time. But
stipulations which contain temporary promises or those not
to be repeated, retain the name of compacts [pactiones].
For example, if two nations reciprocally agree to
furnish troops to each other in time of war, this stipulation
is called a treaty [foedus]; but if one nation permits another,
on account of the high price of grain, to purchase in its
territory, this will be a compact [paction]. A compact
[paction] of that sort, also, is the truce made after a battle

for the purpose of burying the dead. 70
The general idea suggested by the international law
authorities-that treaties are a special class composed of important
long-term agreements-is consistent with constitutional structure and
purpose. It is, moreover, consistent with (though not compelled by)
contemporary dictionary definitions and discourse. As noted,
Bailey's English dictionary defined "treaty" as "an agreement

between two or more distinct Nations concerning Peace, Commerce,
Navigation, etc."'

In light of the international law usage, it now

269. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 145, bk. II, §§ 152-53. There has
been some debate about the correct translation of the second paragraph. An earlier
edition rendered it as follows:
The pacts with a view to transitory affairs are called agreements,
conventions, and pactions. They are accomplished by one single act, and not by
irritated oaths. These pacts are perfected in their execution, the duration of
which equals that of the treaty.
M. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATuRE:
APPLIED TO THIE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, bk. II, § 153
(Luke White ed., 1787) (1758). Not only does this version appear garbled on its own
terms, but it seems to mistake the grammatical structure of the final sentence, which
consists of two independent clauses (one referring to "pactes" and the other to "traitds")
connected by a colon. The original reads:
Les Pactes qui ont pour object des affaires transitories, s'appellent
Accords, Conventions, Pactions. Ils s'accomplissent par un acte unique, & non
point par des prestations r6itdrdes. Ces Pactes se consomment, dans leur
exdcution, une fois pour toutes: Les Trait6s regoivent une exdcution successive,
dont la dure 6gale celle du Traitd.
VATrEL, LE DROrr DES GENS, supra note 145, at bk. II, § 153. The translation given in
the text, or something similar, is generally preferred, and appears to be a more accurate
rendition of the original. See Weinfeld, supra note 125, at 459-60 & n.30 (giving a similar
translation of the relevant sections).
270. WOLFF, supra note 148, § 369.
271. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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seems more probable that Bailey thought of a treaty as an important
international agreement-and gave as examples three categories of
important agreements. Similarly, the spokesmen of the founding
generation, in emphasizing the importance of dividing the treaty
power between President and Senate, 272 are in no way undercut by
the observation that the Constitution may be thought to vest in the

President alone the power to make minor and temporary
agreements. 273

3. Substance and Post-Constitutional Agreements
Post-constitutional practice is also consistent with the
substantive distinction proposed above. Almost the entire universe
of pre-Civil War international agreements concluded outside Article
II, Section 2 can be classified as (1) settlement agreements; (2) postal
conventions; (3) localized or temporary military agreements; and (4)
agreements under which the United States undertook no material
obligation. 274

All seem describable, consistent with a generalized

reading of Vattel, Wolff, and Grotius, as nontreaty "other
agreements." None is of long-term importance to U.S. interests.
The settlement agreements (which, as noted, make up the bulk
of the nontreaty agreements concluded in this period) are
272. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
273. Professor Paul's recent critique of executive agreements, which proceeds along
somewhat similar lines as the argument in this section, may overstate the matter in
asserting that eighteenth-century international law usage limited nontreaty agreements to
contemporaneous exchanges. See Paul, supra note 30, at 736-37. The collective sense of
Grotius, Wolff, and Vattel seems to be that a nontreaty agreement was of limited
importance and duration, but was not necessarily confined to a contemporaneous
exchange. Moreover, as set forth below, post-constitutional practice does not support
limiting nontreaty agreements to contemporaneous exchanges. See infra Part IV.B.3.
274. See Miller, supra note 172, vols. 2-8.
The arguable exception to this
categorization is the 1850 agreement concerning Horseshoe Reef. See Horseshoe Reef
Agreement, supra note 208, 18(2) Stat. 325, 5 Miller 905. By that agreement, Great
Britain ceded an islet in the Niagara River to the United States provided the United
States maintained a lighthouse upon it. In a sense this is a long-term agreement, albeit
not an especially important one. However, two observations may be made in response.
First, the Horseshoe Reef arrangement was, in effect, approved by Congress, which may
at the time have been thought sufficient authorization. See 5 Miller at 917-18, Notes
(discussing appropriation by Congress for the project). Second, the agreement may be
read not to impose any actual obligations on the United States. It does not appear that
the British affirmatively wanted a lighthouse (since Britain declined to build one). See id.
at 914, Notes. More likely, the British agreed to cede the reef for so long as the United
States maintained a lighthouse: thus the United States (it appears) could discontinue the
lighthouse and allow the reef to revert to Britain without violating any international
obligations. So read, the arrangement is more properly classified as an agreement
imposing no material obligations upon the United States.
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particularly instructive in this regard. In Dames & Moore, the Court
observed that historically some settlement agreements had been

concluded by treaty and some by nontreaty agreement

75

The Court

attached little importance to the dual approach. But it failed to make

the historical inquiry necessary to see that the choice of instruments
was by no means random. Early practice shows a clear line between
settlements done by treaty and settlements done by executive

agreement. Essentially every pre-Civil War settlement (some fortythree of them) which involved a small number of claims and which
was liquidated by an agreed-upon payment to particular parties was
handled by an executive agreement.2 76 Essentially every settlement
275. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,679 (1981).
276. See Johnston Settlement Convention, supra note 202, 8 Miller 577; Dickson
Settlement Agreement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 519; Hemenway & Co. Settlement
Agreement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 449; Perkins Settlement Agreement, supra note 202,
8 Miller 267; 1858 China Claims Settlement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 13; 1858 Chile
Claims Settlement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 3; 1857 French Claims Settlement, supra note
202, 7 Miller 591; Adams Settlement Agreement, supra note 202, 7 Miller 587; Chincha
Islands Settlement Agreement, supra note 202, 7 Miller 503; Settlement of the Claim of
Stephen H. Weems, Note of John L. Marling, Minister Resident of the United States, to
Pedro de Aycinena, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, and answering note of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 26-29, 1855, U.S.-Guat., 7 Miller 325; Engagement to
Pay Claims with Other Promises, Oct. 23, 1855, U.S.-Fiji, 7 Miller 283; Adjustment of the
Dillon Case, Note of John Y. Mason, Minister of the United States, to Comte Walewski,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, and answering note of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Aug. 3-7, 1855, U.S.-Fr., 7 Miller 147 [hereinafter Dillon Settlement]; Settlement
of the Case of the Steamer Black Warrior, Two notes of Claudio Anton de Luzuriega,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, to Horatio J. Perry, Charge d'Affaires of the United
States, and note of Augustus Caesar Dodge, Minister of the United States, to Juan de
Zarala, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Feb. 21-June 28, 1855, U.S.-Spain, 7 Miller
31; Settlement of the Claim of John B. Phillips and George M. Eichelberger, Note of the
Swiss Federal Council to Theodore S. Fay, Minister Resident of the United States, and
answering note of the Minister Resident, Mar. 9-16, 1855, U.S.-Switz., 7 Miller 113;
Convention for the Payment of the Claims of Citizens of the United States Proceeding
from the Venezuelan Law of Espera, June 1, 1853, U.S.-Venez., 6 Miller 197; Convention
for the Settlement of the Case of the Brig Native, Feb. 5, 1853, U.S.-Ecuador, 6 Miller
105; Agreement for the Settlement of the Claim of Samuel Franklin Tracy, Aug. 6, 1852,
U.S.-Peru, 6 Miller 59; Settlement of the Claim of Zimmerman, Frazier & Co., Note of
Florentino Castellano, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay,
to Robert M. Hamilton, Consul of the United States, and answering note of the Consul,
June 23-24, 1852, U.S.-Uru., 6 Miller 45; 1852 Venezuelan Claims Settlement, supra note
223, 5 Miller 1063; Convention for the Settlement of the Case of the Brig Morris, Feb. 9,
1850, U.S.-Ecuador, 5 Miller 665; Convention upon the Claim relative to the American
Brig Mount Vernon, July 7, 1849, U.S.-Venez., 5 Miller 587; Convention for the Final
Settlement of the Cases of the Brig Josephine and the Schooner Ranger, June 15, 1849,
U.S.-Ecuador, 5 Miller 581; Convention for the Settlement of the Case of the Brig Native,
Apr. 25, 1848, U.S.-New Granada (Colom.), 5 Miller 437; Convention upon the Claim
Relative to the American Brig Sarah Wilson, Apr. 12, 1848, U.S.-Venez., 5 Miller 429;
1846 Venezuelan Claims Settlement, supra note 223, 5 Miller 103; Convention for the
Settlement of the Claim for Interest and Other Losses in Favor of the Owners and
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(some twenty-one of them) that involved a large number of claims

paid in undivided lump sums or that provided for referral to an
arbitral panel for future fixing of the payment amounts was handled

by treaty.

7

The distinction cannot have been predicated upon the

Persons Interested in the Brig Josephine, May 16, 1846, U.S.-New Granada (Colom.), 4
Miller 813; 1845 British Claims Settlement, supra note 208, 4 Miller 779; Convention for
the Settlement of Claims Arising out of the Seizure of the Schooner Yankee, Mar. 29,
1845, U.S.-New Granada (Colom.), 4 Miller 741; Convention for the Settlement of the
Case of the Brig Morris, Nov. 5, 1844, U.S.-New Granada (Colom.), 4 Miller 663;
Convention for the Settlement of the Claim of Arising out of the Loss of Part of the
Cargo of the Schooner Henrietta, Apr. 22, 1844, U.S.-New Granada (Colom.), 4 Miller
555; Arrangement for the Settlement of the Case of the Brig Morris,Feb. 26-Mar. 1, 1844,
U.S.-Venez., 4 Miller 523; Convention for the Adjustment of the Claim for the Detention
and Seizure of the Schooner John S. Bryan, June 12, 1843, U.S.-Braz., 4 Miller 507;
Convention for the Settlement of Claims Arising out of the Confiscation of Part of the
Cargo of the Schooner By Chance, Feb. 9, 1843, U.S.-New Granada (Colom.), 4 Miller
499; Basis of the Agreement with Mr. Pollard for the Indemnity of the Money Belonging
to the Owners of the Brig Macedonian (undated memorandum), July 1840, U.S.-Chile, 4
Miller 287; 1839 Netherlands Claims Settlement, supra note 180, 4 Miller 179; Portugal
Claims Settlement, supra note 179, 3 Miller 653; 1829 Colombian Claims Settlement,
supra note 178, at 523; Brazilian Claims Settlement, supra note 178, 3 Miller 485; Russian
Claims Settlement, supra note 176, 3 Miller 201; 1825 Colombian Claims Settlement,
supra note 165, 3 Miller 195; Wilmington Packet Agreement, supra note 173, 5 Miller
1075. During this period only two such settlement agreements were presented to the
Senate for its consent. In 1838, a settlement with the Republic of Texas was presented to
the Senate in conjunction with a treaty fixing the boundaries between Texas and the
United States. See Convention for Marking the Boundary between the United States of
America and the Republic of Texas, Apr. 25, 1838, U.S.-Tex., 18(2) Stat. 754,4 Miller 133
(submitted to Senate May 7, 1838); Convention to Terminate Reclamations of the
Government of the United States, Apr. 11, 1838, U.S.-Tex., 18(2) Stat. 753, 4 Miller 125
(submitted to Senate May 7, 1838). In 1859, an agreement with Venezuela was presented
to the Senate, apparently at the request of the U.S. private party. See Convention for
Settlement of the Ayes Island Claims, Jan. 14, 1859, U.S.-Venez., 18(2) Stat. 796, 8 Miller
137. President Buchanan included in his transmission to the Senate the statement
previously quoted, see supra note 205, indicating that Senate action was generally not
considered necessary for such agreements.
277. See Convention for the Adjustment of Claims of Citizens of the United States
Against the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, July 2, 1860, U.S.-Costa Rica,
18(2) Stat. 163, 8 Miller 469 (Senate resolution of advice and consent passed Jan. 16,
1861); Special Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of
Paraguay Relating to the Claims of the United States and Paraguayan Navigation Co.
Against the Paraguayan Government, Feb. 4, 1859, U.S.-Para., 18(2) Stat. 592, 8 Miller
259 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Feb. 16, 1860) [hereinafter Paraguay
Settlement]; Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Chile (for arbitration of the case of the Brig Macedonian), Nov. 10, 1858, U.S.-Chile,
18(2) Stat. 114, 8 Miller 117 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Mar. 8, 1859)
[hereinafter Macedonian Agreement]; Convention for the Adjustment of Claims, Nov. 8,
1858, U.S.-China, 18(2) Stat. 146, 8 Miller 93 (Senate resolution of advice and consent
Mar. 1, 1859); Claims Convention Between the United States of America and the
Republic of New Grenada, Sept. 10, 1857, U.S.-New Grenada (Colom.), 18(2) Stat. 564,7
Miller 661 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Mar. 8, 1859); Convention Extending
the Duration of the Commission on Claims Authorized by the Convention of Feb. 8,1853,
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status of the other contracting party: the United States entered
executive settlement agreements with great powers such as France
and Britain, and treaty settlements with minor powers such as
Paraguay and Costa Rica., 8 Nor can the distinction be predicated
July 17, 1854, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 18(2) Stat. 333, 6 Miller 787 (Senate resolution of advice and
consent July 21, 1854); Convention for the Settlement of Claims, Feb. 8, 1853, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., 18(2) Stat. 326, 6 Miller 111 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Mar. 15,
1853); Convention Relative to Claims of American Citizens, Feb. 26, 1851, U.S.-Port.,
18(2) Stat. 639, 5 Miller 929 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Mar. 7, 1851);
Convention for the Satisfaction of Claims of Citizens of the United States on the Brazilian
Government, Jan. 27, 1849, U.S.-Braz., 18(2) Stat. 90, 5 Miller 507 (Senate resolution of
advice and consent Jan. 14, 1850); Convention Further to Provide for the Payment of
Awards in Favor of Claimants Under the Convention Between the United States and the
Mexican Republic of the 11th of April, 1839, Jan. 30, 1843, U.S.-Mex., 18(2) Stat. 490, 4
Miller 479 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Mar. 2, 1843); Convention for the
Satisfaction of Claims of American Citizens, Mar. 17, 1841, U.S.-Peru, 18(2) Stat. 611, 4
Miller 329 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Jan. 5, 1843); Convention for the
Adjustment of Claims of Citizens of the United States of America on the Government of
the Mexican Republic, Apr. 11, 1839, U.S.-Mex., 18(2) Stat. 487, 4 Miller 189 (Senate
resolution of advice and consent Mar. 17, 1840); Convention for the Settlement of Claims
Between the United States of America and Her Catholic Majesty, Feb. 17, 1834, U.S.Spain, 18(2) Stat. 718, 3 Miller 811 (Senate resolution of advice and consent May 13,
1834); Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and His
Majesty the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to Terminate Reclamations, Oct. 14,
1832, U.S-Two Sicilies, 18(2) Stat. 771, 3 Miller 711 (Senate resolution of advice and
consent Jan. 19, 1833); Convention Relative to Claims and Duties on Wines and Cottons,
July 4, 1831, U.S.-Fr., 18(2) Stat. 245, 3 Miller 641 (Senate resolution of advice and
consent Jan. 27, 1832) [hereinafter Convention on Wines and Cottons]; Convention
between the United States of America and His Majesty the King of Denmark, Mar. 28,
1830, U.S.-Den., 18(2) Stat. 170, 3 Miller 531 (Senate resolution of advice and consent
May. 29, 1830); Convention Relative to Indemnity Under the Treaty of July 12, 1822,
Nov. 13, 1826, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 18(2) Stat. 308, 3 Miller 261 (Senate resolution of advice
and consent Dec. 26, 1826); Convention Relative to Indemnity under the Award of the
Emperor of Russia, July 12, 1822, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 18(2) Stat. 303, 3 Miller 91 (Senate
resolution of advice and consent Jan. 3, 1823); Convention for the Payment of Sums Due
by France to Citizens of the United States, Apr. 30, 1803, U.S.-Fr., 18(2) Stat. 236, 2
Miller 516 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Oct. 20, 1803); Convention between
His Catholic Majesty and the United States of America for the Indemnification of Those
Who Have Sustained Losses, Damages, or Injuries in Consequence of the Excesses of
Individuals of Either Nation During the Late War, Aug. 11, 1802, U.S.-Spain, 18(2) Stat.
711, 2 Miller 492 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Jan. 9, 1804); Additional
Convention to Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of Nov. 19, 1794, Jan. 8, 1802,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., 18(2) Stat. 285, 2 Miller 488 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Apr.
26, 1802).
The lone exception is a referral to arbitration of a claim against Ecuador by
executive agreement in 1857. See 1857 Ecuadorian Claims Settlement, supra note 202, 7
Miller 707. However, the private U.S. party did not pursue the arbitration, and the claim
was included in a subsequent settlement (by arbitration) established by treaty. See id. at
712, Notes. Thus, in fact, no obligations were actually undertaken by the United States by
the 1857 Agreement.
278. See Convention for the Adjustment of Claims of Citizens of the United States of
America against the Government of Costa Rica, July 7, 1860, U.S.-Costa Rica, 18(2) Stat.
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upon the local practice of particular embassies, because the United
States entered into both treaty settlements and executive agreement
settlements with the same countries at roughly the same time. This
occurred, for example, with Chile (treaty providing for arbitration in
1853, executive settlement of single claim in 1858), China (treaty
providing for arbitration in 1858, executive settlement of single claim
also in 1858), and Brazil (treaty providing for lump sum payment in
1849, executive settlement of particularized claims in 1843).279 In
short, it seems inescapable that the treaty/nontreaty agreement
distinction was a matter of conscious national policy based upon the
substantive character of the settlement.
This substantive difference is consistent with the distinction
suggested by the international law terminology: the less important,
short-term understanding is handled by executive agreement; the
more significant agreement involving substantial executory
obligations upon the part of the United States is resolved by treaty.
With respect to the arbitration treaties, the executory character is
apparent: the United States is to participate in, and be bound by, the
decisions of an as-yet unconstituted arbitral panel. With respect to
the lump-sum settlements, the executory character may be less clear.
However, the United States undertook future obligations in the sense
that its government assumed the responsibility of dividing the lump
sum among multiple contending claimants. 280 Moreover, because the
private parties did not participate in or agree to these settlements,
grievances remained outstanding-and thus the obligation not to
further press claims assumed considerable importance."' Finally,
because these settlements involved multiple claims, they typically
involved substantial sums of money (and frequently substantial
163, 8 Miller 469 (Senate resolution of advice and consent January 16, 1861); Paraguay
Settlement, supra note 277, 18(2) Stat. 592, 8 Miller 259 (Senate resolution of advice and
,consent Feb. 16, 1860); Dillon Settlement, supra note 276, 7 Miller 147 (executive
agreement); 1845 British Claims Settlement, supra note 208, 4 Miller 779 (executive
agreement).
279. See Macedonian Agreement, supra note 277, 18(2) Stat. 114, 8 Miller 117 (Senate

resolution of advice and consent Mar. 8, 1859); Convention for the Adjustment of Claims,

Nov. 8, 1858, U.S.-China, 18(2) Stat. 146, 8 Miller 93 (Senate resolution of advice and
consent March, 1, 1859); 1858 China Claims Settlement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 13
(executive agreement); 1858 Chile Claims Settlement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 3
(executive agreement); Convention for the Settlement of Claims, Jan. 27, 1849, U.S.Braz., 18(2) Stat. 90, 5 Miller 507 (Senate resolution of advice and consent Jan. 14, 1850);
Convention for the Adjustment of the Claim for the Detention and Seizure of the
Schooner John S. Bryan, June 12, 1843, U.S.-Braz., 4 Miller 507 (executive agreement).
280. See, e.g., Convention on Wines and Cottons, supra note 277, 18(2) Stat. at 245, 3
Miller at 642 (arts. I & II) (Senate resolution of advice and consent Jan. 27,1832).
281. See id.
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compromises).'
For all these reasons, the practitioners of postconstitutional diplomacy thought these .settlements rose to the status
of treaties. 283
By contrast, the executive settlements were of lesser importance,
as they involved less money, fewer parties, and less contention.'
Typically, the only on-going obligation the United States assumed
was not to assert further claims (since the amount of payment and
identity of the receiving party was specified).28 Because the injured
party participated in and (happily or not) assented to the settlement,
this was not a material obligation. Indeed, it may have been thought
that because the individual party relinquished its legal rights, the
settlement was fully executed upon consummation and thus
contained no on-going obligations. 26 In any event, it seems clear that
the post-constitutional diplomats thought these agreements by their
nature did not amount to treaties in the constitutional sense.
Examination of agreements not involving settlement of claims
confirms the idea of long-term importance as the key to the
definition of a treaty. Several of the nontreaty agreements concluded
in the relevant period concerned relatively important matters: for
example, the 1813 Prisoner of War Agreement covering, among other
matters, treatment of prisoners, exchanges, and paroles; the 1847
armistice ending hostilities in the Mexican War;2s8 and the 1859
agreement regarding occupation of San Juan Island (which placed a
nontrivial amount of U.S. territory under British military
occupation).

9

However, each of these agreements was understood

to be temporary. The war between the United States and Britain was
282- See Conventions on Wines and Cottons, supra note 277, 18(2) Stat. 245, 3 Miller
641; see also 3 Miller at 650, Notes (stating that in settlement with France claims of over
$50 million settled for an ultimate payment of $5.2 million, to be distributed by the U.S.
government).
283. This observation, of course, casts substantial doubt upon the holding of Dames &
Moore, at least as an original matter. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
The Algiers Declarations, upheld in Dames & Moore, plainly fall into the category of
settlements which, in the pre-Civil War period, would have been concluded as a treaty.
284. See, e.g., 1825 Colombian Claims Settlement, supra note 176, 3 Miller at 194-95
(showing total of less than $100,000 at issue, paid to four parties identified in the
agreement itself).
285. See id.
286. See

VATrEL,

THE LAW OF NATIONs, supra note 145, bk. II, § 192 (stating that

"as soon as a right is transferred by a lawful convention, it no longer belongs to the state
that has ceded it; the affair is concluded and terminated").
287. See Prisoner of War Agreement, supra note 174,2 Miller at 558-63 (arts. II-IX).
288. See 5 Miller at 278-80, Notes (discussing 1847 armistice).
289. San Juan Island Agreement, supra note 202,8 Miller 281; see also Watts v. United
States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288,292-95 (Wash. 1870) (discussing the validity of this agreement).
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not expected to continue, for peace negotiations were already
underway and most major issues had been resolved; the 1847 truce
was similarly thought to be temporary pending negotiation of a
definitive treaty, as was the San Juan Island agreement."' In
contrast, it is difficult to identify any treaty concluded during this
period that concerned purely temporary matters. Similarly, to the
extent any nontreaty agreement had long-term implications, the
subject matter was extraordinarily non-controversial. The various
postal agreements discussed above are perhaps the leading examples,
as they did contemplate on-going obligations.2 91 Those obligations
(typically relating to cooperation with foreign postal authorities and
recognition of foreign postage) were so minor, however, that they
apparently did not rise to the level of treaties in the eyes of
diplomats. In short, temporary agreements were concluded outside
of Article II, Section 2; agreements involving long-term comnitments
were concluded within Article II, Section 2 unless their subject
matter was minor. 2
V. THE NONTREATY POWER AS PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Having established an identifiable class of "nontreaty"
agreements independent of Article II, Section 2, the next step in the
290. See BEMIS, supra note 201, at 159-69 (discussing the diplomacy of the War of
1812); id. at 281-83 (discussing San Juan Islands controversy); 5 Miller at 278-80, Notes
(discussing diplomacy of the Mexican War); 8 Miller at 409-23, Notes (discussing
proposals for treaty made after San Juan Island Agreement).
291. See supra notes 206-07.

292. This conclusion raises a structural difficulty for Article I, Section 10. Since states
can enter into agreements (with congressional approval) but not treaties, defining
"treaties" as suggested in this section might seem to preclude states from entering into
any long-term understandings, even with congressional approval. With respect to
understandings with foreign nations, this seems a reasonable conclusion-any such
sovereignty-limiting actions should be taken only by the federal government, subject to
the supermajority check of the Senate. However, states commonly enter into long-term
interstate "compacts" among themselves, and this has not been thought to pose a
constitutional problem. Nor should it: interstate compacts, even if long term, do not limit
the sovereignty of the federal government, for they can presumably be preempted by a
subsequent Congress. The solution, I suggest, is that an agreement between two states
under the Constitution would not have been thought to be a "treaty" in any event,
because a treaty is an accord between sovereign nations which is governed by
international law. See, e.g., supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that the
eighteenth-century dictionary definition of "treaty" includes the requirement that it be
"between two or more distinct Nations"). Interstate compacts, as agreements within a
federal system, are not between "distinct Nations" nor are they governed by international
law. Thus, states may enter into agreements among themselves under the "agreement"
clause of Article I, Section 10 without regard to their duration, because no interstate
agreement, no matter its subject, can be a treaty.
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presidential argument is to show that the Constitution granted the
President power over such agreements. Nontreaty agreements at the
federal level are not specifically discussed in the Constitution.293
However, Article II, Section 1 (the Executive Vesting Clause) states
that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. 294 As I discuss below, the presidential argument
depends upon construing this text as a grant of foreign relations
powers to the President, including the power over nontreaty
agreements.
A.

The Executive Vesting Clause and the Dilemma of ForeignPolicy
Power

1. Overview
I begin with some familiar background. In the eighteenth
century, "executive power" was a common term in political writing
that was understood to encompass, among other matters, authority
over relations with foreign nations.295 That accorded with political
practice at the time-particularly in England, where, despite focus on
the division of powers between the crown and parliament, the whole
of foreign relations power was part of royal prerogative (which, in
turn, was associated with "executive power" in English political/legal
theory). Thus Blackstone described the English constitutional
structure as follows:
We are next to consider those branches of the royal
prerogative, which invest [the king] ...with a number of
293. It seems clear from the structure of the Constitution that the power to make
nontreaty agreements on behalf of the United States would have been understood to be
lodged somewhere within the federal government. By explicit text, a power to make
important international agreements (that is, treaties) was given to the President with the
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, while each individual state had a power to make
lesser nontreaty agreements on their own behalf (with the consent of Congress). Were
the national government denied the ability to make nontreaty agreements on its own
account, such lesser agreements could be concluded only by simultaneous agreement of
all of the states (acting pursuant to the power reserved in Article I, Section 10) plus the
approval of Congress. In short, it would require greater consensus and be procedurally
more cumbersome to make minor agreements than to make major ones. That is an
absurd structure which could not have been contemplated. Nor is it likely that such a
structure occurred through inadvertence: the phrasing of Article I, Section 10 shows that
the framers had nontreaty agreements in mind, and thus, in deciding to omit the phrase
"and other agreements" from the grant of treaty power in Article II, Section 2, some
rational procedure for achieving minor agreements must have been contemplated.
294. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
295. See generally Yoo, supra note 136, at 196-217 (discussing the eighteenth-century
view of executive power).
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authorities and powers; in the exertion whereof consists the
executive part of government.
The prerogatives of the crown ...respect either this

nation's intercourse with foreign nations, or its own
domestic government and civil polity.
With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the
delegate or representative of his people. It is impossible
that the individuals of a state, in their collective capacity,
can transact the affairs of that state with another community
....

In the king therefore, as in a centre, all the rays of his

people are united, and form by that union a consistency,
splendor, and power, that make him feared and respected by
foreign potentates; who would scruple to enter into any
engagements that must afterwards be revised and ratified by
a popular assembly. What is done by the royal authority,
with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation;
what is done without the king's concurrence is the act only
of private men.296

Jean de Lolme, whose treatise Constitution of England was a
well-known authority,29 stated in the section entitled "Of the
Executive Power" that "the king remains charged with the execution
of [the laws] and is supplied with the necessary power for that
purpose.""29 In listing these powers, de Lolme continued: "He is,
with regard to foreign nations, the representative and the depository
of all the power and collective majesty of the nation." 99 Similarly
Montesquieu, whom Madison called "[t]he oracle who is always
consulted" on separation-of-powers matters,"' listed within the
executive power the power "by [which] he [the chief executive]
makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the
public security and provides against invasions. ' 30 ' These observations
derive from the earlier writing of John Locke, who on this subject
observed:
296. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 135, at *250-252 (emphasis added).
297. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1587, 1598 (1997) (listing de Lolme as an important reference during the constitutional
period).
298. JEAN LOUIS DE LOLME, CONSTITUTION DE L'ANGLETERRE 70-71 (Dublin, P.
Byrne & J. Moore ed. 1793) (1775).
299. Id. at 73.
300. THE FEDERALIST, No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Isaak Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
301. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 69 (R.
Hutchins ed., 1952) (1748).
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There is another Power in every Commonwealth ...

[which] contains the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and
Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all Persons and
Communities without the Commonwealth, and may be
called Federative ....
These two Powers, Executive and Federative, though
they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending
the Execution of the Municipal Laws of the Society within
its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other the
management of the security and interest of the publick
without,with all those that it may receive
benefit or damage
3
from, yet they are almost always united. 0
Locke continued:
Though, as I said, the Executive and Federative Power
of every Community be really distinct in themselves, yet
they are hardly to be separated, and placed, at the same
time, in the hands of distinct Persons. For both of them
requiring the force of the Society for their exercise, it is
almost impracticable to place the Force of the
Commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or
that the Executive and Federative Power should be placed in
Persons that might act separately, whereby the Force of the
Publick would be under different Commands: which would
be apt sometime or other to cause disorder and ruine. 03
Thus, English political theory placed the full power of foreign
relations in the hands of the crown, and in the eighteenth century
denominated it an aspect of the crown's "executive power." This
power included the ability to conclude treaties and alliances °4 and, a
fortiori,lesser agreements.
The English system was not the only example familiar to the
constitutional generation. Not all continental systems vested the full
foreign relations power with the chief executive.
Sweden,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands, for example, referred certain
important decisions (including, in some cases, important treaties) to a
council or popular assembly for approval. 35 However, these systems,
302. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 145-147, at 383 (P. Laslett
ed., 1988) (1698).
303. Id. at 384.
304. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 135, *257; DE LOLME, supra note 298, at 73.
305. See Haggenmacher, supra note 141, at 328-29, 334-35. These forms of
government were familiar in the United States. See 1 JOHN ADAMS, DEFENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1777)
(surveying forms of government in Europe); VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note
145, bk. IV, § 10 (discussing Sweden). See also VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra
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like the English system, began with the idea that foreign relations
power was (as Blackstone and others described) an aspect of
executive power, and then qualified that power in certain specific
respects."' The remainder of the foreign relations power-including,
for example, the power to enter into treaties and agreements other
than those specifically requiring additional approvals-lay with the
organ credited with executive power.
Although the drafters of the Constitution expressed appreciation
for English constitutional structure (and relied heavily on
Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Locke), they declined to adopt that
system in foreign affairs. The Constitution instead specifically
allocated important aspects of foreign relations power away from the
307
President: in addition to the obvious example of the treaty power,
the Constitution gave the Congress the power to declare war and to
raise, support, and regulate armed forces, 30 8 and conferred on the
Senate a shared power in naming ambassadors.3 9 In addition, the
text conveyed certain particularized foreign relations powers upon
the President-namely, the power to receive ambassadors and the
status of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.310 Thus the
constitutional text, building upon the divided foreign relations power
then existing in some continental systems, appeared to take the
unified foreign relations power described by Blackstone and
distribute it among the constituent elements of the federal
government.3 1 '
2. Executive Power and "Unallocated" Foreign Relations Powers
The difficulty with regarding the Constitution's explicit
allocation of foreign relations powers as a self-contained system is
that a number of critical foreign relations powers are not addressed
by the constitutional text. To take perhaps the leading example, what
of the authority to establish foreign policy? 3 2 True, foreign policy is
note 145, bk. II, § 211 (indicating Roman practice of Senate approval of treaties).
306. See Haggenmacher, supra note 141, at 328-29, 334-35.
307. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.

308. See id. art. I, § 8.
309. See id. art. II, § 2.
310. See id.
311. Indeed, early drafts of the Constitution gave even less foreign relations power to
the President. The treaty power, for example, initially was given to the Senate alone,
while Congress had the power to "make war," not merely to "declare war." See RAKOVE,

supra note 219, at 263-66.
312. By "foreign policy" power, I mean the authority to announce publicly the views
of the United States (and thus direct the moral and diplomatic force of the United States)
with respect to important international issues. I think it significant to distinguish the
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sometimes set by treaty (allocated by Article II, Section 2), may
involve war or commerce (perhaps encompassed by Article I, Section
8), and may relate to military matters (perhaps encompassed by the
Commander-in-Chief power of Article II, Section 2). However, that
leaves quite a bit unexplained. Consider the Monroe Doctrine of
1823, which placed the United States in opposition to further
European imperialist ventures on the American continents.3 13 The
power to make such a declaration fits poorly within any textually
allocated category of foreign relations powers: it was not a
prospective declaration of war and did not relate to military
dispositions, it was not achieved through international agreement,
and it was not even a diplomatic initiative set forth through U.S.
ambassadors.3 14 It was simply a public declaration of non-military
policy in a presidential message to Congress-a power not
immediately identifiable in the constitutional text. Other related
examples may be identified in the post-constitutional period. For
example, when Great Britain asserted the right to stop U.S. merchant
ships to search for and recapture ("impress") British seamen, the
United States chose noisily to oppose that policy, contributing to
years of strained relations with Britain." 5 Similarly, Britain claimed a
right to seize cargo of U.S. ships belonging to Britain's enemies
where the United States was not involved in the hostilities, and again
foreign policy power (which I use in a fairly narrow sense to mean the announcement of,
in effect, the U.S. opinion on international matters) from the foreign relations power
(meaning, as Blackstone described it, all of the interaction between one nation and
others, and of which the foreign policy power is but one small aspect). In the U.S.
constitutional system, unlike the English system, it is not meaningful to speak of a single
foreign relations power, since one of the substantial structural innovations of the
Constitution was to divide among various components of government that power which
Blackstone and Locke, among others, had seen as essentially indivisible. Hence in
speaking of the U.S. system I use the phrase foreign relations powers, of which the foreign
policy power is one (and the power to conclude nontreaty agreements is another).
313. See James Monroe, Message to Congress, December 2, 1823, 41 ANNALS OF
CONG. 11, 22-23 (1856), reprintedin BEMIS, supra note 201, at 210-11. As summarized by
Bemis, Monroe's statement indicated that "[t]he United States would regard as the
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to itself the effort of any European power to
interfere with the political system of the American continents, or to acquire any new
territory on these continents." BEMIS, supra note 201, at 208. The declaration came in
response to the specific threat of a Franco-Spanish alliance to reconquer the newly
independent South American nations. See id.
314. One might think of the foreign policy power as encompassed by the power to
appoint ambassadors. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. However, that would make it a shared
power of the President-plus-Senate, an interpretation that does not appear to have been
seriously contemplated during the relevant period. Moreover, as with the Monroe
Doctrine, even in the early history of the nation foreign policy was not necessarily
announced through ambassadors.
315. See BEMIS, supra note 201, at 126-38.
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the United States made a diplomatic issue of the matter at serious
cost to Anglo-American relations.31 1 The constitutional authority to
make these decisions seems ill-encompassed by the particularized
textual allocations.

Textually, the most satisfactory solution to the dilemma of the

"unallocated" foreign policy power is the Executive Vesting Clause.
Under the English system, the foreign policy power was encompassed
within the "executive power" of the crown. This structure was
likewise true even of continental systems in which foreign relations
powers were somewhat more diffused; as discussed above, these
systems identified the executive as the general repository of foreign
relations powers and also required the participation of other
branches in important foreign relations decisions.
Accordingly,
one may see the "executive power" that is "vested" in the President
by Article II, Section 1 as including the foreign relations powers of
the English crown (understood to be within the term of art
"executive power" as used by Blackstone and de Lolme), less those
substantial matters conveyed to the other branches by the
Constitution. 18 If so, the power to set foreign policy would be

316. See id. The U.S. position was that "free ships make free goods": for example, if
the flag of the ship is that of a noncombatant nation, the cargo should generally be
similarly considered noncombatant (and thus not subject to seizure) even if owned by
nationals of a nation involved in the hostilities. The British position was that goods
owned by belligerents were subject to seizure anywhere on the high seas.
317. See Haggenmacher, supra note 141, at 328-35.
318. This view was expressed most clearly by Hamilton in 1793:
The second article of the Constitution of the United States, section first,
establishes this general proposition that "the Executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America."
The same article, in a succeeding section, proceeds to delineate particular
cases of executive power.
It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to consider this
enumeration of particular authorities as derogating from the more
comprehensive grant in the general clause, further than as it may be coupled
with express restrictions or limitations ....
The difficulty of a complete
enumeration of all the cases of executive authority would naturally dictate the
use of general terms, and would render it improbable that a specification of
certain particulars was designed as a substitute for those terms, when
antecedently used. The different mode of expression employed in the
Constitution, in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the executive,
serves to confirm this inference. In the article which gives the legislative powers
of the government, the expressions are: "All legislative powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." In that which grants the
executive power, the expressions are: "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Untied States."
The enumeration ought therefore to be considered as intended merely to
specify the principal articles implied in the definition of executive power; leaving
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allocated to the President. 19 This view solves the textual dilemma of
"unallocated" foreign policy power; it is, moreover, consistent with
post-constitutional history, for in each case described above the
President set important nonmilitary policies regarding impressment,
neutral shipping, and the Monroe Doctrine. z
Against this proposition is the familiar argument that the
"executive power" of Article II of the Constitution, far from being
unlimited, extends only to those matters specifically enumerated as
executive powers in Article II; otherwise, one might inquire, why
bother to list those matters specifically? This view has a substantial
pedigree, dating at least to the Pacificus/Helvidius exchange in 1793,
the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in conformity
with other parts of the Constitution, and with the principles of free government.
The generaldoctrine of our Constitution, then, is, that the executive power
of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and
qualificationswhich are expressed in the instrument.
Alexander Hamilton, Letters of Pacificus, No. 1 (1793) (quoting the Constitution), in 4
HAMILTON, supra note 163, at 437-38 (second emphasis added). See also MCDONALD,
supra note 219, at 200, 202 (discussing similar views expressed by James Wilson and
James Iredell during the ratification debates).
319. Some confirmation of this view of executive power is found in the course of the
constitutional convention. At one point the delegates considered specifying a Council of
State (essentially a cabinet) to assist the President. See 1 ELLIOTr, supra note 115, at 250
(minutes of the convention, Aug. 20, 1787). One of the offices proposed was Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, to be "appointed by the President during pleasure," who would be
empowered "to correspond with all foreign ministers, prepare plans of treaties, and
consider such as may be transmitted from abroad, and generally to attend to the interests of
the United States in their connections with foreign powers." Id. (emphasis added). This
broad description of a power "to attend to the interests of the United States" in foreign
affairs would seem to include what I have called the "foreign policy power" as well as
other foreign relations powers not explicitly allocated by the final text of the Constitution.
Since the Secretary was appointed by and answerable to the President, ultimate control
over those matters apparently was identified with the President. This proposal was, of
course, not adopted; however, since it assumed that generalized foreign relations powers
were identified with the President, and since this aspect of the proposal provoked no
comment, this suggests that, as a general matter, the executive was thought to have such
powers.
320. See BEMIS, supra note 201, at 126-38, 196-214. It is, moreover, hard to see where
the President would get foreign policy power if not from the executive vesting clause.
One might say that it comes from the power to receive (and thus communicate with)
ambassadors, or perhaps from an ill-defined "inherent" power. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). However, either of these
propositions will depend heavily upon the executive power of the English crown to give it
content. The principal reason one would think that the power to receive ambassadors
included the power to establish and communicate policy is that such power traditionally
inhered in the chief executive, and the reason one might think the President had an
inherent power to set foreign policy is that chief executives traditionally had that power.
So described, these arguments seem no more than semantically distinct: the substance is
that the traditional executive power in foreign relations provides (where not textually
overridden) the basis for the U.S. executive's power.
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in which Hamilton took the executive view and Madison expressed
the rejoinder. 2' In Madison's view, "[t]he natural province of the
executive magistrate is to execute the laws, as that of the legislature is
to make the laws. All his acts, therefore, properly executive, must
' The only
presuppose the existence of the laws to be executed."322
executive powers not derivative of a particular enactment, Madison
continued, are those such as the pardon power and the Commanderin-Chief power explicitly allocated to the executive by Article II of
the Constitution.313 Thus foreign relations powers, such as the power
to declare war and make treaties, were not executive and would not
be executive even if the Constitution had not specifically allocated
them to other branches.324
Madison explicitly criticized the
identification of "royal prerogative" in the British government with
"executive power" as understood in the Constitution.3z
But Madison's view has serious consequences, illustrated by the
dilemma of the foreign policy power. If the executive is limited to
the particularized powers of Article II, significant foreign relations
powers, including the foreign policy power, are not executive powers
and indeed are not mentioned at all in the text. Yet, obviously the
foreign policy power must exist in the national government; the
Constitution could hardly have been understood to establish a
government incapable of setting and articulating a national foreign
policy, especially when strengthening the union's hand in foreign
affairs was a matter of great concern to the framers. Under the
321. See 4 HAMILTON, supra note 163, at 432; James Madison, Letters of Helvidius
(1793), in 1 MADISON, supra note 144, at 614-15; see also supra note 319 (discussing
Hamilton's view as to the scope of the executive power). In 1793, President Washington
issued a proclamation declaring U.S. neutrality in the recently resumed warfare between
Britain and France. It was widely debated whether the President in fact had this power,
or whether it belonged to Congress as ancillary to the power to declare war conveyed by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Hamilton's "letters," published under the
pseudonym "Pacificus," defended Washington's executive power to issue the
proclamation, on the basis of the Executive Vesting Clause. Madison, writing in reply as
"Helvidius," argued that the President had invaded a power of Congress.
322. Letters of Helvidius, No. 1, in 1 MADISON, supra note 144, at 614-15.
323. See iL at 618.
324. See id. at 618-19.
325. Id. at 618-19. This view has support in the context of post-revolutionary political
thought, which manifested what Professor Rakove calls a "reactionary... animus against
the executive." RAKOVE, supra note 219, at 250. That outlook was reflected prominently
in the early state constitutions and in the Articles of Confederation. See id. at 245-56;
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1788-92 (1996).
The issue, of course, is whether the counter-trend in U.S. political thought after the mid1780s, see RAKOVE, supra note 219, at 250-68, led to a reinstatement of the traditional
executive power, at least as a starting point, in constitutional thinking, see Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 171, at 544-46.
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constitutional structure, Congress would: be the only serious
alternative to the President within the national government. Taking
this view to its logical extent, Helvidius would need to rest the
foreign policy power with Congress and argue that the President and
ambassadors were merely ministerial messengers of Congress's
decisions.
That interpretation is subject to substantial objection. Congress
also lacks a comprehensive, textually explicit power over foreign
policy. While some aspects of foreign policy, such as those relating to
war and commerce, might be seen as adjuncts to the particularized
powers of Congress, others (exemplified by the Monroe Doctrine)
seem as disconnected from Congress's particularized powers as they
do from those of the President. Madison would need to argue that
the general grant of "legislative power" in Article I, Section 1
encompassed a generalized foreign policy power (and, moreover,
excluded it from "executive power").,2 6 This argument runs directly
counter to the terminology of then-contemporary political
philosophy (which saw foreign policy encompassed by-or at least
allied with-executive power) and to then-contemporary English and
continental practice (in which the chief executive established foreign
policy). 327 Of course, the Constitution did take substantial steps in
reallocating some foreign relations powers, such as war power and
treaty power; however, if a reallocation of foreign policy power was
intended, one would expect the text and its explicators to be specific,
as they were elsewhere.
Furthermore, placing the power exclusively with Congress raises
yet another dilemma: whether only enacted foreign policy could be
pursued. It would be a peculiar view that the United States could not
express a position on international matters unless that position was
reflected in legislation. To escape this problem, one would need to
read the grant of "legislative power" to include the power to set
foreign policy nonlegislatively-a construction lacking any textual,
326. Madison/Helvidius in fact never reached these issues. Since Madison argued that
the "neutrality power" was encompassed within Congress's war power, see supra note 324
and accompanying text, he finessed (but in no way resolved) the dilemma of textually
unallocated foreign relations powers.
327. I do not suggest here that the President's power was necessarily regarded as
exclusive: Congress might have the power to regulate foreign policy as part of the
"necessary and proper" clause. But, as that power would be derivative of the President's
power, this proposition assumes that the President in fact has the power-and the source
of that power would be the Executive Vesting Clause. Whether the power is exclusive or
concurrent is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Cf. Bloom, supra note 29, at 167
(discussing exclusivity).
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In short, the implications of

Madison's view produce a substantially greater stretch of the text
than Hamilton's. Madison's view is, moreover, entirely inconsistent
with post-constitutional practice, as indicated above. No President
(including Madison and his ally Monroe) took the Helvidius view
seriously once in office, and despite Madison's theoretical writings,
Congress never attempted to assert sole power to set foreign policy.3'2

B.

The Allocation of the Nontreaty Power
Whatever one thinks of the Helvidius/Pacificus debate, the
critical point for the present inquiry is that the presidential argument
for a nontreaty power depends upon identification with Pacificus.
Once Hamilton's Executive Vesting Clause argument is accepted, it
is a short step to recognizing presidential power over nontreaty
agreements. The traditional chief executive possessed that power
under both the English and continental systems.3 29 If we understand
that the power is not encompassed within the treaty power (and
hence not explicitly conveyed to the President-plus-Senate by Article
II, Section 2),33o then it remains, with the foreign policy power, an
element of the "unallocated" foreign relations powers and thus an
aspect of the "residual" 33 executive authority of the President.
Given the substantive limits upon the subject matter of nontreaty
agreements discussed above, 332 the power does not seem a great

one-certainly not as great as the power to set foreign policy. Thus
there does not seem to be available a structural objection333based on
the conveyance of disproportionate power to the executive.

This view accords as well with post-constitutional practice. As
discussed above, the substantial majority of nontreaty agreements in
the post-constitutional period were concluded on the independent
authority of the President.334 Most (in particular the settlement

328. See generally BEMIS, supra note 201, at 85-319 (recounting diplomatic history of
the early nineteenth century).
329. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Part III.
331. The phrase is from CORWIN, supranote 31, at 115.
332- See supra Part IV.
333. There are, moreover, important structural reasons in favor of allocation to the
President alone. As a practical matter, one might not wish to subject minor, short-term
agreements to the protracted approval process of Article II, Section 2, either because-as
short-term agreements-they would need to be concluded more quickly, or because-as
unimportant agreements-they would not merit the expenditure of scarce senatorial
resources.
334. See supra Part III.D.
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agreements) concerned matters unrelated to any explicit power of the
President. None was challenged on constitutional grounds. The best
textual explanation for the practice is that the constitutional
generation understood the power to conclude such agreements to be

among the foreign relations powers vested in the President by Article
II, Section 1-an explanation that similarly resolves the broader

difficulty of unallocated foreign relations powers.
Moreover, there is simply no other satisfactory argument from
perspective. Executive agreements (as I have defined
President's
the
them) are not made in execution of a particular enactment, and thus
lie outside of the enactment-based executive power identified by

Helvidius. In particular cases, the President might claim a power
over nontreaty agreements as ancillary to one of the explicit powers
of Article II. Indeed, this argument appears, among others, in Pink
and Belmont. The executive agreement at issue in those cases was
concluded as part of the recognition of the Soviet Union by the
The power to receive ambassadors has been
United States.3
interpreted to include the recognition power.336 Hence, if the

executive agreements arose from the recognition, perhaps they can

be founded upon the recognition power.3 37 However, aside from
factual implausibility in Pink and Belmont themselves, 338 this
argument is inadequate as a general matter from the presidential
perspective. The textually particularized powers of the President are
335. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
336. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 43; see also Letters of Pacificus, No. 1, in 4
HAMILTON, supra note 163, at 441 (arguing that the recognition power is included in the
right to receive ambassador). But see Adler, supra note 17, at 134 (arguing that under the
original understanding the President lacked discretionary authority to decline to receive
ambassadors in most cases).
337. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,227-29 (1942).
338. On the disconnection between the assumption of Soviet claims and the
recognition, see MILLET, supra note 30, at 1-116. The Soviet Union had no interest in
having the claims actually collected, and in many cases, it was not even known the extent
of the claim, or the obligor. At most, the Soviet Union wanted an offset of its claims
against the claims asserted by the United States. Whether the United States actually
collected the offset claims from private obligors was a matter of complete indifference to
the Soviets. Indeed, as Millet argues, it appears that at the time neither the United States
nor the Soviets were interested in Soviet claims against private parties. The principal
claims settlement was to offset the United States claims against the Soviet claims based
on the U.S. occupation of Siberia. The claims later pursued in Belmont and Pink were
added essentially as an afterthought. It is a substantial stretch of the facts to suggest that
validating (much less enforcing) the Soviet claims was critical to recognition. Certainly
the Soviet Union would have accepted diplomatic normalization without any attention to
the claims. Thus even Pink and Belmont, the standard citations for the power to conclude
executive agreements ancillary to recognition, cannot be justified by the assertion of that
limited power.
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few. Military affairs and recognition would be the principal areas in
which nontreaty agreements would be permitted (derivative of the
Commander-in-Chief clause and the power to receive ambassadors).
An argument for nontreaty power based on such powers would leave
outside its scope many executive agreements, including most of the
agreements concluded in the post-constitutional period.
In
particular, settlement agreements, the most widely used and accepted
species of executive agreement, would largely be excluded; even if
one grants that the executive agreement in Belmont can be described
as ancillary to recognition, most settlements cannot. 39 Nor do
settlement agreements ordinarily concern military affairs, or any
other power specifically allocated to the President. There is simply
no way to describe them as executive power consistent with the views
of Helvidius. 340
As a result, the executive argument for nontreaty power depends
upon Pacificus, and hence upon three critical points in Pacificus's
favor: first, that English (and other continental) practice placed the
nontreaty power (along with most or all of the foreign relations
powers) with the executive; second, that reading the Executive
Vesting Clause to confer on the President those traditional foreign
relations powers of the executive not allocated elsewhere is the
clearest textual solution to the dilemma of unallocated foreign
relations powers; and third, that post-constitutional practice confirms
this view by providing examples of uncontested unilateral executive
action in respect of unallocated foreign relations powers (including
the power over nontreaty agreements). Yet each of these points turns
against the executive-and proves the ultimate failure of the
executive's position-in the next (and final) step of the argument.
VI. NONTREATY AGREEMENTS AS THE LAW OF THE LAND
The final step in the defense of a Belmont-type power under the
original Constitution is to show that nontreaty agreements had the
force of law within the domestic legal system-or, put another way,
that nontreaty agreements, like treaties, do not require legislative
implementation to function as domestic law.341 On this issue,
339. This observation includes essentially all of the settlements listed supra Part III.D.
340. Thus, while conventional defenses of the executive agreement begin by asserting
a power ancillary to the executive's textually explicit powers, they typically end with an
appeal to a broader executive foreign relations power that permits executive agreements
on a comprehensive range of subjects. See, e.g., Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing,
supranote 21, at 178; HENKIN, supra note 1, at 219-24.

341. In international law terminology, this question is phrased as the inquiry as to
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however, the matters on which the executive's argument has
previously relied now point in the opposite direction. The argument
has been developed as follows: (1) because the word "treaty" is not
all-encompassing, there exist a class of agreements outside its reach
(and thus outside the scope of Article II, Section 2 );342(2) because the
power of the traditional eighteenth-century chief executive was
comprehensive as to international agreements, one may posit that the
U.S. President's "executive power" conveyed by Article II, Section 1
is similarly extensive, except as limited (with respect to the
subcategory "treaties") by Article II, Section 2 ; 3 and (3) postconstitutional practice confirms that the U.S. executive was
understood to have independent power to conclude nontreaty
The President's nontreaty power, as an original
agreements.'
matter, depends upon these propositions. Yet each of these points
argues strongly against giving nontreaty agreements the force of law.
A.

The Textual Difficulty

First, consider the textual argument. In Belmont, Justice
Sutherland argued that since treaties had legislative force and since
the term "treaty" was, as a practical matter, used loosely to describe
international agreements generally, one could conclude that all
international agreements had the status of treaties. 345 But this is
because Sutherland also assumed, rather than proving, that the
President had independent power to make international
agreements.' 6 As discussed above, the problem with this assumption
is that the Constitution specifically gives treaty power to the
President-plus-Senate, and, as the authorities adduced by Raoul
Berger show, there seems little doubt that the constitutional
whether the agreement is "self-executing"-as is a treaty by operation of Article II,
Section 2-or "non-self-executing"-meaning that, as is true of treaties in many legal
systems, implementing legislation is required before it has domestic legal force. See
JANIS, supra note 41, at 95-98. I generally avoid this terminology in the subsequent
discussion, since in the domestic terminology of constitutional law we think of
"execution" meaning the enforcement of existing law (e.g., the President's power to
execute the laws). Thus, to avoid confusion, it may be preferable to speak of
"incorporation" of treaty obligations into law, whereas in an international law context it
would be appropriate to say "execution" of treaty obligations as law. But the inquiry is
the same, by whatever name.
342. See supraParts III & IV.
343. See supra Part V.
344. See supra Parts IV.B.3 & V.
345. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (relying on Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) and B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912)).
346. See supraPart II.B.1.
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generation understood Article II, Section 2 to exclude independent
presidential power with respect to treaties 47 From this Berger
concluded (contraSutherland) that the President had no independent
power over any international agreements? 48 As we have further seen,
the executive can escape Berger's conclusion by attacking its central
assumption:
that "treaty" is synonymous with "international
agreement." Once that assumption is defeated, Berger's argument
collapses: though the President has no independent treaty power by
operation of Article II, Section 2, that says nothing about the
President's nontreaty power-and thus Sutherland's view of the
President's power to make international agreements can be
defended.
The difficulty is that this argument depends upon upholding a
firm distinction between "treaties" and "other international
agreements" (thus avoiding Berger's claim based on Article II,
Section 2). That distinction, in turn, is fatal to Belmont's argument
regarding supremacy. The Supremacy Clause encompasses only the
Constitution itself, statutes, and treaties.349 A mushy definition of
"treaty" such as Sutherland used in Belmont can finesse the fact that
nontreaty agreements are not mentioned in Article VI. But once one
is committed to a precise definition of "treaty" as a term of art in
Article II, Section 2, one is effectively driven to a similarly precise
definition in Article VI. And a precise distinction between treaties
and nontreaty agreements excludes the latter from the scope of the
Supremacy Clause. The only recourse is the unpersuasive claim that
"treaty" means one thing in Article II and another in Article VI-the
strained argument for which Berger (in the Article II, Section 2
3 50
context) can be justly criticized.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that Article VI was
viewed as the only mechanism by which treaties became the "law of
the land." Under the Articles of Confederation, there was no
comparable clause, and state governments routinely flouted
347. See Berger, supranote 17, at 37-40.
348. See Berger, supranote 17, at 37.
349. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... ).
350. See supra Part III. As discussed, it is important to the refutation of Berger's
position to argue that the word "treaty" has the same meaning in Article I, Section 10 and
in Article II, Section 2 (since it clearly has a technical meaning in Article I, Section 10).
See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text. Having so argued, it is decidedly
awkward for the executive to next contend, in support of Belmont, that the word "treaty"
in Article VI has a different meaning than the word "treaty" in Articles I and II.
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provisions of federal treaties.3

1

It is almost a clich6 to say that one of

the reasons behind the move to a stronger federal government under
the Constitution was to respond to international complaints about the
United States failing to honor international obligations. 52 Clearly
3
this concern underlay the inclusion of treaties in Article VI.

During the ratification debates, the Supremacy Clause was identified
as the mechanism according treaties the status of superior law and
thus resolving the difficulty of state government noncompliance.
Defenders of the Constitution explained the clause on this ground,
and opponents of the Constitution attacked it on this basis; no one
the text or structure of the
suggested that another mechanism within
3 4
Constitution accomplished such a result.

Similarly, the early courts, in enforcing treaties as the "law of the
land" and preemptive of state law, credited Article VI as the basis for
that power. The 1796 case Ware v. Hylton355 is illustrative. Ware
sued Hylton, a Virginia debtor, on behalf of a British creditor.
Hylton defended on the ground that a Virginia statute, enacted
during the revolution, discharged the debt. The 1783 treaty ending
the revolutionary war had, among other things, agreed that prerevolutionary debts would be honored. The issue was whether the
treaty overrode the state statute.356 In the view of Justice Iredell,
himself a member of the constitutional convention:
[T]he Plaintiff could not have recovered in a Court of
Justice in the State, as the law stood, previous to the
ratification of the present Constitution of the United States.
[T]he stipulation in favour of creditors [in the 1783 treaty],
so as to enable them to bring suits, and recover the full
value of their debts, could not at that time be carried into
351. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 219, at 27-28; STORY, supra note 127, at 686.
Although the Continental Congress asserted that federal treaties overrode inconsistent
state law under the Articles of Confederation, and at least one lower court so held, see
RAKOVE, supra note 219, at 28 (citing Rutgers v. Waddington, 1 Am. State Papers,
Foreign, Bost. Ed. 1819,369,370), that view was not widely credited. See Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 271-72 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (discussing congressional view
and response); STORY, supra note 127, at 686.
352. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 219, at 28; STORY, supranote 127, at 686.
353. See RAKOVE, supranote 219, at 28; STORY, supranote 127, at 686.
354. See MCDONALD, supra note 219, at 196-97 (discussing views of the antifederalists); id. at 202-03 (discussing views of the federalists). On the central importance
of the Supremacy Clause to the structure of the Constitution, see RAKOVE, supra note
219, at 171-77.
355. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
356. See id. at 235.
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effect in any other manner, than by a repeal of the statutes
of the different States, constituting the impediments to their
recovery, and the passing of such other acts as might be
necessary to give the recovery entire efficacy, in execution
of the treaty. 357
Thus, the pre-constitutional system required legislative
implementation of treaties. However, Iredell continued,
The extreme inconveniencies felt from such a system
dictated the remedy which the constitution has now
provided, that "all treaties made or which shall be made
under the authority of the United States, shall be the
Supreme law of the land; and that the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Under this
Constitution therefore, so far as a treaty constitutionally is
binding, upon principles of moral obligation,it is also by the
vigour of its own authority to be executed in fact. It would
not otherwise be the Supreme law ....
31s

As a result of that constitutional clause (and only that particular
clause), the plaintiff in Ware had a valid claim: "The provision [i.e.,
the Supremacy Clause] extends to subsisting as well as to future
treaties. I consider, therefore, that when this constitution was ratified,
the case as to the treaty in question stood upon the same footing, as if
every act constituting an impediment to a creditor's recovery has
been expressly repealed ....359
357. Id. at 271 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (emphasis in original).
358. Id. at 277 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI) (emphasis in original).
359. Id. (emphasis added). Iredell initially delivered this opinion sitting as circuit
justice in the court of appeals. He further concluded that, although the treaty overrode
inconsistent statutes as a general matter, the Virginia law did not constitute a barrier to
recovery of an existing debt within the meaning of the treaty (since Hylton's debt had
been extinguished by law prior to the treaty). The Supreme Court reversed Iredell on the
latter point, holding that the Virginia law did constitute an "impediment" within the
meaning of the treaty. However, the Court reaffirmed Iredell's general view of the status
of treaties. Justice Chase, for example, suggested that prior to ratification of the
Constitution, treaties may have been preemptive of preexisting state law, but continued:
"If doubts could exist before the establishment of the present national government, they
must be entirely removed by the 6th article of the Constitution" for it is "apparent on a
view of this 6th article of the National Constitution ...that the Constitution, or laws, of
any of the States so far as either of them shall be found contrary to [the 1783 treaty] are
by force of the said article,prostrated before the treaty." Id. at 236-37 (opinion of Chase,
J.) (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Cushing, paraphrasing Article VI of the
Constitution, relied on the fact that the treaty had been "sanctioned, in all its parts, by the
Constitution of the United States, as supreme law of the land." Id. at 282 (opinion of
Cushing, J.). Justice Wilson, whose views could be construed as contrary, had nonetheless
elsewhere expressed a view of the Supremacy Clause similar to Iredell's, see infra note
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John Marshall, as Chief Justice, expressed a similar view:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations,
not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself,
the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its
operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by
the sovereign power of the respective parties to the
instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established.
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is consequently, to be regarded in the courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, ... without the aid of

any legislative provision 6
Justice Story's constitutional commentaries are to the same
effect. In discussing the Supremacy Clause, Story identified the two
different views of treaties (as requiring legislative implementation, or
as being part of domestic law of their own force) and identified
Article VI as the mechanism shifting the U.S. practice from the
former to the latter:
In regard to treaties, there is equal reason, why they
should be held, when made, to be the supreme law of the
land.... [T]hey ought to have a positive binding efficacy, as
laws, upon all the states, and all the citizens of the states.
The peace of the nation, and its good faith, and moral
dignity, indispensably require, that all state laws should be
subject to their supremacy.
The difference between
considering them as laws, and considering them as
executory, or executed contracts, is exceedingly important
in the actual administration of public justice. If they are
supreme laws, courts of justice will enforce them directly in
all cases, to which they can be judicially applied, in
opposition to all state laws, as we all know was done in the
case of the British debts secured by the treaty of 1783, after
the constitution was adopted [a reference to Ware v.
371 and accompanying text, and a fifth justice, Patterson, did not address the matter.
Thus there was substantial consensus that the inclusion of "treaties" as a part of supreme
law in Article VI was decisive to the result in Ware. Subsequent citations of Ware read
the case to hold that the supremacy of treaties is established by Article VI. See infra note
361 and accompanying text.
360. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Chirac v. Chirac, 15
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 259, 270-71 (1817) (concluding that the 1778 treaty between the United
States and France became legally effective through the Supremacy Clause upon
ratification of the Constitution); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103,
109 (1801) ("The constitution of the United States declares a treaty to be the supreme law
of the land. Of consequence its obligation on the courts of the United States must be
admitted." (emphasis added)).
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Hylton]. If they are deemed but solemn compacts,
promissory in their nature and obligation, courts of justice
may be embarrassed in enforcing them, and may be
compelled to leave the redress to be administered through
other departments of the government. It is notorious, that
treaty stipulations (especially those of the treaty of 1783)
were grossly disregarded by the states under the [articles of]
confederation. They were deemed by the states, not as
laws, but like requisitions, of mere moral obligation, and
dependent upon the good will of the states for their
execution.... It was probably to obviate this very difficulty,
that this clause [the Supremacy Clause] was inserted in the
constitution; and it would redound to the immortal honour
of its authors, if it had done no more, than thus to bring
treaties within the sanctuary of justice, as laws of supreme
obligation. 6 '
However, if treaties are part of domestic law as a result of the
Supremacy Clause, nontreaty agreements (not encompassed by the
Supremacy Clause, under the argument set forth above) would seem
excluded from domestic law. No constitutional mechanism is
discernible that would have made nontreaty agreements, but not
treaties, part of supreme law. Any mechanism (other than the
Supremacy Clause itself) that made treaties and nontreaty
agreements part of the law of the land would render the Supremacy
Clause surplusage and would render the reasoning of Ware v. Hylton,
as well as the view of the clause expressed in the ratifying debates
and in Story's commentaries, fundamentally misguided. In short, the
importance attached to the Supremacy Clause, and the inability to
identify a mechanism outside the clause that might apply to nontreaty
agreements but not treaties, suggests that once nontreaty agreements
are excluded from the Supremacy Clause they are shown to lack
domestic legal effect.
This view, moreover, comports with the use of the word "treaty"
in Article III, Section 2. Since treaties were made supreme law by
Article VI, it made sense to give jurisdiction over their interpretation
to the federal courts. If executive agreements were also supreme law
(by operation of some provision other than Article VI), they too
should have been included in the jurisdictional grant of Article 111.361
Thus the executive must either concede that an executive agreement
361. STORY, supra note 127, at 685-86 (emphasis added).
362. Cf. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 115, at 468-69 (recording statement of James Wilson to
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that the purpose of granting federal jurisdiction
over treaties in Article III was to secure federal enforcement).
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is a federal law that does not give rise to federal jurisdiction (a
peculiar result), or again resort to the argument that the word
"treaty" has different meanings in different parts of the document.
On the other hand, giving "treaty" a single (limited) meaning in all
four instances in which it is used in the Constitution produces a
sensible reading: nontreaty agreements exist but are not part of
domestic law, and therefore are not part of federal jurisdiction.
As a textual matter, therefore, the executive cannot have it both
ways. The executive must insist on a rigorous and limited definition
of "treaty" to escape the negative implication of Article II, Section 2
and the conventional view during the ratification debates that all
treaties required the approval of President-plus-Senate. But to insist
upon a rigorous and limited definition of "treaty" precludes reliance
on the Supremacy Clause to establish the supremacy of nontreaty
agreements, and no other avenue is available. The textual arguments
establishing a nontreaty power themselves defeat the argument for
nontreaty agreements as domestic law.
B. Pre-ConstitutionalPractice
The foregoing view is confirmed by the most important
precedent available to the founding generation: the English system.
While the royal prerogative encompassed complete control of foreign
relations, including the power to make all international agreements
(treaties and nontreaty agreements alike), 63 agreements made
pursuant to that power had no status as English domestic law unless
implemented by legislation passed in Parliament. As an English
court recently described the longstanding practice:
[T]he Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of
treaties, does not extend to altering the law or conferring
rights upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights
which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention
of Parliament. Treaties, as it is sometimes expressed, are
not self-executing. Quite simply, a treaty is not part of
English law unless and until it has been incorporated into
the law by legislation. 6
363. See supra notes 295-304 and accompanying text.
364. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. v. Australia, 29 I.L.M. 670, 694
(1990) (H.L. 1989). In Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario,
[1937] A.C. 326,347-48, Lord Atkin noted:
[W]ithin the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a
treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail
alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action.... Once
[treaties] are created, while they bind the State as against the other contracting
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As early as 1674, it was held that treaties created no domestic
rights cognizable by English courts. 65 The routine eighteenthcentury practice was to enact implementing legislation. For example,
in the United States the controversial 1794 treaty with Great Britain
(Jay's Treaty) was said to be automatically implemented by the
Supremacy Clause; in Britain the treaty was enacted by Parliament,
and English cases thereafter looked to the implementing legislation
as the basis for enforcement authority.366
Although Parliament rarely refused to enact a treaty (and indeed
was thought to have a moral obligation not to refuse), 67 such refusals
did occur. As recounted by Henry Wheaton, one of the earliest U.S.
writers on international law, the Treaty of Utrecht (establishing
commercial reciprocity between Britain and France) "was never
carried into effect, the British parliament having rejected the bill
which was brought in for the purpose of modifying the existing laws
of trade and navigation so as to adapt them to the stipulations of the
3 68
treaty.
Moreover, Parliament's power in this regard was understood and
taken into account in conducting British foreign policy. The matter
arose most frequently with respect to subsidies. A central feature of
British foreign policy in the eighteenth century was the use of
subsidies to support (or one might say to buy the support of) secondtier European powers such as Portugal and the German and Italian
states. But negotiations with respect to those subsidies were
conducted with an eye to Parliament, for it was understood that the
funds the crown might promise the Portuguese or the Prussians by

parties, Parliament may refuse to perform them and so leave the State in default.
Id. at 347-48 (opinion of Atkin, L.J.); see also The Parlement Beige, [1878-1879] 4 P.D.
129, 154 (Eng.) (concluding that recognition of unenacted treaty as giving rise to legal
rights would be "a use of the treaty-making prerogative of the Crown which I believe to
be without precedent"); JANIS, supra note 41, at 95-96 ("[Mlost other common law
countries deny the very possibility of self-execution; that is, they do not permit treaties to
take effect in their municipal legal systems without legislative enactment.").
365. See Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Chancery 1674).
366. See Act of 37 Geo. 3, ch. 97, 41 Stat. 320 (1796); Sutton v. Sutton, 39 Eng. Rep.
255,259 (Chancery 1830). To the same effect is In re Besset, 1 New Sess. Cas. 337,341-42
(Q.B. 1844), which involved the 1843 extradition treaty between Britain and France, and
the English statute enacting it, 6 & 7 Vict., ch. 75(a) (1843). In Besset, the court looked
only to the statute, not the treaty, and stated: "We have not any power over the prisoner
...but that which the late act of Parliament has conferred.... We have not any power
but under this statute." Id.
367. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,273 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
368. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 188 (1836) (De Capo
reprint 1972).
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treaty could be delivered only with parliamentary approval.3 69 The
entry into an international accord did not alter the ordinary
mechanisms for approving expenditures under English law.3 70
This feature of English law was generally understood in the
United States. James Wilson observed:
In England, if the king and his ministers find themselves ...
to be embarrassed because an existing law is not repealed,
or a new law is not enacted, they give notice to the
legislature of their situation, and inform them that it will be
necessary, before the treaty371 can operate, that some law be
repealed, or some be made.

Patrick Henry, in objecting to the scope of the Supremacy Clause,
argued that "[t]reaties rest ... on the laws and usages of nations. To
say that they are municipal [i.e., that they take effect as domestic law]
is to me a doctrine totally novel. To make them paramount to the
''372
Constitution and laws of the states, is unprecedented.
369. See JEREMY BLACK, BRrITSH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE'75-89

(1985).
370. The issue of monetary support of a treaty has an instructive sequel in U.S.
practice. After the Jay Treaty was approved by the Senate, it remained for Congress to
appropriate money for certain aspects of it. The pro-treaty faction argued that Congress
was bound to make the appropriation by the Supremacy Clause; the antitreaty party
relied on the above-cited English practice to say that treaty appropriations were
discretionary to the legislature. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. In short,
each side was fully cognizant of English practice, and the issue was whether the
Supremacy Clause changed it.
371. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 115, at 506-07 (statement of James Wilson to the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention). Wilson further suggested, perhaps disingenuously,
that this practice would be largely continued under the Constitution, at least to the extent
of giving the House some involvement in treaty implementation.
372. 3 id. at 500 (statement of Patrick Henry to the Virginia ratifying convention).
Henry adduced English practice as evidence of his view that the Supremacy Clause was
"a doctrine totally novel." 3 id. at 502-03. The ratifying debates are at times quite
confused in their citation of English practice. Opponents of the Constitution, for
example, at times asserted that Parliament had the right to ratify treaties'(a point clearly
not accurate except perhaps with respect to treaties ceding English territory); defenders
replied, citing Blackstone, that the crown's power to enter into international agreements
was unqualified (correct)-and at times went on to suggest (perhaps disingenuously) that
by virtue of this power, treaties in England were part of supreme law in the sense that
they displaced existing law of their own force. But when compelled to address specifics, it
seems clear that in general the federalists also understood the English system, although
they were reluctant to make that plain. For example, Francis Corbin, a Virginia
federalist, when challenged to give an example of an English treaty being supreme law,
argued that the 1783 peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain had given
the United States the right of access to the Newfoundland fisheries, and although that
right had not been ratified by the English Parliament or enacted into English law, no one
doubted that it was a valid right. That of course was true, as the crown would not have
needed Parliament's accession to such an agreement, but it does not demonstrate that
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Subsequently, Iredell in Ware described English practice as follows:
The King of Great Britain certainly represents the
sovereignty of the whole nation, as to foreign
negociations ....
His power, as to declaring war and
making peace, is as unlimited as the respective authorities
for those purposes in the United States.-The whole nation
of Great Britain speaks as effectually, and as completely
through him, as all the people of the United States can now
speak through Congress, as to a declaration of war, or
through the President and Senate as to the making of peace
....

Yet, I believe it is an invariable practice in that

country, when the King makes any stipulation of a
legislative nature, that it is carried into effect by an act of
Parliament. The Parliament is considered as bound, upon a
principle of moral obligation, to preserve the public faith,
pledged by the treaty, by passing such laws as its obligation
requires; but until such laws are passed, the system of law,
entitled to actualobedience, remains de facto, as before.37 3
English practice is damaging to the executive's argument for two
reasons. First, it confirms the role of the Supremacy Clause as
changing existing practice as to treaties-and since the Supremacy
Clause does not cover nontreaty agreements, one may conclude that,
as to them, the prior practice continued.
More critically,
identification of the nontreaty power with the U.S. President in the
original understanding depends upon a Hamiltonian construction of
the executive power as including the foreign policy prerogatives of a
English treaties were self-executing, as the right in question did not involve a matter
governed by parliamentary law. On the other hand, Corbin acknowledged that "a
commercial treaty [in England] must be submitted to the consideration of Parliament,
because such treaties will render it necessary to alter some laws, add new clauses to some,
and repeal others." 3 id. at 511. Similarly, Madison asked rhetorically, "Would it not be
constituted a dangerous principle in the British government were the king to have the
same power in internal regulation as he has in the external business of treaties?" 3 id. at
515.
373. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 273-74 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (final
emphasis added). Iredell cited the example of a commercial treaty between Britain and
France signed in 1786, which purported to establish duties on certain imports, and in
execution of which the King requested (and the Parliament enacted) implementing
legislation adjusting the tariff; Iredell concluded that:
[N]o man living will say that a bare proclamation of the King, upon the ground
of the treaty, would be an authority for the levying of any duties whatever; but it
must be done in the constitutionalmode, by act of parliament, which affords an
additional proof, that where any thing of a legislative nature is in contemplation,
it is constantly implied and understood, (without express words) that it can alone
be effected by the medium of the legislative authority.
Id. at 275.
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traditional chief executive (most evidently, the English crown). 374
Yet the foreign policy prerogatives of the English crown did not
include the power to supersede existing domestic law by international
agreement. In claiming that power in Belmont, the executive sought
a power greater than that possessed by George HI. That is doubly
problematic. First, it requires an interpretation of the Executive
Vesting Clause more expansive than any claimed by Hamilton (or
any other executive advocate of the constitutional generation).
Hamilton, famously the exponent of the strong executive, identified
the executive power as that possessed by the traditional executive
under English theory, less that (such as war and treaty power)
specifically given to other branches by the Constitution. 7 Even in
this view, Hamilton was strongly opposed by other prominent
members of the constitutional generation?76 Yet a defense of
Belmont power requires the President to claim more than the
traditional chief executive possessed.
It is, moreover, inconsistent with the general view of executive
power at the time to think powers greater than the royal prerogative
were intended to be conveyed to the President. To the contrary, the
constitutional generation, including Hamilton, sought to reduce the
royal prerogative (particularly in foreign affairs) by distributing
aspects of it to other branches. 77 This approach was driven by a
substantial suspicion of executive authority, which arose from
practical experiences with the overreaching of George III.37 That
does not necessarily show that no expansion upon any axis was
intended, but it does make it difficult to believe that the Constitution
would have been understood implicitly to grant to the President
powers greater than the royal prerogative, or that this grant would
not have been remarked upon.
C. Post-ConstitutionalPractice
The view that executive agreements lack the status of law is
further confirmed by post-constitutional practice. An important
element in the case for executive nontreaty power is postconstitutional practice: in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, Presidents exercised without objection an independent
374. See supra Part V.
375. See supra note 318.
376. See supra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
377. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 379-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaak Kramnick
ed., Penguin Books 1987).
378. See supra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
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power to enter into minor or temporary understandings with foreign
nations. This confirms the constitutional understanding that the
procedure of Article II, Section 2 did not extend to the entire
universe of international agreements.379
On the subject of domestic legal effect, however, this element of
the case likewise turns against the executive. None of the pre-Civil
War claims settlements concluded by independent executive action
had any effect on domestic law.3 80 There is, in other words, no
historical support for self-executing claims settlements; it appears
that the first assertion of the domestic legal effect of a settlement
agreement was made in Belmont in 1937. The record with respect to
nontreaty agreements other than claims settlements is similar. As
indicated above, there were relatively few of these in the nineteenth
century. No legislative effect appears to have been claimed for any
of them prior to 1870, more than eighty years after ratification,38 ' and
no such agreement was actually held to have legislative effect prior to
the decision in Belmont.
Most nontreaty agreements concluded in the pre-Civil War
period did not require implementation into domestic law, as they
379. See supra Part III.D.
380. All of the claims in question were directed against the government of a foreign
nation. Under the holding of Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 116,
122-24 (1812), foreign governments had immunity from suit in U.S. court. Thus the only
remedy available was through discretionary diplomatic channels; once the United States
agreed, through the settlement agreement, not to pursue such claims beyond a certain
compromise, the claimant's recourse was entirely foreclosed without resort to any change
in the domestic legal regime. One possible exception is the 1839 Netherlands Claims
Settlement, see supra note 180, 4 Miller 179, an executive agreement by which the United
States agreed to assume future claims against the Netherlands with respect to a particular
incident. This agreement does appear to give rights to foreign parties. However, these
rights could not have been vindicated in U.S. court because the United States would have
had sovereign immunity against such a claim. See United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (1 Pet.)
436, 444 (1834). In any event, no one ever claimed that this agreement attained the status
of domestic law.
381. In that year the Washington territorial court apparently concluded (in dicta) that
a nontreaty agreement might supersede federal law (although it further concluded that
the agreement in question-the 1859 agreement regarding joint occupation of San Juan
Island-did not have that effect). See Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 293-95
(1870) (discussing the San Juan Island Agreement, supra note 202, 8 Miller 281). In the
course of litigation, the United States pressed the argument that the agreement regarding
San Juan Island displaced the jurisdictional authority of the Territory (which was
conveyed by an act of Congress). See id. at 296. This appears to be the first assertion that
an executive agreement could displace existing law (although since made by a local U.S.
attorney in response to a technical jurisdictional argument of a criminal defendant, its
philosophical basis may be doubted). The territorial court ruled against the United States
on the facts, but concluded that executive agreements might have that effect under certain
circumstances. See id. at 299-300.
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involved matters beyond the cognizance of domestic law. However,
one variety of executive agreement did require domestic effect: the
postal agreements. These agreements established postal rates and
imposed obligations on U.S. post offices. They, unlike almost all
other pre-Civil War executive agreements, were approved by acts of
Congress." Of course, it could be argued that the relevant parties
believed (1) that these agreements were "treaties" and (2) that
approval by Congress constituted a constitutional alternative to
approval by the Senate under Article II. But, as discussed above,
that interpretation has some difficulties.3 83 A more plausible view is
that the postal agreements were thought to be within the class of
unimportant agreements that might be concluded on independent
presidential authority, but that they required congressional
authorization to take effect within the domestic legal system. That
would explain why they (and essentially no other executive
agreements during the relevant period) were approved by the
legislative branch. 8
Thus there is no pre-Civil War practice of giving legislative
stature to nontreaty agreements. To the extent the executive
argument for nontreaty power rests upon historical practice to inform
original understanding, the legislative effect of such agreements
remains unsustained.
D. PracticalConsiderations
The principal objection to excluding nontreaty agreements from
the "law of the land" is that it makes little sense (and indeed is
diplomatically self-destructive) to afford the President some power to
conclude international agreements yet deny legislative effect to those
agreements. The result may well be an inability to carry out
international obligations (which are no less obligatory in
382 See, e.g., Act of Feb. 27, 1861, ch. 57, 12 Stat. 151 (1861); Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch.
7, 1 Stat. 232 (1792).
383. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
384. The view of executive agreements as non-legislative in effect is, moreover,
consistent with the codification practice of the early nineteenth century. Article II
treaties were published as part of the statutes-at-large. See 11 Stat. 573-749 (1859) (citing
various treaties); 8 Stat. 6-613 (1846) (citing various treaties). That, of course, is
consistent with a view of treaties as equivalent to enacted law. Executive agreements, on
the other hand, were not published (and indeed typically were not even publicly
proclaimed). See 8 Stat. at ix-xii (containing index entitled "List of the Treaties Between
the United States and Foreign Nations" reflecting no executive agreements). This
practice would be peculiar if executive agreements were thought (like treaties) to be
equivalent to enacted law; but it would be quite normal if executive agreements lacked
such status.
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international law despite domestic barriers to implementation)?8 5
Indeed, this result is precisely the problem that the constitutional
generation confronted (and that the Supremacy Clause resolved)
with respect to treaties. 6 Is it therefore plausible, one might ask,
whether the difficulty was not similarly recognized and resolved with
respect to nontreaty agreements?
Several responses may be made to this objection. First, the issue
may not have been thought of great importance; nontreaty
agreements (such as the truces mentioned by Wolff and Grotius) less
often require implementation as domestic law. Indeed, most of the
nontreaty agreements actually concluded during the pre-Civil War
period did not require any domestic implementation. 8 Moreover,
were a change in law required, it could have been accomplished
through Congress (which assuredly was understood to have the
power to legislate as would be "necessary and proper" to effectuate
executive agreements)? 8 As a result, nontreaty agreements were not
less capable of implementation than treaties. Just as a President
negotiating a treaty would need to be mindful of the need to secure
Senate ratification, a President negotiating a nontreaty agreement
would need to be mindful (if domestic effect would be necessary) of
the need for implementing legislation in Congress. In addition, the
English practice-which created precisely this division between
domestic and international obligations-was familiar to the
constitutional generation and was not subject to widespread
theoretical objections or practical difficulties. 9 Indeed, that system
was retained in the United States at least with respect to
international obligations requiring appropriations: the executive (or
executive-plus-Senate) can enter into a fully binding international
agreement that nonetheless cannot be implemented as a domestic
matter without action by Congress as a whole. 30 There is no reason
to think that the drafters of the Constitution eschewed a system in
which international obligations might depend upon legislative
implementation. The problem with the Articles of Confederation
385. See JANIS, supra note 41, at 83-84 (stating that a state cannot excuse compliance
with international law obligations on the basis of domestic legal constraints).
386. See RAKOVE, supra note 219, at 27 (noting that the critical difficulty of
treatymaking under the Articles of Confederation was that it "placed Congress in the
awkward position of guaranteeing what it lacked the constitutional authority to deliver").
387. See supra Part III.D.
388. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
389. See supraPart VI.B.
390. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (requiring congressional approval of
appropriations).
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was not that international obligations required legislative
enforcement (true also in England) but that, because of the narrow
grant of power to the Congress (and the lack of federal courts), there
was (quite unlike England) no federal legislative power to implement
international obligations at a national level.391
Put another way, the ordinary path (in pre-constitutional
thinking) by which to make international obligations part of domestic
law was by majority vote of the whole of the legislature. This was the
English system. The Articles of Confederation adopted this system
but relied upon the states for legislative implementation (which the
states failed to provide).3 9 The Constitution shifted the power of
implementation to the federal government and deviated from the
ordinary English practice with respect to treaties to require a
supermajority vote of part of the legislature for, in effect,
implementation. But this approach is not a reason to imply any
intent to dispense with legislative participation altogether with
respect to nontreaty agreements; it seems more likely that, with
respect to these agreements, the Constitution retained the customary
practice of implementation by a majority of the legislature.
Nor does subsequent history suggest that this is an unworkable
system. The principal reasons why congressional implementation
might be thought ill-advised (aside from Congress's disapproval of
presidential action) are that (1) executive agreements are too
numerous and unimportant to warrant Congress's attention and (2)
executive agreements may need to be concluded too quickly to allow
congressional participation. Neither objection seems substantial.
With respect to the first point, even in modem practice the number
legislative
that would require
agreements
of executive
In 1933, for example, the Litvinov
implementation is small.
Agreement was the only executive agreement concluded by the
President for which domestic effect was claimed; there was no
practical reason why President Roosevelt could not have submitted it
to Congress for implementation. 393 The second argument seems
more properly directed against the allocation of the treaty power,
391. Cf. supra note 386 (discussing Congress's lack of authority to carry out its
international obligations under the Articles of Confederation).
392. See supranote 386.
393. Of course, Congress might have declined to implement it (particularly in light of
then-existing popular suspicion of the Soviet Union). Perhaps Congress should not have
the power to block such an accord. But this argument is about allocation of power, not
about practicalities. There is no reason to suppose that, merely because we think power
should be allocated one way, the constitutional generation did not adopt another, equally
viable, approach.
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rather than the domestic effect of the nontreaty power. As argued
above, the sine qua non of the nontreaty power is that the resultant
agreement not be of long-term importance. Essentially by definition,
it is unlikely that a situation will arise in which implementation of an
executive agreement is so critical that Congress would not have time
to consider it. A matter of such importance would entail a treaty,
rather than an executive agreement. True, that may suggest an
argument that the President should have some "emergency" treaty
power independent of the Senate. That argument, however, seems to
have been decisively rejected by the constitutional generation
(whatever we may think of it in light of modem circumstances). In
any event, it is not an argument for legislative effect of executive
agreements (which should not concern important matters).
Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the system which appears to
be adopted by the Constitution is so irrational in practice as to
suggest an alternative interpretation.
As a result, the executive is undone by the executive's own
argument. The constitutional existence of presidential nontreaty
power depends upon a narrow definition of the word "treaty,"
identification of "executive power" as granted in Article II with the
foreign relations prerogatives of the English crown, and confirmation
by unremarked historical practice. But each of these arguments cuts
against giving legislative effect to nontreaty agreements. A strict
definition of "treaty" forecloses reliance upon the Supremacy Clause,
the only textually apparent avenue for achieving independent
domestic legal effect. The royal prerogative did not contain a power
to incorporate international agreements into domestic law, and thus
the Hamiltonian argument-that the President succeeded to
prerogative powers in foreign affairs where the Constitution is
otherwise silent-cannot support an assertion of such a power.
Finally, there is no historical evidence of the exercise of this power in
the post-constitutional period. It therefore seems, as an original
matter, that Belmont was simply wrong: the President may have had
the power to conclude undertakings such as the Litvinov
Agreement,3 94 but that agreement would have provided no source of
394. Or at least the part of it relevant to Belmont. In accepting the assignment of the
Soviet claims in return for recognition, the President did not commit the United States to
any continuing obligation (since the extension of recognition was, in Vattel's terminology,
fully executed by a single act); the President did not commit to continue the recognition
indefinitely, nor to actually collect upon the Soviet claims. Other parts of the
agreement-specifically the waiving of U.S. claims against the Soviet Union-may or may
not have been within the original nontreaty power.
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rights in U.S. law until it was (as it presumably could have been)
enacted by Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION (AND REFLECTIONS ON MODERN PRACTICE)

The modem executive agreement power remains underexamined perhaps because, from a conventional perspective, it is a
bit of a constitutional embarrassment. On the one hand, requiring
approval of every international understanding through the
cumbersome supermajority procedure of Article II, Section 2 seems
fatally inconsistent with modem diplomatic practice. At minimum,
as political scientist Joseph Kallenbach has argued, modem practice
depends upon "numerous understandings and arrangements worked
out at lower diplomatic levels in the course of resolving relatively
[including] for example, the particular manner
minor questions ...
and
or immigration laws
of customs
of enforcement
regulations...."3 95 An inflexible adherence to the exclusivity of
Article II, Section 2-as demanded by the conventional originalist
reading 96 -seems largely irrelevant to any nontheoretical debate
concerning appropriate diplomatic conduct.
On the other hand, once constitutional constraints are relaxed in
the interest of practicality, the limits of that flexibility become
difficult to discern. Kallenbach, for one, largely abandons the pursuit
of constitutional limitations, trusting instead the realities of the
political process to constrain executive action.3 97 The result has been
that diplomatic initiatives of considerable magnitude are
accomplished through independent executive agreements when
exigency, convenience, or congressional opposition make the Article
II, Section 2 procedures appear burdensome.398 Moreover, giving
executive agreements equal status with treaties constitutes them as
supreme law of the land-thus affording the President an
independent lawmaking ability. 99 Yet if used too widely, or
recognized too openly, these powers subvert the constitutional
design, which envisions a checking function for the Senate 4 'a to
preclude unwise international commitments and a checking function

395. KALLENBACH, supra note 215, at 502.
396. See Adler, supra note 17, at 27-32; Berger, supra note 17, at 35-48.
397. See KALLENBACH, supra note 215, at 501-05; cf. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 222
(arguing that there must be some limits on the executive agreement power but concluding
that they remain unidentified at present).
398. See, for example, the agreements set forth in supra notes 8-12.
399. See HENKiN, supra note 1, at 228.
400. Or, perhaps, Congress. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 6, at 801-05.
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for Congress (or the Senate in the case of Article II treaties) to
preclude inappropriate creation or extinguishment of domestic legal
rights. We thus have an uneasy constitutional compromise: the
President is liberated from the constraints of Article II, Section 2 as a
practical necessity (else the everyday business of modern diplomacy
simply could not be conducted), and we trust that political constraints
will, in substitution, prevent the President from using this liberation
to become a wholly unconstrained diplomatic actor.
This article has argued that, as an original matter, the foregoing
is a false difficulty. The original design did not have the inflexibility
claimed for it. Because the terminology of the founding generation
recognized a class of international agreements in addition to
"treaties," the approval process designated for "treaties" in Article
II, Section 2 did not extend to all international understandings. 40 1
Rather, as argued above, minor, temporary agreements were not
included. If one further accepts the President as the repository of
residual unallocated foreign relations power (by operation of Article
II, Section 1)40 the President is thus afforded power over these minor
agreements.
This reading mitigates the practical difficulty of the ordinary
conduct of low-level diplomatic relations: the "arrangements worked
out at lower diplomatic levels in the course of resolving relatively
minor diplomatic questions" 3 that worried Kallenbach would almost
assuredly fall within the President's independent power. For
example, the principal such arrangement in early diplomatic
practice-the settlement of private claims-was accomplished,
without constitutional objection, through the President's independent
authority.'
As set forth in this Article, attention to the original design allows
recognition of this practical power without permitting material,
unchecked presidential authority contrary to the purpose of Article
II, Section 2. First, as discussed above, the original view of the
nontreaty power can only be read to extend to minor and temporary
(or nonexecutory) agreements. This reading is, in fact, generally
consistent with usual modern practice. Most modem independent
executive agreements are of this nature, and, despite broad
theoretical assertions of executive power, State Department

401.
402.
403.
404.

See supra Parts II & IV.
See supra Part V.
KALLENBACH, supra note 215, at 502.
See supra Part II.D.
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guidelines for choosing between treaties and nontreaty agreements

generally have suggested that minor temporary agreements may be
concluded on the President's independent authority while
agreements of greater magnitude require Senate (or congressional)
acquiescence. 5 It is often assumed that modem practice represents
a deviation from (or, if one prefers, an evolution of) the original
design, extending to the President a power necessary in light of
modem realities upon which the original Constitution gave no

guidance. This assumption, I suggest, we have been too quick to
accept: the nontreaty power, in a form similar to that ordinarily
exercised today, can be defended on the basis of an original reading

of the Constitution.46
The difficulty in modem practice is, instead, that the ordinary

exercise of the nontreaty power in nonmaterial matters has been used
to justify less frequent, yet diplomatically significant, extraordinary
exercises of that power. Dames & Moore is illustrative. 4° The
agreements at issue (the Algiers Declarations) bound the United

States to establish jointly with Iran an arbitral tribunal, submit the
claims of its citizens to that tribunal, prosecute them according to its
405. See, e.g., State Department Circularto All Diplomatic Posts Concerning Criteria
for Deciding what Constitutes an International Agreement, reprinted in MICHAEL
GLENNON & THOMAS FRANCK, 1 FOREIGN RELAnONS LAW 14 (1980); Department of
State CircularNo. 175, reprintedin 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784,784 (1956).
406. Some more substantial executive agreements may also be justifiable under the
original design. The word "treaty" in the original understanding seemed to encompass
agreements that entailed a long-term surrender of sovereignty. A number of subsequent
controversial executive agreements may not fit this category. Consider two examples.
First, under President Roosevelt's "destroyers for bases" arrangement in 1940, the United
States agreed to send several "over-age" destroyers to the British navy for use in World
War II, in return for the option to lease various British bases in the Western Hemisphere.
See supra note 10. Professor Borchard, among others, criticized this procedure for
circumventing the requirements of Article II, Section 2. See Edwin Borchard, The
Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 AM. J.
INT'L L. 690, 690-97 (1940). In light of the foregoing discussion, it is not clear that
Borchard was correct. The principal U.S. obligation-delivery of the destroyers-was
accomplished immediately upon signature of the agreement. The ongoing obligationmaking the bases available-fell only upon Britain. From the U.S. perspective, the
agreement was fully performed immediately, so arguably it did not amount to an ongoing
surrender of sovereignty which would need to be reflected in a "treaty." Thus it may,
even under the original understanding, be defensible as an exercise of the President's
nontreaty power. A similar argument can be made for the central provisions of the
Litvinov Agreement upheld in Pink and Belmont. See supra note 9. The principal U.S.
obligation-extension of diplomatic recognition-lay within the President's independent
authority and was accomplished upon signature. Again, from the U.S. perspective no
material executory obligations were undertaken. Thus, it may have been permissible to
accomplish the understanding through a nontreaty agreement.
407. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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procedures, and accept the ultimate result." 8 These are material
nonexecutory obligations that, under the original design, likely would
not have been included within the nontreaty power.409 In upholding
the agreement, the Court looked to the historical practice and
practicalities of the ordinary exercise of the nontreaty power. If one
assumes-as the Court seemed to-that this ordinary exercise is itself
a departure from the original design, it is less easy to identify a
difference of constitutional magnitude between those ordinary
agreements and the one at issue in Dames & Moore. An
understanding of the original nontreaty power, on the other hand,
reveals that the agreement in Dames & Moore, but not the usual
diplomatic practice, was a departure from the original design. Thus
the Algiers Declarations needed to be justified on some
extraordinary ground and not merely by reference to a supposed
general relaxation of constitutional restrictions.4 t0
Second, I have argued that a material (and heretofore largely
unrecognized) limitation upon the nontreaty power under the
original design is that nontreaty agreements lack legislative effect.
Modem practice generally assumes (and the Court has confirmed)
that an executive agreement has legislative effect in the manner of a
treaty under Article VI. 41n That assumption is, I suggest, an

408. See id. at 664-66.
409. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
410. Viewed in isolation, the Algiers Declarations may be thought a poor case for
deviation from the Article II, Section 2 procedures. There was no serious argument that
the Senate would not have had time to consider the agreement, and there is no material
indication that the Senate would not have approved it. Similar arguments can be made
with respect to other extraordinary nontreaty agreements. This is particularly true of the
Yalta Agreement, which (among other matters) essentially gave U.S. approval of Soviet
post-war preeminence in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. See Yalta Agreement, supra
note 11. The only real reason for bypassing the Senate -wasthat the President wished to
pursue an independent foreign policy without senatorial oversight; this approach was
justified by reference to the ordinary practice of nontreaty agreements, but would have
been quite difficult to justify in isolation (other than by a frontal attack on the
constitutional design reflected in Article II, Section 2). Assuming the Yalta Agreement is
seen as an ongoing commitment, it evidently amounts to an executory obligation of
considerable importance. The advisability of Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin at Yalta
has, of course, been widely and inconclusively debated. The merits of this debate are
immaterial to the present inquiry. The point is, rather, that an agreement of this
importance-by which Roosevelt bound the Cold War diplomacy of succeeding
administrations-under the original design should have been subject to the check of the
Senate. True, the Senate might well not have approved, and thus Roosevelt might not
have been able to secure full Soviet cooperation in the closing part of the war. That
possibility, however, is precisely the point of the original design: this was a decision
which, the constitutional generation believed, one person should not make alone.
411. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 228.
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outgrowth of the modem assumptions about the nontreaty power in
general. If the nontreaty power itself is thought to be an evolution
from constitutional understanding not grounded in the original
document, there may be reason for a similar evolution of the
legislative effect of nontreaty agreements-so this effect is granted to
treaties and to the other types of international agreements that have
evolved. In short, our assumption that nontreaty agreements are not
part of the original understanding has made us (quite naturally)
indifferent to the original understanding of their legislative effect;
that effect would of course not have been in the contemplation of a
generation that did not recognize nontreaty agreements in the first
place. However, if we accept that nontreaty agreements were part of
the original design (as I have argued), we are (again quite naturally)
drawn to examine whether such agreements were, in the original
design, accorded legislative effect. As argued above, they were not.
Given the historical and textual evidence, it is essentially impossible
to describe a consistent argument that sustains both the existence and
the legislative effect of nontreaty agreements; the evidence in support
of the former directly refutes the latter.412
This important limitation further reconciles the nontreaty power,
as originally understood, with the general constitutional purpose of
checking executive power in foreign affairs. The dispute in Belmont
is illustrative. Belmont posed two questions: whether the Litvinov
Agreement was a constitutional exercise of presidential power, and,
if so, whether it preempted New York law. As to the first, at least the
components of the Agreement at issue in Belmont seem to fall within
the original conception of the nontreaty power. Answering the initial
Belmont question in the affirmative does not lead to a material
imbalance in the conduct of foreign affairs: the President, in making
the Agreement, did not commit the United States to a material
course of action (other than what could have been accomplished by
presidential policymaking outside the context of an agreement).
In contrast, the President's decision to enforce the Soviet claims
as a matter of U.S. law was an assertion of presidential lawmaking
authority deviating from usual constitutional procedures: in the
ordinary case, the Constitution imposes its checking design upon
lawmaking, so that laws do not represent the decree of a single
person. Roosevelt's independent enforcement of the Litvinov
Agreement-and the Supreme Court's approval of that enforcement
in Pink and Belmont-seem contrary to that design. It is this element
412. See supra Part VI.
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of Belmont that makes it particularly powerful and particularly
problematic.
Thus the modem difficulties with executive agreements arise
from a misperception of the original design. The constitutional
generation recognized that "treaties" did not include all international
agreements. In drafting Article II, Section 2, they could have said
that "treaties and other international agreements" required
supermajority Senate consent-but they were concerned in particular
with the sovereignty-limiting role of treaties, and did not include the
less-important "other agreements." This constitutional design left
the President with the flexibility of the "nontreaty" power to conduct
ordinary low-level diplomacy. Similarly, Article VI could have been
drafted to say that "treaties and other internationalagreements" were
supreme law of the land. To do so, however, would have created an
independent presidential lawmaking authority; treaties, but not the
other agreements, were to be concluded with legislative participation.
By omitting the "other agreements" from Article VI, the framers
assured that presidential lawmaking by executive agreement would
require legislative participation.
Thus the constitutional design is both simple and practical: the
President has independent authority to enter minor agreements in
order to conduct routine affairs-a power little open to abuse-but a
legislative check is required, either through the Senate or Congress as
a whole, if the President wishes to undertake a material long-term
obligation or alter domestic law.

